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ABSTRACT

FICTIONS OF THE GIFT: GENEROSITY, OBLIGATION, AND ECONOMY
IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND
Cynthia J. Klekar
Fictions of the Gift: Generosity, Obligation, and Economy in
Eighteenth-Century English Literature examines the relationship
between generosity, obligation, economy, and the gift in
eighteenth-century English literature and culture. The central
inquiry of the project investigates the paradoxical nature of the
gift and ways in which the politics of a gift economy informed
both practical and symbolic relations of domination in the
period. Given the widespread nature of the language of the gift
in the period, I concentrate on cultural texts and eighteenthcentury novels to demonstrate the work of the gift within a
number of eighteenth-century institutions, such as international
trade, diplomacy, property, marriage, and the family. By
analyzing representations of gift economies in social and
literary texts, such as Lord George Macartney’s China journal,
Daniel Defoe’s Roxana, Henry Fielding’s Tom Jones, and Frances
Burney’s Cecilia, I demonstrate how the fiction of the
disinterested gift underwrites a number of the period’s social
and economic concerns. Drawing on the work of Marcel Mauss,
George Bataille, Pierre Bourdieu, Jacques Derrida, and Marshal
Sahlins, I locate a specific ideology of the gift during the
eighteenth century. The gift serves an ideological purpose
specific to the eighteenth century and emerges as a way to
ameliorate the conflicts that arose as the patronage system waned
and capitalism and individualism became more prominent and
seemingly threatened socioeconomic hierarchies. In this respect,
the gift becomes a way to maintain relations of domination in a
period in which forms of domination were being challenged and
changed. Although eighteenth-century texts do not represent a
gift economy as the primary system of exchange or acquisition of
wealth, the language of the gift nevertheless is adopted
simultaneously to disguise and to describe the harsh realities of
profit, obligation, and domination by depicting a symbolic
exchange of loss. The gift enacts the affective bonds of the
patronage system–-of equal and mutual favor and return–-but
paradoxically functions to mask the amorality of self-interest
and manipulation. The narrative of the gift in the eighteenth
century substitutes for the explicit relations of competitive
capitalist exchange an implicit and seemingly disinterested ethos
of mutual benefit.
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CHAPTER ONE
Gifts, Obligation, and Economy
in the “Age of Benevolence”
I.

In the closing act of Congreve’s The Way of the World, Mrs.
Fainall presents a “gift of deed” to Mirabell, and enacts an
important transition within the rhetoric of gift-giving from an
ethos of aristocratic patronage to a complex and on-going
negotiation of value.1 This exchange is emblematic of the
continual and often problematic transformation of social values
in the eighteenth century. In this dramatic moment, Fainall, who
represents an economy of honor and patronage (he has married both
for money and to blackmail Lady Wishfort to hand over more), is
displaced by Mirabell, who represents the new economy based on a
utilitarian ethic of mutual exchange and contractual obligation.2
Thus, in the presentation of the gift, the play dramatizes the
emerging legitimacy of contractual relations underpinning social
authority and economic power, as well as Mirabell’s skill in
using his emotional and gender-based power over Mrs. Fainall, his

1

William Congreve, The Way of the World, ed. Brice Harris, Restoration Plays, (New York, NY: The
Modern Library, 1953) 592.
2

The complexities of social and economic transition dramatized in The Way of the World are discussed in
further detail by Richard Braverman, “Capital Relations and The Way of the World,” ELH 52.1 (1985): 133-58.
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former mistress, to prosper in his efforts to marry Millamant.
The hero’s ultimate control of interpersonal and legal
relationships is cast in a language of gift, debt, and obligation
that becomes increasingly important later in the eighteenth
century. The gift of deed that Mrs. Fainall signs over to
Mirabell is indeed in the form of a “gift” that both invokes
obligations and is the product of her obligation to her former
lover. The gift is represented both as property that can be
exchanged and as an embodiment of reciprocity between giver and
receiver. Rather than entailing obligations of honor and service,
the “gift of deed” represents the enactment of capitalist
relations in the form of gift exchange, thereby concealing the
negotiation process and the power relations bolstered by the
exchange. Significantly, Congreve leaves the audience in the dark
about the existence of Mrs. Fainall’s gift of deed to her former
lover until Act 5. What seems to be a Machiavellian strategy on
Fainall’s part has been rendered irrelevant from before the start
of the play because Mrs. Fainall’s “gift” both empowers Mirabell
and effectively compels her to aid him in his designs on
Millamant. In this sense, Fainall’s impotence emphasizes the fall
of courtly obligation and the rise of capital relations. This
scene and the play overall mark an acknowledgment of the shift in
eighteenth-century social, political, and economic conceptions of
debt and obligation.

3
I draw on this scene from Congreve’s play in order to
situate the argument of my dissertation historically. My
contention is that the anxieties and conflicts that accompanied
the cultural and economic changes in the period were dealt with,
in literary works, by manipulating the language and practice of
gift economy. As Fainall’s fate suggests, the patronage system in
1700 was succumbing to a competitive, market-based economy.
Fainall relies on a traditional system that regulates the
transmission of landed property–-property follows the legal ties
of marriage and blood. He expects to triumph because he believes
he can coerce both daughter and mother. Mirabell, on the other
hand, represents a system of innovation and status mobility,
consummate with the settlement of 1688 which recognized the
sovereignty of parliament as well as the prerogatives of
property. Thus, the gift exchange permits him to redefine the
terms of an old social order within the context of a new economy.
Mirabell’s new way of looking at the world stresses the
legalization of the prerogative will, the limitations of heroic
and courtly conventions, and the triumph of the legal document
and negotiated settlement. Such negotiations, however, are always
asymmetrical and always reassert unequal distributions of power
and property. The future Mrs. Fainall doesn’t give Mirabell her
estate solely because she loves him; fearing that she is pregnant
with his child, she is coerced by him into marrying “a false and
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designing lover” and signs her gift of deed over to him to
protect the land and her income from her future husband.
In this sense, the asymmetry of gift exchange characterizes
the action of the play: the exchange of women in the play is
disguised by the exchange of gifts, and the commodification of
Mrs. Fainall and Millamant is recast in a language of generosity,
complicity, and love for love. The significance of this scene is
that it recalls a generosity and affective giving that
characterized idealized depictions of the aristocratic patronage
system in medieval and renaissance societies, but in actuality
perpetuates a competitive, market-based system that should
benefit women and the lower classes; however, in actuality the
gift subverts this possibility through a seemingly selfless gift
exchange that creates new relations of obligation and reinforces
traditional ones.

II.
Fictions of the Gift: Generosity, Obligation, and Economy in
Eighteenth-Century English Literature locates a specific ideology
of the gift during the complex transition from a hierarchical
feudal order to one of economic exchange based on credit and
contract.3 The gift serves an ideological purpose specific to the
3

This shift has been documented in a number of ways by a number of critics. For representative examples,
see J.G.A. Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law: English Historical Thought in the Seventeenth
Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957); Pocock, Politics, Language, and Time: Essays on
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eighteenth century and emerges as a way to ameliorate the
conflicts that arose as the patronage system waned and capitalism
and individualism became more prominent and seemingly threatened
socioeconomic hierarchies. In this respect, the gift becomes a
way to maintain relations of domination in a period in which
forms of domination were being challenged and changed. Although
eighteenth-century texts do not represent a gift economy as the
primary system of exchange or acquisition of wealth, the language
of the gift nevertheless is adopted simultaneously to disguise
and to describe the harsh realities of profit, obligation, and
domination by depicting a symbolic exchange of loss. The gift
enacts the affective bonds of the patronage system–-of equal and
mutual favor and return–-but paradoxically functions to further
and mask the amorality of self-interest and manipulation. The
narrative of the gift in the eighteenth century substitutes for
the explicit relations of competitive capitalist exchange an
implicit and seemingly disinterested ethos of mutual benefit.
My dissertation examines the relationship between
generosity, obligation, economy, and the gift in what I argue is
a representation of a masculinist and often exploitative economy
in eighteenth-century English literature. The central inquiry of
the project investigates the paradoxical nature of the gift and

Political Thought and History (New York, NY: Antheneum, 1971); Christopher Hill, Puritism and Revolution
(London: Secker and Warburgh, 1958); and Paul Langford, Public Life and the Propertied Englishman: 16891798 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991).
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the ways in which the politics of a gift economy informed both
practical and symbolic relations of domination in the period.
Given the widespread nature of the language of the gift, I have
chosen to concentrate on several important cultural texts and
eighteenth-century novels to demonstrate the work of the gift
within a number of eighteenth-century institutions, and the
impact of the gift on conceptions of gender and class. I
structure my argument chronologically, moving from an analysis of
public institutions, such as international trade, diplomacy, and
business, to an analysis of private institutions, such as
property, marriage, and the family.
By analyzing representations of gift economies in social and
literary texts, such as Macartney’s China journal, Daniel Defoe’s
Roxana, Henry Fielding’s Tom Jones, and Frances Burney’s Cecilia,
I demonstrate how the fiction of the disinterested gift
underwrites a number of the period’s social and economic
concerns, such as authority, gender, labor, property, and
marriage. I interrogate the assumption that gift exchange
cultivates disinterested personal relations and explore how
seemingly disinterested gestures, like Congreve’s “gift of deed”
in The Way of the World, bolster state, paternal, and filial
authority in the eighteenth century. As England and Europe
experienced profound economic transitions, the gift became a
critical means by which to deflect the emerging confusion about
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origins, value, class, and property. It is my claim that the
discourse of the gift both complicates and promises to work
through these issues. In the literary representations I examine,
the gift is used to transfer property, to disguise business as
diplomacy, to displace notions of consumption and production, and
to suture over the period’s crisis in value, property, gender,
courtship, and marriage. My concerns include also identifying the
justifications for gifts in the period and the strategies used to
valorize gift exchange. The concern in the eighteenth century
with charitable giving, the upper class’ preoccupation with
regulating responsible charity for the protection of the state,
and the exchange of women in marriage, point to a middle- and
upper-class benevolence as the primary agent of a seemingly
disinterested generosity. Although the writers of the period
named theirs’ an “Age of Benevolence,” my dissertation suggests
that an essentially hegemonic and paternal authority over charity
and generosity recasts the period not as the age of benevolence,
but as the age of obligation.4
Therefore, eighteenth-century literary critics must read the
gift in the period not just as part of an on-going dialogue about
social relations, but as a historically specific phenomenon
directly related to the ways in which the period is

4

Eighteenth-century writers who characterize the period as “The Age of Benevolence” and/or discuss the
period’s preoccupation with benevolence include David Hume, Adam Smith, The Earl of Shaftesbury, Henry
Fielding, Daniel Defoe, Frances Hutchinson, Bernard Mandeville, Richard Price, and Jonathan Edwards.
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characterized. An analysis of gift exchange specifically in this
period reopens many debates about the period and its legacy, both
historically and in literary culture. I propose to show that the
conception of the eighteenth century as the age of benevolence is
inaccurate, that the agency women seemed to have gained in the
period is much more limited than normally assumed due to modes of
symbolic domination, and that in this period it is the gift, not
capitalism, that comprises the vocabulary for discussing
political and personal relationships.
Historically, the period embodies the tendency to naturalize
generosity in a way that enables power relations to flourish
ideologically. Politically, morally, and aesthetically,
eighteenth-century culture revolved around the collective
misrecognition of the gift and the power of this misrecognition
to bolster patriarchal authority and vastly unequal
concentrations of wealth. Contemporary discourses of the gift
emerged from state, religious, and private attempts to institute
public charity, attempts to legitimize traditional systems of
authority, and the rise of sentimentality as a marker for moral
superiority. An analysis of the gift and generosity in the
eighteenth century reveals a cultural tendency to disguise in
both the public and private spheres strategies for manipulating
power relations.
The number of charitable institutions founded at this time

9
cloak the period in a rhetoric of benevolence and social
responsibility–-over one hundred societies and institutions were
created in the eighteenth century to support various charities,
schools, hospitals, and almshouses, and to promote specific
reforms. Both political and religious documents emphasized giving
to the poor as a means to deflect personal and moral
responsibility. Clearly, this sudden and widespread interest in
charity was driven by a moral instinct: charity offered an escape
from personal guilt in this life and an escape from punishment in
the afterlife. However, it was also driven by socioeconomic
concerns, and the primary motive behind subscribing to a
charitable institution was more often than not, in many ways,
related to social mediation and authority. Essentially, charity
was seen either as strengthening the nation by providing
subsistence to the poor and opportunities for labor and
production that would ultimately benefit the state, or as an
encouragement to corruption and vice.
The Lying-in hospital and the Foundling hospital used
appeals to social usefulness to attract subscribers. These
charities stressed the number of soldiers, sailors, and laborers
who could be saved and added to the national stock. As Donna
Andrews states, “That charity that did not stress its practical
usefulness, and relied only on disinterested appeals, found it
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much more difficult to attract public aid.”5 For example, the
Lock Hospital did not stress the practical benefits of the
charity but relied on an appeal to the spirit of Christian
charity and thus had far less subscribers. This demonstrates the
intersections between giving and self-interest in the emergence
of public charities. The successful charities also were able to
boast a list of well-known names, famous lords, and important
city politicians, so that they attracted smaller, lesser wellknown subscribers who wished to see their names on the same
lists. Andrews points out that the number of merchant subscribers
was considerably low since they were accustomed to “considering
the security and size of the return” before committing themselves
or their money to an investment.6 Once citizens felt confident
that their money would not be lost or spent recklessly, they
could indulge fully in contributing to charity. While research
supports that most philanthropists did contribute voluntarily,
evidence contradicts the solely disinterested motive seemingly
informing the subscribers’donations.
The substantial amount of studies that examine charity and
benevolence in the eighteenth century fail to interrogate fully

5

Donna T. Andrews, Philanthropy and Police: London Charity in the Eighteenth century (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1989), 71.
6

Ibid, 72.
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the gift beyond a conception of public duty.7 While movements
supporting parish relief and foundling hospitals are well
documented, the gift as a concept within day to day business or
between specific individuals of similar rank and class is glossed
over as a natural human inclination to reaffirm social relations
through symbolic gestures. These seemingly disinterested
exchanges that proliferate in eighteenth-century literature and
culture repeatedly are relegated to an affective realm in direct
opposition to the self-interestedness of capitalism.
In examining a variety of eighteenth-century texts, I draw
on the work of contemporary theorists Georges Bataille, Pierre
Bourdieu, Jacques Derrida, and Marshall Sahlins, who, in
different ways, question the nature and work of the gift. The
debates that characterize their works demand a reexamination of
eighteenth-century England’s commitment to an ethos of
generosity. Novels, diaries, poetry, drama, and political tracts
point to the prevalence and importance of gift relations in
eighteenth-century England, repeatedly demonstrating their
implication in wider disparities of power in English society.
Typically, however, analyses of instrumental gift relations in
industrial or proto-industrial societies, such as England in the

7

For representative studies see Andrews; Beth Fowkes Tobin, Superintending the Poor: Charitable Ladies
and Paternal Landlords in British Fiction 1770-1860 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993); Roy Porter, “The
Gift Relation: Philanthropy and Provincial Hospitals in Eighteenth-century England,” in eds. Lindsay Granshaw
and Roy Porter, The Hospital in History (London: Routledge, 1989), 149-78; and W. K. Jordan, The Charities of
London 1480-1660: The Aspirations and the Achievements of the Urban Society (London: Ruskin House, 1960).
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eighteenth century, have focused on charitable donations rather
than on economic and social exchange more broadly, suggesting
that gift-related behaviors were marginal to the modern market.
Because gift economies historically are viewed as alternatives to
the self-interest and calculation of capitalism, the gift
maintains an idealized status and its obligatory nature is hidden
by seemingly reciprocal and equal exchanges. My project,
therefore, reads eighteenth-century texts for the ways they
represent the socioeconomic work of the gift, social and
individual expectations of reciprocity, the motivations for
giving, and the relations that are maintained and fractured
within gift economies. The social and literary texts of this
period present the rise, complication, and confusion of affective
relationships in a market-based culture. On both a public and
private level, the gift promises to resolve these conflicts. By
examining eighteenth-century representations of gift exchange, I
demonstrate how the gift in this period entails both symbolic and
practical forms of obligation that serve in a capitalist culture
to support both a symbolic paternal authority and an unequal
distribution of property.
The multiple definitions of the gift in the eighteenth
century are summed up by Samuel Johnson's definition.8 According
to Johnson, a gift could take the form of a “bequest, endowment,

8

E.L McAdam, Jr.and George Milne, eds., Johnson’s Dictionary, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1963).
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or alms given to the poor;” an inheritance; or anything “bestowed
without price; an oblation, offering, bribe.”9 Eighteenth-century
texts consistently conflate the terms “gift,” “loan,” “favor,”
“duty,” and “debt,” thus complicating the ostensible simplicity
and selflessness of the gift. A number of texts demonstrate that
dowries, contracts, and the marriage market continue the
tradition of identifying women and the female body as gifts.
Bernard Mandeville’s essays on charity and Adam Smith’s economic
writings are among those that demonstrate the extent to which the
politics of generosity permeated both social and private life:
the period’s concern with giving and receiving informs political
tracts, utopian narratives, poetry, drama, and the early novel.
Moreover, the narrative of the gift takes the form of a variety
of voices, from upper-class educated men, to the laboring lower
class, to women. While some of this material lies beyond the
scope of this dissertation, the widespread use of the language of
the gift testifies to the ideological significance of a rhetoric
that is often ignored or misread by critics of eighteenth-century
literature.

III.
Although the language and practice of gift exchange seems to
belong to the fields of anthropology and sociology, the gift also

9

Ibid, 149.
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involves questions of narrative: gifts tell stories about social
interaction. The central question I pose in this project is why,
in a period in which people and relationships are more and more
defined by a capitalist vocabulary, are the same people and
relationships just as often, or in some cases even more so,
described in terms of disinterested benevolence and mutual
exchange? Accompanying that question is the concern that although
gifts and capital are seemingly antithetical, eighteenth-century
texts typically do not register an anxiety or conflict about the
conflation of gifts and capital, even when they seem to mark a
transition in the use of such language, as in The Way of the
World.
As economists and anthropologists alike make clear, the
advent of capitalism did not mean the death of the gift. The
archaic and primitive forms of society to which most
anthropologists refer when discussing gift economy may seem
inconsequential in the twenty-first century. However, the gift’s
ability to bind social relations remains at work, and perhaps was
even stronger in the eighteenth century precisely because of the
threat posed by capitalist innovation. In fact, in most
eighteenth-century novels that seem to be about money, it is the
gift, not the commodity, that receives the most attention and
that is crucial in defining self-identity, kinship relations,
social obligation, and the socially sanctioned symbolic relations
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of domination. All of the texts I discuss, it can be argued,
offer a critique of the charitable spirit of the period, a
narrative of obligation that exposes the ramifications attached
to so-called disinterested gestures of benevolence.
I would like to explain how my interdisciplinary approach
offers a new way to understand the period and the central
conflicts that often seemed to dominate non-fictional and
literary texts. For literary scholars, most anthropological
studies analyze and describe communities with social, political,
and economic conceptions of the world, their communities, and
their own identities that are dramatically different from early
modern European perceptions of experience. For example, Marcel
Mauss’s ground-breaking analysis of gifts,Essai sur le don,
addresses the meaning and function of the gift within a precapitalist Maori culture whose ideological values and assumptions
seemingly operate outside of familiar realms of profit,
individualism, and economic domination.10 Consequently, it is
reasonable to ask how such an anthropological approach can be
used to examine the radically different culture of eighteenthcentury England; a culture which takes as its basis of personal
and social signification principles concerned primarily with
property, profit, individualism, and socioeconomic
stratification. My answer to this question lies not in arguing
10

Marcel Mauss, The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies, trans. W.D. Halls,
(London: Routledge, 1990).
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for similarities between different cultures but in demonstrating
that a connection exists between the languages and methodologies
of non-European and early modern European cultures. While Mauss’s
Maori culture may function within a system of gift exchange and
reciprocity, that culture still depends on complex economic
exchanges based on notions of value and valuation to mediate
social and personal experience. In this respect, the languages of
gift and obligation are not limited to “primitive” cultures. As I
will demonstrate in this project, communities maintain themselves
on the belief that relationships with other individuals ensure
their own survival. In the eighteenth century, Adam Smith claims
that there never can be a “community of thieves and robbers”:
they would have to agree not to steal from each other in order to
maintain a sense of community.11 Like other writers of the
period, Smith sees morality and exchange as interdependent. In
this respect, the language of gift exchange offers a way to
reassert the identity of communities based on mutual obligations
at a time when such relationships were perceived to be in crisis.
In the remainder of this introduction, I examine the assumed
disparity between gift economies and market economies that I
outlined above, as well as the complex role played by gift
exchange in capitalist culture. In discussing the work of
Bataille, Bourdieu, Derrida, and Sahlins, I demonstrate the
11

Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. D.D. Raphael and A.L McFie (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1976).
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timeliness and relevance of my argument to current economic
theory. These writers represent a variety of theoretical
approaches to understanding gift economies, and I critique these
theories to emphasize the need for an expanded paradigm that
accounts for the internalization of the logic of gift exchange in
relationships based on affective exchanges rather than simply
material transactions. I argue that although contemporary theory
attempts to demystify the gift, ultimately it remains an
idealized embodiment of an ethic of generosity. Thus, those who
seek to formulate a theory of gift economy as an alternative to
capitalism in actuality reinscribe the problem they attempt to
solve.
Almost all twentieth-century critiques of gift economy
respond either explicitly or implicitly to Mauss. The notion that
gift exchange throws into relief the impersonal calculations of
capitalism was best articulated by Mauss and has informed a
generation of scholars who sought to defend or critique the
notion of a system of exchange that did not seek to maximize
profit and further self-interest.12 Mauss defines gift economy as
a series of reciprocal exchanges that invoke an obligation to
reciprocity, thereby mediating social relationships that are free
12

For a number of interdisciplinary responses to Mauss see Alan D. Schrift, ed., The Logic of the Gift:
Toward an Ethic of Generosity (New York: Routledge, 1997); Mark Osteen, ed., The Question of the Gift: Essays
Across Disciplines (New York: Routledge, 2002); Margot Finn, The Character of Credit: Personal Debt in English
Culture, 1740-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 7-11; and Natalie Zemon Davis, The Gift in
Sixteenth-Century France (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2000), 3-10.
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from concerns of material gain: “... clans, families, and
individuals create bonds through perpetual services and countergifts of all kinds, usually in the form of a free gift...”.13 In
this economy, it is the gift, not the commodity, that accounts
for the acquisition and distribution of all wealth: the gift has
the capacity to demand a return immediately or the promise of a
return in the future, creating an “unceasing circling of both
goods and services, returned and to be returned”.14

This

obligation, according to Mauss, functions socially to negotiate
competing claims and to settle disputes about authority, rank,
and familial status. For example, one could defeat a rival by
giving a gift with the knowledge that the rival could not
possibly reciprocate; thus, the opponent suffers defeat because
he is thereafter always under an obligation he cannot fulfill.
Despite the obligatory nature of the gift, however, Mauss
perceives gift economy as distinct from the principles of
capitalism. He makes clear that gift economy is not dependant on
individual production or on profit-–neither the giver nor the
receiver acquires any material gain: “the object received as
gift, the received object in general, engages, links magically,
religiously, morally, juridically the giver and the receiver”.15

13

Marcel Mauss, “Gift, Gift,” trans. Koen Decoster in Schrift, 28.

14

Ibid, 29.

15

Ibid, 29.
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The gift supposedly informs and structures non-material values
only-–alliances, diplomacy, friendship, kinship, sacrifice, and
marriage.
Mauss’s essay continues to provoke a dialogue on giftexchange for two fundamental reasons. First, his basic assertion
locates the gift in primitive societies as a form of exchange
that privileges social relations between people rather than
material relations between objects. Gifts are exchanged with the
expectation of an immediate reciprocal equivalent or the
understanding that an equivalent counter-gift will be given at a
later date. In this sense, the gift entails obvious obligation–the initial gift must be returned. Therefore, the gift in
primitive societies always entails either implicitly or
explicitly a double assumption–-that one will receive and hence
one will give. The second argument that gives rise to debate is
Mauss’s claim that the socially mediating work of the gift
resides in the “hau” of the gift, a mystical social quality that
he defines as “the total social fact.”16 For Mauss, the hau is
the property that compels the gift to circulate, to be given and
returned: “it is the spirit of the thing to come back again and
again.”17 By assigning this mystical quality to the gift, Mauss
sees gifts acting on society to reinforce personal relationships

16

Ibid.

17

Ibid.
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between the subjects transacting, rather than members of society
using gifts to establish a relationship and to negotiate the
comparative values of the objects exchanged. Mauss’s theory is
open to critique, therefore, because the notion of the hau fails
to explain why we give in the first place and thus his
explanation replaces interested gestures with the mystical
quality of the gift.
Mauss’s claim has encouraged at least some of his readers to
perceive gift economies as idealized forms of disinterested
exchange based on an ethic of generosity rather than profit.
Anthropologist C.A. Gregory draws from Mauss’ study a distinction
between the work of commodities and the work of gifts: “Commodity
exchange establishes objective quantitative relationships between
the objects transacted, while gift exchange establishes personal
qualitative relationships between the subjects transacting.”18 In
gift economies, objects take on a non-alienated form-–the
personification process dominates and things and people assume a
social function. As a result, gift economy establishes personal,
qualitative relationships between subjects. In contrast,
according to Gregory, in capitalist economics things and people
take on the form of objects, thereby objectifying the
relationship between people and establishing a relationship
between things. Rather than reinscribing the opposition between

18

C.A. Gregory, Gifts and Commodities (London: Academic Press, 1982), 41.
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gift and commodity that Gregory describes, a number of critics
within the social sciences and humanities have attempted to
theorize a logic of gift exchange applicable to modern society.
Questions of the gift within contemporary discourse can be
traced to four distinct responses to Mauss, exemplified by the
work of Georges Bataille, Pierre Bourdieu, Jacques Derrida, and
Marshall Sahlins. I begin with Bataille who most closely frames a
paradigm influenced by Mauss. Bataille proposes in The Accursed
Share that the basic movement of economy is predicated on loss-–a
general economy of surplus, sacrifice, and gifts.19 The modern
capitalist economy, which he terms a restricted economy, in turn
stultifies the natural process of expenditure by restricting
economy to accumulation and “squandering without
reciprocation.”20 Bataille is very much influenced by Mauss in
his assertion that a return to “the basic movement that restores
wealth to its function, to gift-giving” will alleviate
disparities of wealth by forcing the expenditure of excess rather
than reinforcing the limits of accumulation.21 Bataille’s theory,
idealized in its attempt to provide an alternative to modern
poverty, socioeconomic inequality, and war, reifies Mauss’s
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notion that gift economies take place outside of interest, and he
fails to recognize or critique the logic of value that incites
competing desires for goods–-whether exchanged reciprocally as
excess or in market negotiations.
Bourdieu comes closer to collapsing the dichotomy between
gift economies and capitalism by describing gift exchange as the
necessary and collective misrecognition that informs social
practice. Bourdieu examines the gift as a mode of social
domination and argues in The Logic Practice that the gift works
as a “veil of enchanted relations” to cover up violence.22 He
identifies gift exchange as a practice of irreversible actions
constructed in time: a sustained, collective misrecognition of
the “objective” truth:
This generative model ... reduces exchange to a series
of successive choices performed on the basis of a small
number of principles with the aid of a simple
combinatory formula, and which makes it possible to
give a very economical account of an infinity of
particular cases of exchanges phenomenally as different
as exchanges of gifts, words, or challenges...[which]
reproduces, in its own order, the functioning of
habitus....23
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The logic of practice “proceeds through a series of irreversible
choices, made under pressure and often involving heavy
stakes...in response to other choices obeying the same logic.”24
For Bourdieu, then, relinquishing the idea of gift exchange as a
primitive, pre-capitalist practice allows us to examine it as a
phenomenon of exchange itself, with strict laws and inscribed
models of behavior that inform both pre-modern and modern
societies. His “economical account” of the dynamics governing “an
infinity of particular cases of exchanges” implicates both givers
and receivers, who, once engaged in the process, either become
trapped in the laws of the practice or risk disrupting social
constructs and symbolic notions of honor, authority, and power.25
Gifts, therefore, act as symbolic capital in the sense that they
are capital misrecognized. Gift exchange is the conversion of
economic capital into symbolic capital which produces relations
of dependence that have an economic basis but which are
disguised:
The motor of the whole dialect of challenge and
riposte, gift and counter-gift, is not an abstract
axiomatics but the sense of honour, a disposition
inculcated by all early education and constantly
demanded and reinforced by the group, and inscribed in
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the postures and gestures of the body...as in the
automatisms of language and thought....26
In this respect, the gift must be misrecognized because it is a
form of symbolic violence, of enacting a relationship of
dominance and dependence, as Mirabell seems to recognize;
according to Bourdieu, “..the strategy of the gift will be
destroyed if its true nature is revealed.”27 Bourdieu’s critique
ultimately implicates the gift not just in a general sense of
obligation, but to specific systems of domination.
In a different but related vein, Derrida argues that the
gift itself is impossible; that the giving of a gift is a
paradoxical instance in which the gift is negated by its very
recognition as gift. Derrida argues that the “possibility of the
impossibility of the gift” is inherent in all acts of gift
exchange.28 The staging of gift-giving eludes the possible since
the moment the gift presents itself as gift it simultaneously is
annulled:
For there to be gift, it is necessary that the gift not
even appear, that it not be perceived or received as
gift...as soon as it appears as gift or as soon as it
signifies itself as gift, there is no longer any ‘logic
26
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of the gift’.29
The gift implicates both the subject and the recipient
irrevocably in networks of debt, obligation, and self-interest.
It is the conditions that define the gift--giving and receiving
in return--that “produce the annulment, the annihilation, the
destruction of the gift.”30 Because it is necessary that the
recipient not give back, it also is imperative that at the same
time he or she not acknowledge the gift as such; recognition of
the gift as gift implies a restitution in that it demands in
exchange a “symbolic equivalent;” it “perceives the gift...the
intentional meaning of the gift...[and] this simple
identification of the gift seems to destroy it.”31 It is the
impossibility that interrupts exchange and makes the gift
economic, even if there is no gift because the gift “gives back
only to the self.”32
Derrida defines the beginning of this (un)economy in the act
of exchange, the precise moment when the gift is (mis)recognized
by both parties as gift. It is at this moment that economy
interrupts the exchange and the gift no longer exists.
Recognition of the gift as gift implies that there must be a
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return even if that return lies in a symbolic equivalent. Once
the giver and receiver perceive the meaning of the gift--that
something has been given that entails labor, expense, or
sacrifice on the part of the giver, and that there is intention
behind the giving of the gift--then the gift is destroyed. It is
the simple identification of the gift that destroys it. What
Bourdieu identifies as a necessary process of misrecognition--the
gift is possible in the sense that it goes unrecognized for what
it truly entails--Derrida deconstructs as impossible. For
Bourdieu, the gift never ceases to operate within a system and a
logic of economy, but, for Derrida, the gift never ceases to be
impossible-–it signifies an irrevocable interruption of the logic
of idealized reciprocity and exchange.
Sahlins reinforces both Bourdieu’s and Derrida’s arguments
when he critiques the “spirit of the gift.”33 Sahlins calls into
question the very structure of the exchange itself–-the physical
act of exchange he sees as annulling the work of the gift. He
argues that Mauss’s paradigm–-that A gives to B, B gives to C,
and C gives back to A–-inevitably creates advantage and undue
loss:
The introduction of a third party could only unduly
complicate and obscure the point.... But if [the point]
is rather that one man’s gift should not be another
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man’s capital, and therefore the fruits of a gift ought
to be passed back to the original holder, then the
introduction of a third party is necessary. It is
necessary precisely to show a turnover; the gift has
had issue; the recipient has used it to his
advantage.34
Sahlins’ use of the word advantage exposes the innate interest
involved in Mauss’s theory of gift exchange. More importantly, he
points out that in the Maori culture specifically, return gifts
are larger and more excessive than the principle of equivalentreturn demands. Sahlins concludes that the exchange turns “upon
the exchange between the second and third party” and that what
Mauss calls the hau in Maori culture could be better translated
“as profit.”35 The gift does not cement a mystical or affective
bond among members of a community, but implicates them in complex
networks of exchange and re-valuation.
My dissertation explores the consequences of these
theories–-that the gift is misrecognized, impossible, and defined
not by a mystical hau but by profit--by identifying the gift as a
means to mask interested commodity exchange. My response to Mauss
and to the critics above involves an examination of value, and I
would argue that the issue in all of these theoretical arguments,
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but which none articulate, is one of value. Inevitably, the gift
is implicated in the economic–-even as it is misrecognized or
impossible–-because it is value. The mystical hau of the gift is
not mystical at all because any notion of reciprocity or
generosity relies ultimately on an ability to recognize,
attribute, or confer value on objects that are given or received.
Because the gift has value it incites an expectation of return, a
practical, realistic, and necessary expectation that when
something is given it has a value that will obligate a return of
an equal or greater value. In this sense, I argue throughout this
dissertation that the gift is a commodity in disguise.
Marx defines the commodity as an object outside of ourselves
that by its very properties satisfies human wants--either a
physical want or a want of fancy.36 The commodity either has a
use-value--a utility--or an exchange value--a proportion in which
its value in use can be exchanged for another value in use.
Although gift economies appear to function on a social level to
establish inter-personal relations, the given object is what
retains the power to invoke those relations. Therefore, it must
have or be able to acquire the kind of arbitrary exchange value
that Marx attributes to commodities.
In order for the gift to meet our expectations of generosity
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and benevolence, the gift must have value. If the gift does not
have value, if the recipient does not find in the gift a use
value or an exchange value, the gesture of the gift fails.
Therefore, I argue that capitalist principles inevitably are at
the root of the logic of the gift because the gift depends on a
system of exchange that naturally perceives a value in the gifts
exchanged. This perception results in gift economies being
inherently dialectical: every act of gift-giving is precipitated
by a recognition of value within a commodity that can then
function as a gift; this recognition invests the “gift” with the
power to demand a return. Simultaneously, the value embedded in a
counter-gift--even before the first recipient recognizes the gift
as gift--precipitates every act of gift exchange. Rather than
enacting a reciprocal and balanced exchange, gift giving provokes
an ongoing negotiation of values. Unlike a commodity, which is
assessed and valued according to an absolute standard--Marx’s
general equivalent--gifts seem to negotiate their relative values
with and against each other. The fiction of gift exchange is that
it somehow suspends or erases the dependence of valuation on a
general equivalent.
Thus, I would argue, Derrida comes to the impossible too
late. His identification of the gift as impossible in exchange
fails to recognize the value the commodity holds prior to its
introduction into circuits of benevolence, debt, or obligation
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that allows it to function as gift and embody a sense of
sacrifice, affection, and disinterest. Bataille, too, overlooks
the concept of value. The expenditure he promotes must always
already derive from an awareness, even if an unconscious one, of
a return that embodies value–-of an idealized reciprocity that
must be violated in excess expenditure and loss. The fascination
with loss resides in the fascination with gain–-the belief in a
gained value is only appreciated in the context of what is lost–a substitution is always expected or at least hoped for. While
Bourdieu and Sahlins come closest to implicating the gift in the
logic of exchange that mutually informs capitalism and theories
of the gift, both hold open the possibility that either the logic
of practice or the spirit of the gift can continue to suture over
precisely the problems with the gift-–its misrecognized violence
and inevitable demand for a return and profit.
In response to these critics, I argue for an expanded
paradigm that identifies gifts in all stages of gift exchange as
commodities, and thus inherently economic. In this dissertation,
I demonstrate that theoretically and historically there is never
an instance of equal gift exchange--when what one gives is
equivalent to what one receives. Rather, gift economies act as a
stabilizing mechanism that underwrite a collective economic
fantasy of equitable exchange. This fantasy fosters the
misrecognition Bourdieu identifies of the values of benevolence,
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generosity, and disinterestedness associated with reciprocity.
Eighteenth-century representations are crucial for this study
because they offer both an historical and theoretical entrance
into reading acts of disinterested exchange and obligation. In
the literary and cultural texts that I study, gifts assume a
fundamental importance as markers for a range of values-reciprocity, benevolence, generosity, friendship, diplomacy,
love, and sacrifice--that either implicitly or explicitly are
seen to stand outside of capitalist calculation. By examining
eighteenth-century representations of gift economies, I
demonstrate that gift exchange entails both symbolic and
practical forms of obligation that negate the possibility of
disinterested economic exchange: a gift is never congruent with
itself and serves in a capitalist culture to support in both the
political and domestic spheres a symbolic paternal authority. My
examination of the narrative of the gift is a study of the
account of the gift in the eighteenth century, of why early
modern capitalists gave and expected to receive within a system
of exchange innately predicated on loss.

IV.
In different ways in the chapters that follow, I argue that
the sociocultural circumstances of the eighteenth century reveal
a complex relationship between giving and receiving that has
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ideological consequences for conceptions of gender, family, and
socioeconomic identity. In order truly to appreciate the
ramifications of gift exchange in early modern capitalist
culture, the motivations for giving require examinations beyond
the abstract notion of social charity. Therefore, I discuss
representations of exchanges that clearly elude or resist moral
prerogatives. Rather than focusing solely on the poor and the
philanthropic institutions constructed to aid and monitor the
lower classes, my study examines gifts given within relatively
equal socioeconomic classes and the power relations inherent in
those exchanges.
Chapters two through five offer close examinations of this
collective misrecognition of the gift and the modes of domination
the gift supported in the eighteenth century. The account of the
gift presents itself as “impossible” and “misrecognized” in both
fictional and non-fictional texts. Chapter two, titled
“‘Prisoners in Silken Bonds’: Obligation, Diplomacy, and Trade in
English Voyages to Japan and China,” focuses on public
representations of gift exchange within the conceptions of
international economy evident in diplomatic encounters at the
beginning of the seventeenth century and at the end of the
eighteenth century. I begin with this analysis of public
transactions conceived of in terms of the gift to trace the
development of ideas of a collective and disinterested economy as
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an alternative to capitalist practice. This chapter precedes my
discussion of private institutions and novels because I argue
that the misrecognition of the gift begins in the public sphere.
I assert in this chapter that the inevitable loss that
accompanies the gift simultaneously situates it as a domestic and
international signifier of civility that mediates relations of
power and difference. Thus, gifts presented to Japanese and
Chinese officials as incentives for expanding English trade
become the means to elicit desire, create illusions of
superiority, and to “give” generously what one cannot sell. My
reading of historical documents examines catalogues of gifts
exchanged between English and Far East merchants to show that the
gift, while seemingly antithetical to basic capitalist
principles, serves to define diplomatic and economic
relationships that the English unsuccessfully try to manipulate
for material gain.
Chapter three “‘Comply and Live, Deny and Starve’:
Asymmetrical Exchange in Defoe’s Roxana” argues that the account
of the gift--of why we give and expect to receive in return--in
the eighteenth century produces a specific narrative structure,
one that is problematized by the very nature of the complex
subject it seeks to represent. Because gift exchange fosters
unending obligatory relationships, narrative attempts to
represent this process necessarily reflect the inability of the
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exchange to produce a coherent conclusion. While this structure
permeates both cultural documents and literary representations, I
draw mainly on Roxana as an exemplary text. Roxana, along with
other texts I examine in subsequent chapters, demonstrates the
impossibility of rendering satisfactorily an account of the gift.
First, the narrative structure of Roxana is complicated by the
fact that the plot revolves around the on-going exchange of gifts
and the heroine’s inability to engage in equivalent exchanges.
The unending obligation Roxana experiences forces the novel to
conclude abruptly because Defoe cannot articulate an end to the
cycle of exchanges that drives his narrative.
Moreover, Roxana’s self-interrogation, in which she
questions her continuing career as a mistress despite having
achieved financial independence, demonstrates precisely the
fiction of the gift. Although Roxana has economic security, the
novel’s inability to resolve her obligation as a receiver of
gifts formally and ideologically demonstrates that the initial
gift that led to this security has never been and can never be
repaid. The reciprocity she offers by giving over her body to the
landlord is not a disinterested return but an obligation.
Moreover, it is an obligation that continues to accrue interest,
thereby preventing Roxana from escaping the first debt, and the
narrative from representing an equal and completed gift exchange.
While financially Roxana can reciprocate, morally she always is
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indebted. Thus, the account of the gift reveals its double bind:
the gift appears as an idealized, non-commodified act of agency
and generosity that simultaneously enables a coercive, unending
obligation that begets further obligation--an obligation from
which one cannot be released, even within an imaginative
rendering.
Chapter four, “Property, Legitimacy, and Socioeconomic Debt:
The Misrecognized Gift in Tom Jones,” examines issues of upperclass authority, ownership, and benevolence in Henry Fieling’s
Tom Jones. I argue that gift giving--misrecognized as a generous
and disinterested act--sutures over relations of authority and
domination that underlie the socioeconomic order depicted in the
novel. To understand the dynamics of asymmetrical exchange in Tom
Jones, I draw on the work of Bourdieu and Slavoj Zizek. In
drawing on both of their concepts of misrecognition, I identify a
double-misrecognition as the actual practice that enables both
capitalist and gift exchange to be possible. In contrast to Zizek
who describes misrecognition as the overlooking of the
“universal, socio-synthetic dimensions” of an act, and Bourdieu
who identifies misrecognition as the overlooking of “imposed
relations of kinship, neighborhood, or work,” I argue that
misrecognition inheres in the socioeconomic dimension of
exchange-–whether capitalist, gift, or barter. The exchange must
be misrecognized as performative: each act must represent an
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idealized social relationship that can be rendered in terms of
mutual advantages and reciprocal obligations.
Squire Allworthy’s unending generosity is misrecognized by
his recipients in order to deny (to themselves as well as to
others) the obligation they have to his authority, both before
and after they receive his gifts. In analyzing key episodes in
the novel, I argue that Allworthy exchanges his material property
for the coerced return of an unending moral and social
obligation. What his recipients interpret as disinterested gifts
that they want to honor in return for his generosity are, in
actuality, contracts that bind them to Allworthy’s moral
standard. The recipients of Allworthy's "gifts," including Tom,
misrecognize asymmetrical relations of obligation because they
misrecognize their socioeconomic debts to Allworthy and the order
he embodies. Throughout Tom Jones the ideology of domination must
be misrecognized as the rationale for the affective and mutual
bonds of social cohesion.
Chapter five, titled “‘Her Gift Was Compelled’: Gender and
the Failure of the Gift in Cecilia,” extends my discussion of
affective relations by providing a contrast to the gender
politics of courtship seen in Roxana and Tom Jones. This chapter
moves to the seemingly most private of relations, the family. I
demonstrate how the public and collective fantasy of equal
exchange becomes a way to manipulate kinship and gender roles to
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conceal power relations and perpetuate in the private sphere a
public ideal of authority. I examine Cecilia for the ways in
which the novel inscribes the gift as a feminized and
domesticated practice in order to bolster a repressive and
patrilineal economic system. I interrogates the values of the
gift that align generosity with the feminine, the power relations
involved in giving and receiving, and questions of how notions of
feminine agency are complicated by acts of giving.
My analysis looks at the heroine’s relationship to Harrel,
Albany, her guardians, and the Delville family to examine the
many ways in which Cecilia is imposed upon through the notion of
the gift. As a woman who accrues both debts and obligations, she
occupies the role of agent and object--someone with money to give
and control, and yet someone who, as woman, is controlled and
exchanged through the laws of primogeniture and marriage. Cecilia
depicts women and children as owing paternal obligations that are
necessary to regulate and reinforce an ideology of paternal
authority and patrilineal succession. Furthermore, the novel
dramatizes challenges to the assumed division between the public
and private spheres by relegating all forms of exchange within
the private as “gifts” that nonetheless have material
consequences for Burney’s heroine. My reading of Cecilia ties in
to both the theoretical and historical concerns with which I
began.

36

V.
Emerging capitalist principles in the eighteenth century
blur the boundary between commodity and “gift,” calling into
question historical and contemporary possibilities of ethical
gift exchange. Critics such as James Thompson have argued that
the period reveals an anxiety towards stabilizing notions of
value and language that economic changes called into question:
“The historical conditions of money and its transformation into
capital in conjunction with the advent of various and disturbing
new forms of paper money, provoked a semiological crisis over the
concept of value.”37 Thompson describes the emergence of
eighteenth-century economic instability as a consequence of the
severe debasement of English coinage following a half-century of
“shifting regimes and neglect, from the civil war through the
interregnum and the Restoration....”38
...for it is the period which witnesses the end of primitive
accumulation and enclosure and that transition to agrarian
capitalism, the development of the first stage of market
capitalism, and the extension of commodity relations into
all areas of social life.39
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Paper credit and speculative finance also contributed to shifts
in value. The change in conceptions of the nature of property
from a material, immovable, and stable form such as land to an
immaterial and fluid one threatened traditional socioeconomic
order. This was perpetuated further through the development of
public credit, banking facilities, and joint stock companies.40
As Catherine Ingrassia points out, “With a change in the nature
of value systems, property became increasingly unreal. The new
financial instruments of Exchange Alley were largely immaterial
forms of property that could be realized only imaginatively.”41
Like such phenomena as speculative investment and credit, the
gift relies on a liminal moment of indeterminancy. Therefore,
although similarly ambiguous, the gift becomes a cultural fantasy
invoked as a means to reassert stability beyond the vagaries of
the market. Because these emerging economic issues could not
readily be stabilized in the eighteenth century, the gift
functions as a way to put into abeyance conflicts of value and to
draw to attention the practice of exchange itself. The seeming
disinterestedness of gift exchange allows it to perform acts of
ideological recuperation by masking the realities of capitalist
exploitation and self-interest. Significantly, a society that
40
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relied on overt charity to reconcile political and religious
responsibility simultaneously and collectively adopted a
misrecognition of other forms of giving to perpetuate a symbolic
mode of domination.
Although eighteenth-century economic theory points to the
coin and the banknote as the confusing and unstable signifiers of
capitalism, the gift in eighteenth-century England most often
took the form of money or of a commodity. Therefore, in an
analysis of a culture where money comes to represent the
confusion between intrinsic and extrinsic value in both monetary
terms and in terms of social identity, the gifts of money and
commodities which hold the potential either to stabilize or
overturn the tenuous definition of value become even more
appealing to the theorist and critic than the theory of money
itself. Thompson argues that capitalism emerges as a model for
regulating the self. The language of capital, he maintains,
becomes analogous to the language of the self and social
relations. In extending and supplementing his argument, this
dissertation suggests that as capitalism emerges so does the
seeming opposition to capitalism, and that the gift, too, in its
misrecognition, becomes, in the eighteenth century, a model for
the self.
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CHAPTER

TWO

"Prisoners in Silken Bonds": Obligation, Trade, and
Diplomacy in English Voyages to Japan and China

Formerly Portugal presented tribute;
Now England is paying homage.
They have out-traveled Shu-hai and Heng-chang;
My Ancestor’s merit and virtue must have reached
their distant shores.
Though their tribute is commonplace, my heart approves sincerely.
Though what they bring is meagre, yet,
In my kindness to men from afar I make generous return,
Wanting to preserve my good health and power.
--Qianlong, Emperor of China, 17931

I.
The poem above, composed by the Chinese Emperor Qianlong to
mark the arrival of Lord George Macartney’s embassy in Jehol,
China, in 1793, invokes a cross-cultural language of gift
exchange, reciprocity, and obligation that informed early modern
conceptions of international trade and diplomacy. In the mind of
the Emperor and in accordance with a long-standing Chinese
cultural self-perception, Macartney’s appearance at the Imperial
Court, his letter from King George III, and the presents he
offers register solely as a tributary offering: the gesture of a
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barbarian race to acknowledge and to celebrate China’s cultural
and religious superiority, and to reinforce the Emperor’s supreme
virtue. Acknowledging precedent for the honor by invoking
Portugal’s diplomatic standing as a country that has recognized
China’s greatness and, therefore, gained the privilege of a
trading monopoly in Macao, the Emperor interprets the gifts
Macartney brings as a sign of deference to a more powerful and
advanced society, one whose merit has extended across the globe.
Although the gifts the English bring are viewed as “commonplace,”
and their commercial value in China “meagre,” the Emperor shows
respect for the distance the embassy traveled and the tributary
offering they transported by making what he considers to be an
adequate and “generous return”–-namely, his kindness. The
Emperor’s return of kindness, however benevolent and commensurate
it appeared from the Chinese point of view, was perceived by the
English as an unequal exchange. Their mission–-although they
understood that China expected a tribute–-was to gain in exchange
for their innovative and scientifically advanced gifts a
diplomatic trading treaty, commercial ports of trade, and
compensation for the grievances of the English merchants.
However, the Emperor’s language implies that his reciprocity
derives solely from a benevolent nature, that he gives in return
out of respect, not out of obligation. This distinction slyly
displaces momentarily the obligation implicit in any gift
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exchange; in other words, Qianlong does not consider himself
indebted to the English or required to make a return. Yet,almost
simultaneously, the Emperor does acknowledge an obligation,
though not to the English. The Emperor’s return gift of
hospitality is a submission required of him to a divine authority
and to ancestral good fortune, both of which have endowed him
with the power to give generously. Furthermore, the Emperor
anticipates a return for this obedience to authority as well-–he
gives adequately to the English to preserve the kingdom’s honor
and so that he may maintain in return “good health and power.”
Thus, the notion of the gift as an ostensibly disinterested
gesture of civility--of an equal exchange between reciprocally
respectful nations—-becomes problematic: what the English viewed
as civility the Chinese interpreted as a ritual of subjection.
Qianlong articulates an Asian perception of the complex
intersections among trade negotiations, diplomatic gift
exchanges, and cultural authority that ironically informed an
English ideology of early modern trade as well. The poem invokes
notions of honor, reciprocity, and return, a vocabulary, that in
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century mercantile and political
narratives, repeatedly qualifies profit-based concerns in the
relationships the English sought to establish and extend in the
Far East. The English gave to the Emperor in expectation of an
equal return, an expectation that they articulated only in order
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to obligate the Emperor to grant their requests. Although the
English accepted his gifts and other amenities while in China,
their expectation of an equal and satisfactory return
necessitated an on-going diplomatic exchange that deferred the
commercial negotiations they sought literally at their own
expense. In this sense, the language of the gift, despite its
ostensibly disinterested nature, created between the English and
their would-be trading partners unequal relations of obligation
and domination.
This chapter examines the intersections between seventeenthand eighteenth-century conceptions of the gift in commercial
trade and diplomatic relations to argue that the Eurocentric
ideology of mutually beneficial trade was promoted by a fantasy
of equal exchange that sutured over relations of subjection and
domination. Rather than establishing relations of equality
through disinterested and benevolent gifts, diplomatic gifts are
used--by both Europeans and Asian nations–-to mask the aggressive
and acquisitive self-interest that characterizes relations of
power and domination. I draw on English travel and diplomatic
narratives and their representations of gift exchange, as well as
East Asian conceptions of tribute, to examine how both East and
West utilized the language of the gift to negotiate competing
conceptions of cultural authority. Specifically, I examine the
journal of John Saris, the captain of the first East India
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Company ship to land in Japan in 1613, and the published accounts
by Lord Macartney, leader of the first English Embassy to China
in 1793.
English tracts on trade during this period, such as Nicholas
Barbon's A Discourse of Trade, John Evelyn's Navigation and
Commerce: Their Original and Progress, and Adam Smith's The
Wealth of Nations, emphasize that the success of public trading
practices was grounded in the development of personal and
disinterested relations mediated by a general gift economy.2 The
gift in these narratives served two functions. First, for
philosophers of trade, the rhetoric of mutual exchange displaced
motives of self-interest and profit. The language of the gift
drew attention to the ostensible benevolence and tolerance of
both the English and Far East peoples, positing each nation as
rich enough to market in a general economy based on surplus.
Second, for the English the mutuality and benefit sutured over
the processes of consumption and production that threatened to
feminize the English and either strip the Far East of natural
resources so as to preserve those at home, or to displace
anxieties about the fact that the English literally during the
course of the eighteenth century were becoming addicted to tea,
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porcelain, and later, opium. The language of the gift transposed
to diplomacy reflects two dialectics. First, each exchange is an
end in itself that establishes what are supposed to be "timeless
relations”: for the English, a civilized and mutually beneficial
trade, for the Chinese, in 1793, the tributary status of another
barbarian country. Yet, second, the exchange also promoted an
unending obligation so that, in theory, gifts must be exchanged
each and every time emissaries meet, and these occasions too are
open to radically different interpretations: for the English, ongoing negotiations to transform financial and symbolic burdens
and obligations to mutual trade; for the Japanese and Chinese
courts, a re-enactment of subjection.
In the accounts of Saris and Macartney, the detailed
descriptions of gifts offered to the Shogun and the Qianlong
Emperor seemingly promote an ideal of mutually beneficial trade.
Journals such as Saris’ are monopolized by discussions of giftexchange, which stands out as the primary form of diplomacy
involved in foreign relations. In fact, the detailing of gifts
often overshadows the commercial aspects of such enterprises,
including account records, the progress of the factory, and the
sale of commodities--those aspects of these missions vital to
East India Company officials for profit-based ventures. The
prominence of gifts in Saris’ journal demonstrates that the role
of gift exchange held far greater implications than those
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associated solely with social customs or diplomatic formalities.
The gifts inscribed the English and the Japanese shogun in a
network of social debt and reciprocity, one that was much more
tenuous and complex than the English may have realized, and which
paradoxically held far more severe consequences than the actual
business relationships they sought to forge.
This complexity is due to the cross-cultural awareness of
the obligatory nature of the gift and its role in mediating a
market economy. Both European merchants and the courts of the Far
East recognized the inherent social aspects of commerce: in order
to cultivate a productive business relationship, European
merchants and court officials had first to cultivate a personal
and political relationship of mutual trust that supposedly would
mirror and enact an idealized relationship between an English
merchant and his East Asian counterpart. The inordinate amount of
time spent by merchants and emissaries documenting gift
exchanges, including the types of gifts exchanged, the places and
times, and the social transactions occurring simultaneously with
the gift-exchange, demonstrates both how gifts permeate
commercial activity and how dependent self-interested capitalism
is on the social dynamics of the gift. My reading of these texts,
then, explores the ways in which diplomatic customs complicated
attempts at trade and trapped the participants in on-going
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negotiations that deferred the realization of quick and easy
profits.
This chapter looks at Saris and Macartney to demonstrate the
persistence of the language of gift economies over a long history
of contact between England and the Far East. Rather than
emphasizing significant changes in English attitudes towards
China, as David Porter, Joanna Waley-Cohen, and Haun Saussy do, I
want to emphasize the crucial ways in which the language of the
gift underwrites economic negotiations and relations of power and
domination.3 In the two centuries between these efforts to
establish or extend trade, numerous European efforts to gain
access to Chinese markets were undertaken by the Dutch, Russians,
and English with only qualified success.4 By focusing on Saris
and Macartney, I want to emphasize the ways in which different
constructions of the seemingly universal language of the gift
illuminates the dynamics of cross-cultural negotiation in the
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early modern world. Furthermore, I want to establish how some of
the travel narratives and diplomatic encounters that are
described by English merchants in the Far East demonstrate the
inextricable link between gifts, economy, and capital in
international negotiations during the early modern era. These
important cultural texts reveal the ideological assumptions and
values that link gifts and exchange and suggest why the gift
figures as a central narrative in fictional texts throughout the
eighteenth century. Although notions of the gift are most often
relegated to the category of an uneconomic, disinterested
exchange, this chapter will demonstrate how the logic of the gift
underwrites both English and Asian conceptions of commercial
exchange. Most analyses of international relations between
England and Asia have focused on mercantile competition, and the
colonial and/or post-colonial implications of England’s contact
with the Far East, suggesting that the gift-related behaviors
documented in these interactions were marginal to the modern
market.5 Deconstructing the gift in early modern trade
demystifies gift exchange as a selfless and disinterested
"alternative" to capitalism, and demonstrates the ways in which
capitalist obligation was grounded in social relations.
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Such an analysis reveals the means by which diplomacy
ostensibly based on trust and equality was manipulated by both
Europeans and Asian countries to establish modes of dominance and
subjection. The accounts of Saris' and of Macartney's embassy,
therefore, reveal a complex negotiation between English attempts
to represent themselves as benevolent but superior trading
partners and the diplomatic relations that compelled English
subjection to Japan and China in exchange for commercial
privileges. In this sense, the travel narrative and the ideology
of trade it espouses becomes less about global economic growth
and progress, and more about the means through which to mediate
assertions of and anxieties about cultural superiority. While the
English and other Europeans based their notions of their
superiority on Christianity, individual liberty, and property,
they were all too aware of the limitations of their economic and
military power in the Far East. Thus, early modern documentation
of cross-cultural relations offers an historic and practical
precedent for the ideological questions and interventions raised
by the critics discussed in the introduction–-Derrida, Bataille,
and Bourdieu, specifically. The impossibility of the gift posed
by Derrida, the fascination with loss discussed by Bataille, and
the misrecognized violence that Bourdieu identifies in gift
exchange all enact themselves in what should be an equal,
straightforward, disinterested economic transaction--cross-
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cultural trade. Furthermore, by examining the historical
dimensions of gift exchange and capitalism and their fundamental
dependence on both overt exchange and covert obligation, we can
understand more fully the ideological conflict that pervaded
eighteenth century fictional representations as well. The
historical economic knot of interest and disinterest that the
gift and capitalism are intended to deny is revealed to be, for
writers and readers of the eighteenth century, a natural,
necessary, and collectively (mis)understood narrative of social
life.

II.
Trade in early modern England at best was paradoxical in the
consciousness of economists and traders. The language of trade
throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries repeatedly
invokes images of mutual exchange, benefit, and equality,
demonstrating interpenetrating conceptual vocabularies between
capitalism and gift exchange rather than a fundamental
opposition. Trade was viewed simultaneously as profit-based
competition and as mutually beneficial for all involved. In
George Lillo's The London Merchant, Thorowgood declares that
“trade had promoted humanity...by mutual benefits diffusing
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mutual love from pole to pole.”6 The idealized notion that
successful trade provided global order, stability, and "mutual
love" was promoted in both fiction and political tracts. John
Evelyn, in his tract Navigation and Commerce: Their Original and
Progress, states, “In a word, Justice and the Right of nations,
are the objects of Commerce: it maintains society, disposes to
action and communicates the graces….”7 Banished from Evelyn's
description is the reality of England's wars with the Dutch and
the complex regulations of the Navigation Acts. The ideology of
trade looks to the rhetoric of civilized society, actually
turning away from profit-based competition and military conflict
to situate trade as natural, moral, and as the mark of civility.
Although a century later Adam Smith comes closest to recognizing
the asymmetry of trade, he nonetheless acknowledges the
reciprocal benefits it entails: “...trade, which, without force
or constraint, is naturally and regularly carried on between any
two places is always advantageous, though not always equally so,
to both.” These examples show that despite the capitalist nature
of trade, its success depended on suppressing the differences
between a restricted economy of profit and a general economy of
the gift.
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Beyond the language of mutual civility, the actual portrayal
of gifts attempts to present trade in the conceptual framework of
civilized cooperation, as a means to establish friendly ties
rather than competing markets. The rhetoric of trade thus
intersects with conceptions of the gift–-both the Europeans and
the Far East nations recognized the gift as a crucial aspect of
diplomatic policy because it ostensibly embodied social and
affective relations: pledges of friendship between distant
monarchs. Evelyn and even Smith depict the negotiations of trade
as universally understood, just as the gifts exchanged between
countries signify an inherent naturalness, a mutual understanding
of respect and generosity, that is seemingly a necessary
prerequisite to trade. The gift exchanges between representatives
of trading nations are depicted as the foundation of a civilized
relationship based on mutual trust. This idea of mutual exchange
underwrites the widespread images of circulation that describe
international trade and, particularly, English efforts to open
trade with Japan and extend it in China. As David Porter
suggests, “The ideal of free circulation that functions as the
implicit standard of cultural legitimacy in British
accounts...derived from an established tradition ...which
proposed the vitality of trade as the paramount measure of a
nation’s greatness” and “...accords it...axiomatic status with
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respect to civilized society.”8 I would argue that the universal
language of the mercantile age is coextensive with the language
of the gift-–of “reciprocal advantages” that defer the potential
for conflict under the guise of benevolence and disinterested
exchange. Mercantile language relied on a mutuality, “diffusing
mutual love from pole to pole” and disguised its self-interest in
aggrandizement by claiming that all would profit, that these
capitalist ventures predicated on market value being higher than
production and transportation costs would somehow add up to an
equal benefit for all. The paradox is that this language of
equality provoked ostensible acts of equal exchanges that were
relegated outside of the market in order to secure capitalist
advantage. Because English accounts treat gift exchange as an
international signifier of a desire for such mutual benefit, of
the many cross-cultural practices, appearances, and beliefs
encountered during early modern voyages to the Far East, gift
exchange is distinguished as a rare common denominator: the
concept of exchanging gifts as a practice in foreign communities,
between lords and servants, or between merchants of different
countries is documented without fascination or novelty, but
described rather as a familiar and anticipated practice.

8

Porter, 198.

53

III.
The gift in early modern trade and diplomacy created, as
Derrida and Bourdieu suggest, always misrecognized relations of
obligation. English and European traders assumed an ahistorical
and transcultural function of the gift. They believed that they
would present the Far East nations with gifts that registered
European progress and, in return, receive equal gifts, such as
advantages in the marketplace. This equitable exchange would
reflect in the eyes of the other an "accurate" reflection of
English self-perceptions of their status as a civilized nation.
Negotiations between Saris and the Japanese began immediately
upon the English arrival in Japan, and the first order of
business noted in his journal was to prepare and transport
presents from the King to the Japanese Shogun. This process took
five days, as the crew had to travel into the city carrying the
presents and then negotiate an audience with the Japanese ruler
by first having the gifts inspected and then placed for a
requisite period of time in the Chamber of Presents. Only after
pages of describing these preparations and exchanges does Saris
briefly mention in one sentence that, “we then landed our goods
and registered at the Customs house” (19).9 Likewise, whenever
communications were sent back and forth between the English and
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Japanese, they were addressed only after a gift exchange. At one
point the Shogun sent officials to Saris’ ship with two vests of
violet broad cloth that are thoroughly described by Saris, along
with an offer to take up residence rent-free in a local estate.
Saris agreed, then related what he gave in return for this
generosity: "one faire silk carpet, on faire large satin Quilt,
and one sash" (43). Following this account is a brief mention of
the communication that occasioned the visit to the ship in the
first place: the Shogun wanted to inquire, “what customs were due
in and out" on goods the English wanted to trade (43). Saris'
attention to the giving and receiving of such gifts does not
mean, however, that there were no conflicts involved in the
politics of giving and receiving presents, or the manner in which
they were exchanged. For example, Saris describes his surprise at
the Japanese secretary's staunch refusal to accept his present,
and his claim that if he did so it would be “as much as his life
were worth if he accepted any gift” (178). Although the Shogun
had the secretary and other officials deliver presents to the
English, the only Japanese official who could accept a present
was the Shogun. Moreover, the Japanese were known for their
particular emphasis on the wrapping of presents. Anthropologist
Joy Hendry notes that Japanese gift-wrapping was an elaborate and
accomplished practice, requiring so many layers of special paper
that they were beyond practical justification. Still, these
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culturally specific practices were readily accepted by the
English, and relations between Saris and the Japanese Shogun
continued productively as long as the requisite presents were
exchanged, and the unspoken expectation of reciprocity on-going.
While gift exchange served on the surface to foster a
civilized reciprocity, a close examination of the actual gifts
exchanged proves that the gifts were unequal and problematic in
maintaining a restricted market economy. The list of gifts
presented to Saris and his crew from the Japanese consisted
mainly of agricultural commodities: cattle, milk, lettuce,
chickens, hens, plantens, and lemons, to name a few.
Immediately, one recognizes that these “gifts” hold immense
symbolic and practical value for the giver: they comprise the
natural food resources of Japan and were significant commercial
objects in the Japanese market. Thus, the distinction between
gifts and commodities is deliberately blurred. The Japanese,
obviously familiar with the custom of gift exchange and its
unspoken obligations, use their commodities as gifts to appear
hospitable and welcoming, while the goods that attracted the
European traders, such as cloths, gowns, silks, and varnished
armors, remain in the marketplace for sale. Rather than give
these over freely, the Japanese manipulate the instability of
gift and commodity to cultivate social relations while
maintaining a commercial advantage: the English will have to pay
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for the commercial goods they desire.
The gifts given to the Japanese by the Europeans were vastly
different yet equally successful in manipulating both social and
commercial relations. Instead of providing commodities with both
use and exchange value, such as the food given by the Japanese,
the British gave luxury items, like silk carpets, elaborately
decorated napkins, satin quilts, and woolen cotton pieces-—items
that were rare in Japan and which were used to elicit desire for
more European trade. Significantly, the goods they offered as
gifts were not resources or products from England, but
commodities purchased along the trade route to Japan. The English
consistently tried to get the Japanese to buy cloth and clothes
that were manufactured in Britain or, with far more success, that
they had purchased in India or Batavia on the way to Japan. In
the latter case, the English East India Company used gold and
silver bullion to buy cotton goods in India in order to resell
them for a profit in Japan or China. The gifts Saris mentions are
used both to establish a social relationship but also to whet the
receivers' appetites so that the Japanese will want to buy the
items in bulk once trade has been established. The English were
trying to find a market and attempting to present themselves as
reliable and friendly traders who were more civil than the
Portuguese and at least as civil as the Dutch. As with the
Japanese efforts to use the English as a counterweight to the
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Portuguese and Dutch, Saris uses gifts to suture over an attempt
to dominate the commercial arena by using the ritual of gift
exchange to create for the Japanese both the obligation to
reciprocate and the desire for foreign goods. Therefore, gifts,
not commodities, provide the vocabulary for understanding the
relationships between the East India Company and Japanese
officials between 1613 and 1621.
The obligation to give and the social expectation of
fulfilling the obligation that is forced upon both parties
ensures continual communication, cooperation, and assistance,
which proves in Saris’ journal to override monetary concerns.
The gift is not represented as a bribe, but as a natural and
legitimate step in the process of establishing commercial
relations. But the obligation of the gift becomes a burden for
the recipient and the donor, and at one point negotiations become
strained. The tension is caused not by violence, deceit, or an
unreasonable denial of requests, which, significantly, Saris
documents in his journal, but by the failure to reciprocate a
gift. After some time in Japan, Saris had a second audience with
the Shogun to discuss further the trade negotiations. As with
every time Saris or an English representative visited the Shogun,
he brought various gifts that were offered before making any
requests. However, in this particular instance, the Shogun
dismissed Saris without making his return of gifts. At this,
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Saris writes: “he had not gifts to present, which truly is the
greatest wrong or indignity that ever hitherto was offered to any
Christian” (xxxviii). Significantly, this episode occurred soon
after the English and Japanese confirmed their trade agreement in
which the English were granted all of the privileges they sought
except their primary request: the freedom to sell in Japan
Chinese prizes that might be captured as punishment for China
rejecting trade with England. Moreover, the Shogun’s diplomatic
snub is followed by the journal's first accounts of violence and
unrest in Japan. Suddenly, Saris' account of the peaceful
coexistence of the English with the Japanese is disrupted by his
attention to violence within the Japanese community, including
many beheadings and the burning of property and bodies. Once
trade is restricted in ways that ensure that the East India
Company will have a hard time competing with the Dutch, the
Shogun disrupts the reciprocal exchanges that characterized
English and Japanese negotiations. Moreover, this is followed by
Saris’ account of violence among the Japanese and against
Christians. The use of the word "Christian" and Saris’ sudden
attention to unrest in Japan follow so closely upon one another
that the narrative effect is to associate the lack of proper gift
behavior with religious ignorance and brutality, a moral judgment
made by Saris as a result of his recognition of the English
economic subservience in the negotiations for trade.
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The ritual of gift exchange continued to inform the East
India Company's trading venture in Japan even after it had been
deemed a failure and the merchants recalled to England.
Ironically, the development of commercial trade relations
depended greatly on an economy predicated on loss; the
substantial value of gifts involved drew into question the very
viability of trade as a profit-making venture. Saris' final
journal entries demonstrate that while the gift enabled the
English to negotiate with Japan, it ultimately was detrimental to
their main goal: economic profit by establishing the EIC as a
carrier for trade between Japan and Northeast China. Saris states
that he made it clear to the Shogun that the company was leaving
Firando not because of any ill-treatment from the Japanese but
because of the “loss of ships and the bad prospects of the China
trade” (195). However, even at this juncture, the Company was
still obliged to send someone to deliver "the customary gifts" to
the Shogun (196). Consequently, the time and resources required
to prepare and deliver the gifts were so great that nearly six
months passed before the English were ready to quit Firando.
Saris' insistence on fulfilling this social duty seemingly
undermines basic economic logic: the obligation to give in return
for the generosity of having been allowed to establish a factory
in Japan forces further economic losses because the English must
stay in Firando until the gifts have been received.
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IV.
The English experience in early seventeenth-century Japan
was revisited, with variations, by European nations in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries trying to extend their
limited trade to China. In 1655 the Dutch send word to the new
Qing Emperor in Beijing that they were interested in establishing
trading privileges in China.10 The response they received stated
clearly that presents should be brought and presented
ceremoniously to the Emperor. However, the Dutch intentionally
disregarded this request, and their merchant was denied access to
the Emperor. Significantly, the Dutch offered instead a sum of
20,000 crowns to buy their trading rights in China.11 The Emperor
immediately refused the money, expressing dismay at the
introduction of a non-tribute-based contract and demanded that
the merchants of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) return with
appropriate gifts. Rather than accept a payment to add to the
treasury or to purchase foreign goods, the Chinese Emperor
insists on a gesture of deference from the Dutch: he refuses the
negotiation of money for trade because it implies an equal
relationship between the partners transacting. Rather, the
Emperor expects the Dutch to submit to his demands absolutely, or
10
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else negotiations will not be considered. For the Chinese, the
exchange of goods and money-–the definitive capitalist exchange–is not an adequate dynamic with which to define the commercial
relationship between their empire and European barbarians. The
Emperor’s demands instead rely on the gift to introduce and to
control commercial negotiations. Consequently, the Dutch and
Chinese are implicated in an asymmetrical mercantile
relationship: once the Dutch acquiesce to the Qing dynasty's
demands, they spend their time and resources in China bargaining
with the exchange of gifts, only to be repeatedly denied an
equivalent return--the access to trading rights that they sought.
More than a century later, Macartney’s embassy is much more
self-conscious about the presentation of gifts and the tributary
mission expected by the Chinese. Macartney embarked on his
mission knowing that his orders were to secure a number of traderelated privileges, yet he brought a letter from King George III
to the Emperor that defined the mission as one of honor and
friendship. Although the King's instructions to Macartney were
chiefly to "free the trade carried on at Canton…and obtain the
exports from China on cheaper terms," in his address to Qianlong,
he writes, "…above all, our ardent wish has been to become
acquainted with those celebrated institutions of your Majesty's
populous and extensive Empire which have carried its prosperity
to such a height as to be the admiration of all surrounding
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nations."12 Even at the end of the eighteenth century, the gift
functions as a productive form of diplomacy because it masks
self-interest and emphasis on profit with disinterested and
complimentary giving. The English did not arrive in China in 1793
to establish markets by force, make demands, or even to negotiate
outright. Instead, they arrived as envoys to pay homage to a
different culture, to honor the country’s government with gifts,
and to establish friendly and profitable ties. Unlike the East
India Company ships, which were restricted to trading only at
Canton with merchant associations and port officials, Macartney's
ships carried no commercial goods, paid no customs duties, and
were allowed to sail North to Tianjin, the port of Beijing.13
Underwriting Macartney's misson is one obvious level of
awareness; the English sent word to China that they would be
coming to honor the Emperor’s birthday, even as the orders for
the embassy were being written, all of which concerned trade
negotiations. But there is also an underlying obligation inherent
in gift exchange, and obligations tied the English to a mode of
subjection of which they did not approve and which, unknown to
them, authorized negotiations about the conditions of their
subjection rather than about equitable trade and mutual benefit.
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Until the nineteenth century, China operated under a
tributary system that extended to surrounding regions and to
Europe. The Chinese regarded every foreign mission to their
country as a tributary mission, despite the visitors' intentions.
The tribute system was a “natural expression of cultural
egocentricity…[Chinese] superiority was not one of mere material
power but one of culture.”14 Because the tribute system defined
all of China's relationships with what the Board of Rites
considered barbarian cultures, Qing officials expected that "the
uncultivated alien, however crass and stupid, could not but
appreciate the superiority of Chinese civilization and would
naturally seek to come and be transformed.”15 As J.K. Fairbank
suggests, the Chinese projected onto all foreigners a desire to
submit themselves to the Emperor, effectively erasing European
desire for trade. Because the Chinese relegated the English and
others to tributary status, they insisted that tribute must
consist of native produce, a symbolic offering of the fruits of
the tributary country. At a time when Chinese taxes were often
paid in produce and foreign trade was prohibited or severely
restricted, European efforts to dazzle the Chinese with examples
of their technological and scientific innovation seemed, at best,
bad form and, at worst, a serious violation of protocol. Trade
14
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could only occur on terms dictated by the Chinese, who prohibited
the exportation of contraband goods on foreign merchant vessels
but allowed regulated exports in tribute vessels that were exempt
from customs duty. In these terms, the tributary system
encompassed a limited foreign trade as well as diplomatic
rituals. Even though the Chinese lodged and fed embassies on
tributary missions, they did so out of deference due from a
superior power to a tributary vassal. What the English and other
Europeans failed to understand was that the Chinese would not
relinquish their own expectations about the significance and usevalue of diplomatic gifts.
Macartney knew before setting sail for China that the
Chinese would perceive his embassy as a tribute-bearing mission
and that any attempts to negotiate trade without a presentation
of gifts would be fruitless. Macartney’s flagship was followed by
one devoted solely to the transportation of gifts. Not only the
English, but the Dutch, Portuguese, and Russians already had
encountered the complex cultural implications of the Chinese
relationship between vassal and suzerain. However, the King’s
letter indicates that this deference to Chinese wishes was one of
calculation rather than of cultural admiration or respect.
Macartney’s voyage, according to the letter sent by the King, was
to honor the Emperor on his birthday. Its language, however,
recasts Macartney’s real mission to secure trade advantages as an
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exchange of gifts. Before Macartney even landed in China,
commercial trade intersected with the idealized gift. Rather than
approach the Qianlong Emperor directly for expanded trading
privileges, England first attempted to establish a symmetrical
relationship based on trust and generosity. The expense of
loading a ship with presents, and the cost of the presents
themselves, indicate that the English expected the loss to be
adequately compensated for by the authorization to establish more
ports and factories in China.
Although Macartney did arrive bearing gifts, the very logic
of "equitable exchange" interfered with his mission. Rather than
negotiating a purely market-based exchange, Macartney was in a
precarious position of having to determine Chinese conceptions of
value. Since money was not acceptable as a gift, as the Dutch
mission had discovered, Macartney had to determine what objects
would please and fascinate the Chinese, what held a particularly
high value in their culture, and what would flatter them enough
to encourage their agreement to his terms. In other words, the
exchange of gifts required a more tenuous negotiation of social
and economic value, and such negotiations threatened the
commercial enterprise because they always risked reinscribing the
dialectic vision of what the gift symbolizes: equity for the
English, tributary subjection for the Chinese. Rather than
discussing openly an equivalent between money and privilege, the
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English and Chinese negotiate through the unequal exchange of
gifts and the on-going pattern of obligation and reciprocity.
The Chinese conception of the tribute-bearing mission implied
that a barbarian people recognized “China’s all-pervading
goodness”(196). For the English, though, the “tribute” mission
was a means to further their economic interests in China: their
goal was not to pay homage to China’s cultural superiority but to
take advantage of their exotic resources, notably tea, porcelain,
and silk, for import into England, sale along trade routes
throughout the Far East, and re-exportation to Europe and
America. Consequently, the rhetoric of mutual exchange in
practice actually undermined England’s mission because mutual
exchange is impossible within the gift economy that they employ
to symbolize their commercial intentions.
Commercial profit was relegated to secondary status soon
after Macartney and his men arrived in Beijing. Believing the
Chinese to be unimpressed with the list of the gifts brought
over, Macartney improvised by adding to the list of presents both
a private telescope and a lens that originally were brought to
sell for a profit.
It appears that the expectations of the Chinese have
been raised very high, by the manner in which the
Embassy was announced, of the presents which it is to
be accompanied with. ...they were conceived of to be of
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immense value, and when he mentioned what they were, it
was thought that the Chinese would be very
disappointed.

From these considerations Mr. Browne was

induced to add his fine telescope to what we had
already brought, and I have this day completed our
apparatus with Parker’s great lens, which Captain
Macintosh brought out with him on a speculation, and
which he has been prevailed upon to part with on very
reasonable terms, forgoing all the profit which he had
the prospect of deriving from the sale of so valuable
and so uncommon an article. (69)

Marcartney recognized the importance of making impressive and
valuable gifts and was willing to take a financial loss to
impress the Chinese. Understanding the consequences of
disappointing the Chinese in this diplomatic exchange, he offered
up the most valuable and scientifically advanced objects–-ones
that otherwise promised to bring in a substantial profit-–in an
attempt to placate the Emperor. Short-term loss is sacrificed to
the prospect of future profit. The gift becomes a way to disguise
these interested relations and also a means to negotiate cultural
subjection. The exchange of gifts allows each nation to defer or
deny the prospect of subjection, obligation, and debt. As with
Saris' experience in Japan, the gift appears to displace both
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obligations and challenges to self-conceptions of individual and
national identity, and to keep in abeyance the subjection
inherent in duty and debt.
On his way to the Imperial Palace, Macartney was informed
that he was expected to perform the customary practice of the
Kowtow. The kowtow required subjects to prostrate themselves and
to perform three times in succession a bow and the “knocking” of
one’s head to the floor nine times. Previous European embassies
had oscillated between not performing the kowtow and not adhering
strictly to the exact court rituals that were taught to foreign
ambassadors by Mandarins on the Board of Rites. The kowtow was
the chief means by which the tributary ambassador repaid the
Emperor for his generosity in arranging imperial board and
lodging for the embassies; the court officials were charged to
see that the emissary did the kowtow before the Emperor with
accomplished ease. But the ritual itself, as seen in the debate
over whether Macartney actually kowtowed, was no guarantee of
admittance to the Imperial Court. In fact, some historians have
speculated that Macartney’s refusal to perform the kowtow was a
key reason for his failure in China. For Macartney, the kowtow
was a humiliating gesture that clearly demonstrated subservience
to the Chinese emperor, and he therefore refused to perform it.
For the Emperor, the kowtow was part of the customary tributary
system in China, the system that demands the conferral of tribute
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to the Emperor before requests are made. The fact that the
Chinese Emperor and Macartney argued over the proper definition
of the gifts--the Emperor consistently referred to them as
tribute while Macartney corrected, identifying them as presents—demonstrates, that the Emperor saw the kowtow as an extension of
the tribute paid by the English with their gifts. In contrast,
Marcartney sees the gifts not as tribute, but as a customary form
of establishing friendly relations that he then hopes will open
Chinese ports as a reciprocal gift. For Europeans going back to
the seventeenth century, the acts of the ambassadors represented
the acts of the sovereign. In other words, if Macartney
prostrated himself before the Emperor it would be equivalent to
King George III's doing so. But the Chinese, interpreting the
presents as tribute, read the gifts as symbolizing the English
envoy's acceptance of his subjection and expected that subjection
to be legitimized by the bodily performance of the kowtow.
The question of the kowtow is significant because it makes
clear the disguised subjection inherent in gift exchange. Rather
than offer objects of value and novelty, Macartney is asked to
physical condescend to the Emperor. Although in Chinese custom
the Emperor kowtowed to God and to his parents, in Macartney’s
view it is far too much a physical indication of subjection. The
very act of the kowtow puts the participant in vulnerable
position, as he kneels and bows his head until it touches the
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floor. In spatial terms, the Emperor is elevated on his throne,
and Macartney literally at the Emperor’s feet. Macartney’s
refusal to kowtow demonstrates what the gift seeks to disguise–that for each participant of a gift exchange, the receiving of
gifts is an act of subjection. Since the two cultures have very
different views of what constitutes a gift, the entire process is
an on-going negotiation–-repeated attempts to place the receiver
in debt and subjection. In the end, it is the ambiguity of the
gifts and the practice of gift exchange that most defines English
and Far East relations–-as well as English and Far East identity.

Despite his boatload of gifts, Marcartney failed to
recognize the centrality of the tributary system to Chinese
culture, and his repeated deferral of diplomatic and cultural
ceremony conflicted with Chinese expectations of reciprocity and
subjection. As Morse notes, provisions were supplied, pilots were
provided, and the transport of the Embassy and the presents was
arranged for, all at the charge of the Emperor from the time they
first landed in China, “but in the business for which he had come
he could make no progress. They were no more than prisoners in
silken bonds” (225). Morse’s reference to the embassy as
“prisoners in silken bonds” articulates the powers of obligation
and subjection that drove relations between the English and the
Chinese. The rhetoric of diplomacy, the controversy over the
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kowtow negotiations, and the performance required to sustain the
official fiction that the English embassy was a gesture of
friendship, displaced commercial relations; disinterested and
benevolent gestures made it impossible for Macartney to broach
the subject of trade and commerce. Macartney’s hesitancy to
discuss business during his audience with Qianlong ironically
reinforced the fantasy structure that distinguishes between
beneficence and profit. The Chinese, by presenting a welcoming
and honorable reception for Macartney, use the English philosophy
of trade to defer negotiations, the very negotiations that
Macartney was instructed to pursue.
Marcartney’s mission was destined to fail even before his
ships set sail. The English were aware of the Chinese adamant
refusal to extend trade beyond Canton. Macartney's entourage
described China as a blocked, backward, and stagnant nation
because the Chinese did not recognize the economic value of
trade. In light of what eighteenth-century traders and economists
knew about Chinese attitudes towards trade, the insistence on
sending an envoy to China with a separate ship just to transport
presents, and under the guise of friendly birthday wishes,
demonstrates that the English believed that their gifts would
obligate the Chinese to make at least some concessions.
Macartney’s anxiety about the quality, novelty, and value of the
presents indicates that this seemingly disinterested form of
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exchange was, in actuality, a final and desperate move to force
the Chinese through a means of what Bourdieu terms "symbolic
violence" to give into their demands.

VI.
The persistent language of gift exchange, despite the East
India Company's repeated failures to secure or to extend trade in
Japan and China, points to the complexities of diplomatic and
economic relations between 1600 and 1800. The practice of gift
exchange in commercial relations emerges in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries as a fantasy of reciprocal advantage that
sutures over relations of domination and the potential for
conflict. Despite the counterintuitive work of the gift in
capitalist ventures, seventeenth- and eighteenth-century
economists and merchants continued to describe and to justify
trade in the rhetoric of the gift: mutual benefits and
reciprocity. As Saris' journal indicates, however, while the gift
serves as a key diplomatic tool, its gesture to civility and
equality in actuality works to legitimize dominance, obligation,
and subservience, for both the Europeans and their Far Eastern
partners in exchange.
While each nation attempts to deny the commerce and profit
gained from these relations, paradoxically, it is the rhetoric of
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the gift and the practical gift exchanges that complicate
equality and provoke competition for cultural superiority.
Embodied in the gifts that each culture considers valuable is an
attempt to display through benevolence a cultural dominance. The
narrative of the gift exchange is one that must balance
precariously the fantasy of generosity and the unspoken
assumption that the gift is both a market of surplus value that
never can be reciprocated and an aggrieve gesture that demands a
satisfactory return. Even though trade and commerce were
supposedly to trump tribute and gifts as the primary form of
economic exchange, the fantasy of the gift had to be maintained
to suture over self-interested relations and to allow a
continuance of “trade” as tribute, honor, friendship, and mutual
benefit. On such ironic and half-understood self-deception rested
a national identity based on the valorization of progress,
profit, and enlightenment.
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CHAPTER THREE
“Comply and Live, Deny and Starve”:
Obligation and Asymmetrical Exchange in Defoe’s Roxana

I.
Early in Defoe’s novel Roxana; or the Fortunate Mistress
(1724), a suddenly generous and compassionate landlord rescues
the heroine and her faithful maid from imminent penury. Although
Roxana owes months in back rent and suffers the removal of most
of her possessions by this landlord, her plight instigates a
series of seemingly benevolent gestures:

the landlord allows

Roxana to remain in the house rent free, provides her and her
maid with extravagant meals, and commits to a business
partnership with the heroine to manage the lodging. But with no
material property of her own to give as a return for the
landlord’s generosity, Roxana must sacrifice her virtue: she
offers her body as an equivalent gift for his financial
assistance. The obligation to give has severe moral consequences
for Roxana. Recognizing that the landlord’s motivations are far
from selfless, she must weigh the value of her virtue against “a
Principle of Gratitude” (36).1 Throughout this episode and the

1

Daniel Defoe, Roxana; or the FortunateMistress, ed. Robert Clark (London: Orion Publishing Group,
1998). Subsequent references are to this edition.
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novel as a whole, Defoe casts the heroine’s exchange of her body
for material benefit in the language of the gift and obligation.
The unspoken contract of gift exchange–-that when one receives
one must give in return-–forces Roxana to give herself “up to the
Devil, to shew [herself] grateful to [her] Benefactor” (36).
This initial scene of gift exchange displays the complex system
of debt, obligation, and authority that informed eighteenthcentury conceptions of the gift. As Roxana continues to profit
materially throughout the novel, she is compelled to “ballance
all obligations” (126) with the only gift that has a value for
both her and the receiver. Yet her gift always invokes an ongoing circular practice because the inequality of the gifts
irrevocably incites feelings of obligation and debt. As a result,
Roxana spends the remainder of the novel attempting to repay a
debt that in actuality never can be repaid. The unequal
relationship between the material and sexual gifts demonstrates
how each new gift enacts a debt that traps the participants in a
series of asymmetrical exchanges that never can be completed.
In this chapter, I draw on the revisionist work of Pierre
Bourdieu and Luce Irigaray on gift economies to argue that the
complexities of gift exchange supplement theories of capitalist
accumulation, and that a sophisticated understanding of the debts
and obligations engendered by the asymmetrical logic of the gift
illuminates the material and symbolic exchanges that pervade
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Roxana.2 Most critics of Defoe focus on the centrality of
capitalism in his texts; critics of Roxana, such as Sandra
Sherman, J.G.A Pocock, James Thompson, Michael McKeon, and
Catherine Ingrassia, read Defoe as a “theorist” of eighteenthcentury capitalism who dramatizes both its virtues and its
contradictions.3 I propose, however, that in Roxana, Defoe offers
a crucial theoretical intervention into the discourses of
capitalism. Reading Roxana as a narrative of asymmetrical gift
exchange and within eighteenth-century conceptions of reciprocity
reveals the novel to be less about money and business than about
obligation and subjection, the symbolic means by which relations
of domination were perpetuated in the period.
My reading of Roxana draws on contemporary gift economy
theory, eighteenth-century conceptions of gender, business, and
prostitution, and Defoe’s own involvement with the period’s
philanthropic concerns to contest arguments that claim Roxana is
an economic agent who chooses with whom she will do business, and
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who achieves her massive wealth through an astute manipulation of
the capitalist system. Susan L. Jacobsen describes Roxana as "the
epitome of commercial enterprise" and as an "entrepeneur"4 and
David Durant identifies her as a “wise financier.”5 This chapter,
however, will demonstrate that the logic of the gift creates the
fiction of Roxana's economic knowledge and agency. The gifts
Roxana receives obligate her to a career as a “Woman of Business”
(117), so that her narrative reconstructs capitalism not as a
matter of individual ingenuity-–whatever her obsessions with
concealing and multiplying her riches–-but as an obligation that
never can be repaid. Defoe’s narrative, therefore, is an account
of Roxana’s attempt to repay with her body the gift of financial
security that her affairs allow her. The conclusion of Roxana
demonstrates that Defoe ultimately condemns the means of exchange
that allows Roxana her supposed financial freedom; his depiction
of the collective fantasy of the gift provides only a temporary
displacement of the overt violence to which she is subjected.
Acts of giving in Defoe’s works seem to occupy only a
compensatory role, serving as a reassuring sign of benevolence,
empathy, and Christian charity in a society greatly threatened by
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competitive economic gain and profit. In turn, the emphasis on
capitalist accumulation in these texts perpetuates in Defoe’s
narrative worlds a fantasy that characters can distinguish
between disinterested and self-interested economic principles:
that gifts and sacrifice are opposed to and therefore separate
from commodities and gain. This assumption is shared by critics
who overlook in Roxana the complexity of gift exchange in the
novel rather than interrogating the ways that these seemingly
private and affective exchanges construct Roxana’s self-identity
and reflect a form of symbolic subjection disguised as
benevolence. Defoe’s texts simultaneously demonstrate in both
social and fictional narratives the ways in which the principles
of a gift economy are defined by the same values and motivations
that determine the operation of a market system. By examining the
nature and function of the gift in Roxana, I suggest that the
moral corruption many contemporaries writers feared would result
from a profit-based economy is best narrated not by Roxana’s
fall, but by the politics of a gift economy that bind her to an
unending debt. In this regard, the novel’s representation of the
complexities of gift exchange reveals both the fiction of the
disinterested gift and the intersections among gifts, obligation,
and the negotiations of individual and social value.
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II.
To understand how the gift inflects Roxana’s relationships
as well as her fantasy of economic agency, it is necessary to
interrogate her knowledge of finance in relation to her astute
and anxiety-ridden recognition of her unending obligation. As
Christopher Gabbard recently has suggested, Roxana’s “financial
acumen needs to be reconsidered, if not thrown entirely into
question.”6 Gabbard demonstrates the ways in which Roxana exposes
herself as financially illiterate, pointing to her “admission of
an inability to read ‘Accompts’” and the fact that it is through
Sir Robert’s “successful investment strategies that she becomes
an exceptionally wealthy woman.”7 While agreeing with Gabbard
that Roxana’s financial knowledge is limited, I would add that
the misinterpretation of Roxana as a capitalist results from the
work of the gift, which disguises her true position as a woman
with limited agency in an economy governed by the laws that
Bourdieu defines;8 she is always indebted and subjected to the
authority of a masculine economy. What has been read as Roxana’s
sophisticated financial manipulation in actuality is her
unwitting involvement in an unending cycle of reciprocity enabled

6
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by a series of “fortunate” affairs with wealthy and generous men.
In this sense, the gifts are insinuated upon Roxana and she
willingly acknowledges the repost she owes for these gifts.
Therefore, her participation in these exchanges must be evaluated
within the vocabulary Roxana employs to tell her story: the
vocabulary of obligation and loss rather than the vocabulary of
capital and profit.
For most readers, the money, jewels, and clothing that
Roxana receives during her affairs establish for her a basis of
funds that accumulate through investment and interest. This
accumulation most often is read as capital that Roxana owns and
astutely manages. However, her self-description as a “Woman of
Business” is undermined by her identification of each acquisition
as a gift exchange that entails debt and reciprocity. In each of
her affairs she openly defines herself as “bound by honor,”
(29)“infinitely oblig’d,”(57) “in gratitude,”(109)and
“indebted,”(223); her debt is cumulative and always asymmetrical.
Roxana’s entry into the business world, therefore, is predicated
on her receiving gifts and perpetuating an economy of
reciprocity: whether it is a dowry from her father, shelter and
sustenance from the landlord, or jewels and clothing from the
Prince, Roxana’s identification of money always is in the form of
a gift. As Susan Stave notes, technically any property a woman
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acquires in this period is constructed in the form of a gift.9
Wills, inheritances, dowries, pin money, and separate settlements
are cast in the rhetoric of a male’s generosity that obligates
the female recipient to the memory and name of a patrilineal
economy (which I shall argue in Chapter 4 on Burney’s Cecilia).
Following Roxana, a number of narratives, such as Clarissa and
Cecilia to name just two, attempt to construct female ownership
of property and wealth, but the obligation entailed in those
acquisitions proves they never own anything but in fact owe a
great deal for the privilege of enacting a fantasy of female
autonomy. Rather than demonstrating a “modern” understanding of
investment, Roxana describes her relationship to money and to the
men who contribute to her wealth in a language of obligation and
debt to an abstract patrilineal order.
The underlying confusion between capitalism and gift economy
in Roxana is a product of what Pierre Bourdieu identifies as the
“guaranteed misrecognition” of the gift. This misrecognition is
aimed at
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transmuting the inevitable and inevitably interested
relations imposed by kinship, neighbourhood or work,
into elective relations of reciprocity, through the
sincere fiction of a disinterested exchange, and more
profoundly, at transforming arbitrary relations of
exploitation (of woman by man, younger brother by elder
brother, the young by the elders) into durable,
relations, grounded in nature.10
Benevolence and generosity become alternatives to self-interest
only in that they facilitate the maintenance and reinscription of
power relations through the fiction that gifts are disinterested.
The fictions that Bourdieu describes allow the obligation
inherent in gift exchange to be replaced by gratitude and equal
sincerity, and the natural laws of opposition and domination are
ostensibly displaced by mutual affection and voluntary relations.
Consequently, in Roxana, gifts are mistaken for capital by both
Roxana herself and by many of Defoe’s readers. Because the
perpetual exchange of gift and counter-gift in the novel takes
place against a backdrop of investment, speculative finance, and
the possibilities of individual improvement that the new economy
promised, Roxana can appear as an independent, wealthy, and
legitimate businesswoman able to negotiate and trade in the
market. However, the seemingly disinterested exchange of gifts
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highlights Roxana’s inability to access independently her own
wealth and to declare her autonomy. The gift produces the fiction
that she chooses self-commodification and that her “capitalist”
exchanges are equal negotiations of value.
Roxana's sense of obligation surfaces most dramatically in
her moral self-doubt and self-recriminations. Her selfidentification in the novel is more prominently aligned with the
necessity of prostitution rather than with the agency of
business. Some readers, however, conflate Roxana’s prostitution
of her body with legitimate business: she seemingly profits from
her sexual labor. This misconception is perpetuated by Roxana's
own repeated references to herself as a whore, mistress, and
prostitute. However, the language of the novel makes clear that
Roxana's understanding of this role is not as a negotiating
subject, but as an object who is bound by a debt to perform
sexual labor. Roxana’s ignorance of finances as well as her
understanding of obligation demonstrate that her “career” as a
prostitute is less an example of feminine economic agency, than
an on-going effort to clear her debts, to return "equally" with a
sexual labor that causes her a great deal of anguish.11 The fact
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that Roxana is able to accumulate wealth in exchange for her
sexual labor does not allow her financial freedom but situates
her in a position in which she symbolizes the gift, and each
exchange of her body enacts a moral and economic loss without a
sufficient return. Her body becomes, therefore, surplus, but it
is a surplus of value for the men who can use it and discard it
at their whim. Essentially, the gifts Roxana receives mean that
her exploitation is recast as subjectivity; she becomes her
debts.
While Roxana subsequently labels herself a "whore," she is
never really in the position of being a prostitute forced to put
a price on her favors. Although prostitutes may proclaim their
economic agency, such as Angelica Bianca in Aphra Behn’s The
Rover (1702), the logic of capitalism undermines the prostitute’s
labor as subjective, profit-based work. Despite the exchange of
money, the prostitute's body always occupies the position of the
gift. As Luce Irigary explains, the prostitute always already is
in circulation:
[They] have value only because they have already been
appropriated by a man, and because they serve as the
locus of relations–hidden ones–between men.
Prostitution amounts to usage that is exchanged. Usage
that is not merely potential: it has already been
realized. The woman’s body is valuable because it has

85
already been used....and has become once again no more
than a vehicle for relations among men.”12
Roxana’s self-identification as a prostitute entangles her in the
infinite regress that results from the misrecognition of the
gift. The irony of Roxana’s situation is that at the same time
that she strives to achieve an economic freedom and escape the
necessity of marriage, she must submit to a patriarchal
imperative: that she return gifts of money and sustenance with an
“equal” gift, her body–-the only gift Roxana has to give that
embodies the dynamic of value for both the giver and the
receiver.13 She can never repay her debts or meet her obligations
because her sexual labor and self-identity can only provoke
further instances of the asymmetries of power that inform the
process of unending obligation.

III.
Roxana attempts to deny her obligation to the landlord by
invoking the fiction that his generosity derives purely from a
merciful nature. As opposed to Amy, who immediately suspects that
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his offer stems from an ulterior motive, Roxana invests herself
in the fantasy of the gift, attempting to displace self-interest
with the very vocabulary that defines it: “that’s a hard thing
too, that we should judge a Man to be wicked because he’s
charitable; and vicious because he is kind” (27). The landlord
has ingratiated himself to Roxana, ironically, by “generously”
giving to her the property he confiscated when she failed to pay
the rent. By returning her furniture, plate, and linen as gifts,
he appropriates the possessions and thereby appears to sacrifice
his property out of compassion for Roxana. Roxana’s initial fall
into what she perceives to be prostitution comes on the heels of
the landlord’s sudden conversion from a ruthless creditor to a
compassionate friend:
I was surprize’d, you may be sure, at the Bounty of a
Man that had but a little while ago been my Terror, and
had torn the Goods out of my House, like a Fury....
But now he put on a Face, not of a Man of Compassion
only, but of a Man of Friendship and Kindness, and this
was so unexpected, that it was surprising.
The landlord’s transition occurs at a timely moment. Roxana has
had to abandon her children and is on the brink of starvation.
Consequently, his actions return to Roxana shelter, stability,
and a comfortable life. Her gratitude then comes to be measured
in terms of relief from extreme distress. As Roxana praises the
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landlord for rescuing her from starvation, she declares herself
“Generously delivered,” (33) and “beholden” (28). Suddenly, the
confiscation of a bankrupt tenant’s goods and shelter by the
landlord in the name of business, self-interest, and the security
of capital is displaced and a lavish and bountiful series of
gifts comes to define the interpersonal dynamic between the
landlord and Roxana. But the landlord's generosity merely is a
way of making concrete the symbolic authority he already has over
her. The fiction of the gift in the form of Roxana’s returned
property has erased the landlord’s identity as a crass
capitalist, but there is no guarantee that he will not again
confiscate it; the landlord/tenant relationship has been
suspended in theory only. Immediately after the return of the
property, the language of the gift comes to represent not only
the landlord’s manipulation of Roxana, but of her self-identity
as well.
Roxana clearly is aware of this tenuousness dynamic. She
acknowledges early on that the gifts she receives from the
landlord are burdened with implications of debt, duty, and
obligation. Because Roxana does not recognize the return of the
property as a return of her possessions to their rightful owner
but as a generous gesture, she interprets her relationship with
the landlord as asymmetrical. After his first few gestures, she
anticipates that she must give something back and that indeed the
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landlord expects something in return. Roxana believes that
everything she owns at this point in the narrative has been given
to her by the landlord; however, the return of her property as a
form of gift only displaces the fact that the landlord was
responsible for their initial loss. As the landlord’s gifts
become more generous, Roxana questions “how should I ever make
him a return any way suitable, was what I had not yet time to
think of... I cou’d only say, that I should never forget it while
I had Life, and shou’d be always ready to acknowledge it” (29).
Her readiness to “acknowledge” material gifts cannot be
restricted to mere verbal thanks. Thus, Roxana makes a return
with the only form of property she believes she has to give.
This exchange often is read as a capitalist transaction: she
exchanges for subsistence her sexual labor. But Roxana realizes
the limitations imposed upon her by receiving the landlord’s
“bounty”: she does not choose to exchange her body in an economic
transaction mediated by a general equivalent that would guarantee
a universal standard of abstract value by which all transactions
can be measured and evaluated, but looks to her body as a return
that at least can begin to equal the generous gift of physical
salvation: “I confess... I scarce had the power to deny him
anything” (32). The events prior to Roxana's sleeping with the
landlord are rife with her concerns about duty, obligation, and
virtue. The landlord himself attempts to create a fictional
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equality by invoking the language of contract; he agrees to view
Roxana as a wife and has made “an Equality” between them. These
scenes embody both the elective gestures of benevolent concern
for social relations as well as the interested calculation of
capitalism: the landlord wants to donate his resources to rescue
Roxana from starvation, but his intentions include also placing
Roxana in a position to owe him perpetually.
While the landlord offers Roxana gifts that ensure her
protection, the Prince offers gifts as a form of social
legitimacy. The gifts from the landlord obligate Roxana because
to refuse would be to starve, but the gifts from the Prince are
accepted because she cannot say no. Roxana’s relationship with
the Prince continues her obligation to a masculine authority able
to give generously. Although Roxana does not initially face the
moral dilemma with him that she faced with the landlord, her
complicity in the affair is predicated on her knowledge that the
Prince’s generosity must be returned. In this sense, the
negotiation of value that occurs within a market exchange is
bypassed and the logic of the gift usurps the exchange: to refuse
the Prince would not only be an economic mistake but also a
social transgression. The gifts embody the inequality between the
male giver and the female receiver. The Prince never makes an
offer that Roxana can refuse, but instead showers upon her gifts
that she cannot turn down. Thus, without asking or demanding,
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Roxana becomes a “mistress” to the Prince: again, she realizes
the equivalent gift for the cultural prestige of the Prince lies
in her body, her only means of return. Roxana does not sell her
body but is compelled to offer it as a return gift when the
Prince gives her presents. Roxana admits without overtly saying
so that she understands the Prince’s intentions. He offers her
the chance to “...make some Gentleman of quality happy, that may,
in return, make you forget all your sorrows”(55) and that through
their relationship she will know "what it is to oblige" a man.
Their relationship is defined in terms of debt and obligation.
Never does Roxana asks for payment or gifts, but rather, the
Prince gives so profusely that she never has to ask.
Roxana’s own assessment of her situation demonstrates that
she is the Prince’s mistress through obligation, rather than
through economic choice: “I had now no poverty attending me; on
the contrary, I was mistress of ten thousand pounds before the
prince did anything for me”(71). Although she stays with the
Prince for approximately eight years, she admits her inability to
end the relationship and only when he says he can no longer see
her does she consider herself free: “now I was at liberty...”
(100). This acknowledged position of captivity and obligation
displaces Roxana’s financial agency. The language of capitalist
commerce is not adequate enough to disguise her recognition that
she has been forced into these obligatory acts through the
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seemingly innocent gesture of benevolence.
The question underwriting the novel is one which Roxana
voices repeatedly: “What was I a Whore for now?” (178;179;180)
The question symbolizes her repeated loss and the unending
obligation these asymmetrical exchanges entail. She first asks
this question during her affair with the Prince, and later
repeats it during her affair with the Lord. She recognizes
throughout these subsequent affairs that there is no blatant
economic reason to continue her "whoredom": “I was perfectly
easie...I that had no poverty to introduce Vice, but was grown
not only well supply’d, but Rich, and not only Rich, but was very
Rich...(99). What Roxana fails to recognize is that her status as
gift–-her self as the only object she has to give–-requires she
remain in debt: gifts do not seal financial transactions but
enact a series of exchanges that incite countergifts that, as
Bourdieu suggests, perpetually mediate social relations of power.
In this sense, her relationship with the Dutch Merchant is the
most interesting and problematic in the novel. In this
relationship more than any other, Roxana discusses openly, as a
substitute for negotiation, the balancing of accounts not solely
with money but with favors and gratitude. Just as is her
relationship with the landlord, this relationship is predicated
on the greatest gift, “saving [her] life,” and creating the
greatest debt of which Roxana can conceive. Significantly, by
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this point in the novel she has accumulated vast wealth, whereas
when she knew the landlord she literally was on the street and
starving. Still, before the Dutch merchant even implies an
expected return, Roxana has decided to sleep with him,
immediately correlating the gift of her body for use at his will
as an equivalent for rescuing her. “I had a grateful sense...
what gain he made was his due, ..and made no Advantage of me...”
(109). Clearly, Roxana views the trade of her sexual labor as a
means of “ballancing accounts.” When the Dutch merchant hints
that he will ask a great favor of her, she immediately decides
that she will sleep with him, considering her body the ultimate
return because she is “sensible of the Obligation I was under to
him, for saving me from the worst Circumstance...I could deny him
nothing” (130). Thus, Roxana does not identify her monetary
wealth as an adequate return; as I have suggested previously,
Roxana always has a sense that she doesn’t own what has been
given to her. Her insistence on repayment with her body
demonstrates her anxiety that the money is not hers to give.
How, then, do we read Roxana’s body and the sexual labor
that her body attracts and performs?

Since there can be no

production without capital, Roxana’s body acts simultaneously as
her basis of capital and her means of production. She may profit
materially from this labor, and thus acquire money and status,
but consistently throughout her “career” the means of production
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and social advancement lie in her body–-in other words, her
material profit never displaces her body as the primary object of
desire that incites the process of evaluation, asymmetrical
exchange, and consumption. For Roxana to act legitimately as an
agent in the process of marketing her sexual labor, a third
“alien entity” would have to dominate the process and embody an
exchange value that both she and the men with whom she has sex
could evaluate as an equivalent substitution.
Roxana depicts both the heroine’s enacting of a logic of
asymmetrical gift exchange and the ways in which such fictions
inform and are informed by the discourses of capitalism that are
associated with the eighteenth century. Capitalist exchange is
predicated on the realization of both an exchange and use value
embedded in the object. Goux explains, “The analysis of value can
begin only when an equivalent appears on the scene. It begins
with the first substitution. The value of the lost object is
expressed in the body of the object replacing it” (22). The
fiction of the gift is that it erases the dependence of a third
entity for evaluation. In reality, however, the gift exchanges
between Roxana and the men in her life inevitably depend on a
general equivalent. When money and goods are given to Roxana,
capitalist theory would assume that these objects obtain value by
coming into relation with a second object, namely Roxana’s body
and her sexual labor. If she were a prostitute with a price list,
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each gift and each sexual encounter could be measured by the same
abstract standard of value: money. But as Derrida recognizes, the
fiction of the gift erases the transcendent mediation of the
general equivalent and, paradoxically, the third entity that
assigns value to the objects exchanged is Roxana’s own inadequate
and asymmetrical return. Thus, her physical body is exchanged as
a "gift" at the same time that she must register its excessive
return with the same "third entity," her body. It would seem that
this creates an impossibility: how can Roxana make an evaluated
and equal return when the object of value is predicated on its
substitution of itself? The substitution in this case cannot
exist, or it immediately cancels itself, being received and
returned simultaneously--but each return puts Roxana in greater
debt to the second participant. What Roxana repeatedly
demonstrates is precisely the inequality of gift exchange, the
loss entailed in a seemingly affective gesture, and the
exploitation both perpetuated and concealed by the fantasy of the
gift. The valuation that gift exchange seemingly avoids instead
requires Roxana to accept willingly a substitution equivalent to
loss. Thus, Roxana’s gain throughout the novel is a gain of loss,
her increased loss of virtue, principle, and autonomy.
Roxana’s role in production, however, is to produce man’s
desire. Her affairs have the outward appearance of the business
of a courtesan. In return for her sexual labor, she receives
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money and objects in the form of jewels, plate, and clothes. Over
time, Roxana comes own “5600l” worth of goods, land securities,
and a yearly income of fifty thousand pounds that she invests
through the assistance of a financial manager. According to some
critics, this accumulation is recognized by Defoe and his readers
in modern economic terms of interest, capital, and investment,
concepts that derive from the historic productions of capitalism.
These terms objectify Roxana’s acts as “business” and relegate
them to a competitive economy. This theory, however, downplays
the subjective relations of domination and authority involved in
the transactions. Indeed, late in the novel, when her wealth has
accrued to “two thousand fifty six Pounds a-year, Ready-Money,
constantly coming in” (229) she continues to seek a position as a
mistress, as a treasured object that will provoke more gifts.
While there are historical examples of “fortunate mistresses” who
maintained themselves by having secured a comfortable standard of
living from wealthy men, there is an obvious element of fantasy
in Roxana’s substantial fortune.14 Roxana’s wealth is predicated
on the gift–so much so that she finds it impossible to give up a
selective, upper-class form of prostitution and live morally on
the money she has obtained. Not only does she recognize her
relationship to money as that of a receiver, but she reenacts an

14

One such example would be the infamous Nell Gwyn, the prostitute/actress whom some believe served
as a model for Roxana.
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obligation to return with each gift she receives. Furthermore,
despite her “success” as a "fortunate mistress," Roxana never
claims to have “earned” her money, but to being increasingly
fortunate in the quality of gifts she receives in exchange for
her body. Importantly, Roxana never even asks for money or gifts,
as the landlord, Prince, Lord, and Dutch Merchant always are more
than willing to give before she can even request or demand
assistance. Roxana does not negotiate, initiate, or exchange in
immediate and mutual transactions with the men who keep her. Her
role in these relationships is not as an independent agent
involved in a negotiation of values, but as one who complies only
after the fact in the exchange that has obligated her to do so.
Roxana’s constant fear of losing her money suggests that she
recognizes her ignorance about how best to manage her fortune.15
She knows how much she has accumulated, but relies on others to
decide how to keep it. Once she has acquired a substantial
fortune, she enlists the help of Sir Robert Clayton (to whom she
was recommended but did locate on her own) who manages her
interest and investments. Initially, Roxana is reticent to take

15

To understand the ways in which the asymmetrical exchange of gifts intersects with issues of gender,
value, and business the eighteenth century, it is important to investigate eighteenth-century conceptions of women
and business in the period. As Catherine Ingrassia points out, between the 1690s and 1753 an average of about 20
percent of the stock holdings an annuities were held by women. Women were an increasing presence in Grub
Street and Exchange Alley. However, women’s involvement in the speculative economy is represented as
disordered. Female subjects are represented as having newly discovered “the pleasures of business” but
compromise the distinction between business and pleasure “within a sexual economy focused primarily on men.”
Anxieties about commerce were represented in terms of the feminine.
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his advice, but each time ultimately agrees with Clayton because
she cannot conceive of an effective alternative; in fact, amid
his insistence that she save more and spend less, Roxana admits
“I knew not how to be a Miser” (208). In each of her affairs,
Roxana plays a passive role in the financial arrangements. She
accepts money, jewels, and goods as a gracious recipient, but the
handling of her material and financial support is conducted by
men. By rescuing Roxana from poverty at the beginning of the
novel, the landlord assumes an authority over her belongings: he
decides what to return and then secures Roxana’s ownership with a
contract of his making. After he is murdered, Roxana takes on the
appearance of a widow with precarious finances and does not
hesitate to allow the Prince to assert his economic benevolence
and authority. Years later, the Dutch Merchant rescues Roxana
from exposure and prevents the confiscation of the jewels which
in actuality she does not legitimately own.
There is, however, an element of female financial
intelligence in the novel, appropriately embodied in Amy.
Indeed, Amy, the maid-servant who performs female and class
appropriate work, is the most astute, responsible, and effective
business person in the novel. It is Amy who repeatedly advises
Roxana on concerns of money and concealment, makes numerous
arrangements for lodgings and equipage, and recommends the Dutch
Merchant as a source of financial advice and aid. Throughout the
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novel, she comes to Roxana's aid as a rational, moral, and
moderate voice of reason, ironically in scenes in which the
heroine construes her authority over Amy as business sense; in
fact, she repeatedly calls Amy her “agent,” recognizing her
dependence on Amy’s loyalty. By making Amy sleep with the
landlord, Roxana, in effect, tries to make her doubly indebted–to the landlord and to Roxana herself–-and to implicate her
servant in the unequal economy of obligation. But Amy's primary
debt is always to her mistress rather than to a masculine world
of supposedly equal exchange–-she can never do enough for Roxana.
Ironically, the servant has a better grasp of commercial markets
than her mistress. Unlike the men in the novel, Amy, who
throughout enacts business exchanges, trades in gain for Roxana
rather than loss. Moreover, Roxana’s relationship with Amy
actually denies Roxana the liberty and independence that is
associated with business. She finds herself in debt to Amy for
her servant’s countless acts of seemingly selfless loyalty. She
can repay Amy only by allowing her to continue to serve her.
The representation of Roxana as a woman amassing wealth,
calculating her earnings, and discussing interest is a fiction
that effectively sutures over yet another fiction: that Roxana
can escape the cycle of the obligatory gift. Roxana’s
unwillingness to exchange her wealth means that the gifts she
receives pile up and are not used: they represent a surplus,
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thereby defying capitalist ideology. Capitalist principles are
guided by scarcity; gifts, however, are predicated on surplus.
Roxana’s relationships are based on the perpetuation of excess,
thereby creating a return that is a social relationship of
dominance rather than an economic relationship of equal gain.
Roxana as gift is forced to stay enclosed in her apartment, she
cannot perform other business with other men, and she cannot
profit from the gifts because she cannot circulate them. She
herself is treasured, confined, and a commodity in perpetual
circulation.

IV.
Roxana herself remains a fiction throughout the novel. She
imagines herself as an upper class courtesan, and appears to defy
the consequences of age and repeated childbirth. Because Roxana
does not legitimately own what she receives, but is rather in
debt, she must always remain in disguise. A characteristic
feature of the novel is Roxana’s self-division: her inability to
reconcile her growing bank account with her diminishing moral
ethic. Her narrative is endemic of the inextricable link between
women and gifts. The woman, in effect, is herself a gift-–locked
into a logic of self-interest and impossible obligations,
obligations that never can be repaid. Her capital, therefore, is
not hers to save and to invest but a gift that places her in debt
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to a masculine authority until she makes an “equivalent” return,
and thus her dependence on a system of gifts encourage her to
misrecognize her career as a courtesan as that of a business
woman. In the language of the gift, the woman is the ultimate
gift, staged as the object that mediates relations, ensures a
return, and maintains the circulation of goods. Furthermore, it
is her perception of herself as a gift that fosters her
identification with a counterfeit identity. She repeatedly
fashions herself into characters that men want-–she assumes the
form of desire that will make her self an appropriate return
gift. As Hummel notes, “Roxana will reveal in her story that she
is unable to create her own permanent identity despite (or
because of) the gifts men invest in her.”16 After the landlord’s
death, Roxana takes advantage of their supposed marriage
situation so that she can benefit as a widow. Roxana is far more
comfortable playing the role of the grieving widow so that she
can benefit from the death of her supposed husband, the landlord.
As a supposed widow, she plays at a role–-the independent woman–that she can never legitimately assume as long as her husband
who deserted her remains alive. Furthermore, when she dresses in
the Turkish garb at the masquerade, she takes on the personae of
the erotic, commodity-rich Far East, enacting in her performance
for the king both a national and a masculine desire: the desire
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to conquer the foreign and to consume it, to profit from its
exotic value. As the Dutch Merchant’s lover and wife, Roxana
appears to be to the mistress of astute husbandry, mimicking the
qualities admired and accepted in Dutch wives more so than in
English.17 Although Terry Castle claims that Defoe “stages the
masquerade scene as Roxana’s triumph–-as a validation of feminine
power,” I would argue that the Turkish garb, as well as the role
of grieving widow, astute business woman, and disinterested
courtesan, are masks forced upon her.18 There is not just one
“masquerade scene;” Roxana’s entire sense of self-conception is a
masquerade that disguises both her position as gift and the gifts
she receives as masculine manipulations of power. Thus, it is
even more difficult to accept Roxana as a wholly independent
agent when she is forced to disguise her past, her means of
wealth, and her own sense of personal identity.
The gift also informs Roxana's understanding of her debt to
her children. Although she is unwilling to expose herself as a
woman who survived through trading her sexual labor, when she
begins to feel remorse, she looks to the gift as a means again to
reconcile accounts. She finds her children and establishes them,
setting them up in business and trade. She must remain anonymous,
however, for many reasons, the primary reason being that she does
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not want her children to feel indebted to her. Although she gives
generously, she works not to interrupt the cycle of the gift by
remaining anonymous. Roxana, however, suffers from her attempt in
that she must disguise herself from her children at the same time
that she wants to reunite with them. The responsibility of parish
charity erases Roxana’s past as a mother, and her part in this
cycle again results in loss. Again, the logic of the gift
disrupts Roxana’s attempts to participate as an economic agent.
As discussed in the introduction to this dissertation, a
fundamental characteristic of the gift that allows it to perform
ideological work is the ability of the gift to disguise origins.
Gift exchange succeeds as a fantasy of disinterested exchange
because the processes of production and consumption seemingly do
not take place. Because Roxana embodies the logic of the gift she
remains caught in an on-going effort to perpetuate her
circulation as an object and thereby must deny the origins of her
wealth–-origins that are implicated in her need to remain hidden
from her children. The source of her wealth is constantly hidden
as her circulation between men is hidden. Her inability to accept
this reality is her downfall, because to confront her daughter
Susan would be to expose what she has fought so hard to deny-–to
herself and others: her subservience and dependence upon a
masculine social order. To avoid confrontation, she must get rid
of Susan. Roxana’s refusal to reveal the truth, and Amy’s
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decision to eliminate the necessity to do so by killing the girl,
are the final actions before Roxana’s ultimate fall. Instead of
providing a conclusion to the gift exchange process that has
dominated the narrative, the persistent necessity to deny the
obligatory gift as it keeps the narrative in motion ultimately
collapses–-for Roxana and for Defoe.

V.
Defoe’s own investment in the charitable debates of the
period inform Roxana and the problematic of the gift. In his An
Essay upon Projects (1697), Defoe advocates insurance and
friendly societies to provide for the poor and distressed. Later
tracts, such as Giving Alms, No Charity (1728), propose projects
for employing the poor, creating workhouses for vagrants, and a
“College of Industry” that would employ people from area
communities to work for and under the direction of the “college.”
But Defoe makes no pretense that his concerns for the poor are
altruistic. In the preface to Giving Alms, he claims his
proposals are for the good of the state and the positive
perpetuation of trade: “People make trade, trade makes wealth,
wealth makes cities....”(22) In fact, Defoe blames irresponsible
and excessive charity as “the foundation of all our present
grief” stating, “An alms ill-directed may be charity to the
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particular person, but becomes an injury to the public and no
charity to the nation” (296). Defoe maintains that some gifts of
charity, rather than allowing a person to reenter social life,
only encouraged laziness and vice.
Roxana’s declining morality is one consequence of the
excessive gift Defoe warns against. It’s clear from Defoe’s
social tracts that he recognized the motivation for giving as
bound in and by the expectation of a return. Roxana’s moral
decline is not a product of the motivations for giving but of the
obligatory nature of the gift and what excessive generosity
generates: vice and a loss of virtue. The landlord’s gestures are
clearly excessive: they move beyond moral imperative when they
become extreme; they not only sustain Roxana and Amy but allow
them the opportunity to live beyond ‘industry’ and to ascend to a
life of comparative luxury. The early scene depicting the debate
between Roxana’s relatives, then, sets up the duality that
pervades the novel: moral consciousness versus necessity; the
error occurs when the landlord lavishes upon Roxana much more
than is necessary to sustain her, thus creating an excess of
charity and in turn an excess of debt. Defoe’s attitude towards
giving distinguishes the “gifts” Roxana receives from those of
economic assistance that aided the poor, elderly, and orphans
and, therefore, the state.
The burden of reciprocity attached to the gift is narrated
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by Roxana’s in-laws in the debate about their familial and
Christian duty to her children. Following Roxana’s abandonment by
her brewer husband, her uncle-in-law and his wife debate the
advantages and disadvantages of charitable giving. Both recognize
clearly that giving entails both loss and an anticipated return.
The wife insists that taking in Roxana’s children will “rob what
is rightfully [their] children’s” (21). Her uncle-in-law,
however, reverts to the Christian view of giving:

by being

charitable to the needy they will place themselves in a position
to be “rewarded by God” (22). Both arguments rely on the
structures that inform the most basic principles of a gift
economy and invoke the dilemma that questions the
disinterestedness of any charitable gesture. The wife recognizes
that giving entails loss, no matter how kind and Christian the
motives. This is the very essence of a general gift economy as
defined by Mauss and Bataille. Knowing that Roxana is destitute
and the children without inheritance, she reasonably concludes
that their gifts of assistance will not be returned in kind. The
uncle-in-law, however, views charity in spiritual terms,
anticipating a return not from those whom he actually assists,
but from God, in whose name he agrees to sacrifice temporal and
monetary self-interest. Having already been asked repeatedly to
take over the care of Roxana’s starving children, the relatives
are forced to take them in when they are left on their doorstep.
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Roxana’s continued visits and her unquestionable reliance on
the parish of the first born to assist indicate that it isn’t
benevolence that is expected, but the fulfillment of a duty.
Defoe’s writings emphasize public institutions for the poor.19
Like his contemporaries, Defoe attempts to apply a logic of
equivalency to the workings of charity-non-profit making "gifts"
to the indigent produce a series of consequences--trade--that
promise a larger social return. As long as moral obligations can
be rendered in terms of economic exchange, charity and
benevolence can be reconciled to a capitalist logic–-charity
becomes a kind of investment. What the wife of Roxana’s uncle-inlaw sees as a too generous gift, Roxana believes is expected as
she views the family of the brewer husband as obligated by
kinship to take in the destitute children. The novel, therefore,
makes a distinction between charitable duty and benevolence. The
uncle and the parish eventually take the children through a sense
of moral obligation. This scene differs from those that represent
giving between Roxana and the men in a number of ways, but the
most significant difference is the emphasis on excess. Whereas
the parish and the family are bound by state and familial
obligation to assist, they do so only within reason: they give
the children what they need to survive and potentially to make it
on their own in the future as productive laborers contributing to
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the state. The perspective of Roxana’s uncle-in-law and the
representation of the Parish insinuate that those gestures of
charity that are a duty are finite. Roxana’s gesture of a
material return, however, is endless and leaves the rhetoric of
religious and state duty behind to invoke a rhetoric of sin and
immorality.
Therefore, the novel posits two types of charitable giving:
A charity that is a duty and an excessive charity. The novel of
accumulation by a woman forces her to trade in her virtue and
strips her of maternal bonds by obligating her to a livelihood
that is a debt. The excess of generosity puts Roxana in a
position where she doesn’t have to work but then her only means
of repayment are through her body. The language in the first part
of the novel parallels her diminishing bank account with her
diminishing health. In effect, she claims that the landlord
“brought her back from the dead”(36). It is safe to say that
without his assistance, Roxana surely would have starved. In this
context, Roxana’s career and economic agency are symbolizations
of excessive charity that corrupts the moral and economic wellbeing of the body and the state.

VI.
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Despite Roxana’s growing wealth, she continues to accept
gifts of money and material objects. While Roxana emulates
Defoe’s obsession with accumulation, she also reifies the dynamic
of the woman as a receiver who is perpetually indebted to a
masculine authority. Rather than acting as an agent, Roxana is a
gift that remains in circulation mediating sites of social
exchange rather than participating in equivalent transactions.
Despite her growing wealth, an economic return is not feasible.
As a woman who already is obligated to individual men and to a
system that places her perpetually “in debt,” she is not
authorized to commit a business transaction or to exchange money.
Although legally she can do so as a single woman, such actions do
not and cannot redress the fundamental asymmetry of female debt
and obligation. Her most valuable gift, which is simultaneously
her most valuable commodity, is her self. Thus, the narrative
ends abruptly as Defoe is unable to imagine a satisfactory
conclusion to an account of the gift that perpetually incites
obligation, or the fate of woman who as a recipient and a gift
herself can never give enough.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Property, Legitimacy, and Socioeconomic Debt:
The Misrecongized Gift in Tom Jones
I.
In Book III of Henry Fielding’s Tom Jones: The History of a
Foundling (1749), Tom sells a horse that was originally a gift
from Squire Allworthy and uses the profits to assist the fired
Gamekeeper Black George and his starving family. Tom parts with
his horse, in which he took “more Pleasure in feeding..., than in
riding...” (94) in order to alleviate “all the Miseries of Cold
and Hunger”(94) that the family has endured.1 This scene is just
one of many that prompts critics to align Tom with a celebrated
spirit of benevolence in the novel, and to read him as one of
Fielding’s exemplary men of moral and civic virtue.2 These
critics have read Tom’s generosity as an indication of his innate
goodness. Indeed, throughout the novel readers are reminded of
Tom’s “princely qualities,”3 despite his adolescent
1

Henry Fielding, Tom Jones: The History of a Foundling, ed. Sheridan Baker, (New York: W. W. Norton
& Company, 1995). Subsequent references are to this edition.
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Critical Edition,ed. Sheridan Baker, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1995), 675-677, 676.
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transgressions and London affair with Lady Bellaston, by his
extended and seemingly unmotivated generosity–-not only to his
superiors, notably Allworthy, in forms of perpetual gratitude,
but also to those below him and to those he does not even know–Tom assists financially at least five people during the course of
the novel. Maaja A.Stewart claims that Tom’s generosity to Black
George and later to others arises from “a naturally noble nature”
and that “he gratifies himself by gratifying those he loves.”4 In
a similar vein, Liz Bellamy identifies Tom’s indiscriminate
generosity throughout the novel as “a natural impulse, an openhearted charity and benevolence, [free] from hypocrisy....”5 As
Bellamy notes, “While the narrator enjoins us to prudence, the
narrative points out benevolence as the most reliable code of
personal conduct.”6 Moreover, Kenneth Rexroth reads Tom’s
“generosity of soul” as the defining feature of his
“gentlemanliness,” which determines the events through which his
“true heritage is revealed.”7 For Stewart, Bellamy, Rexroth and
others, such generosity anchors the novel’s moral universe.8
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In contrast to these critics, I argue in this chapter that
like all the other acts of giving in the novel, Tom’s generosity
can be traced to the complex burdens of social and personal
debts. Tom’s obligations situate his benevolence within the
novel’s depictions of class privilege and virtue, and show Tom,
like other characters, acting on the assumption that he will
receive something in return. While the obligations under which he
operates as Allworthy’s heir--even after he has been banished-differ from those that torment Defoe’s Roxana, they nonetheless
situate Fielding’s hero within the complex economies of gift
giving that I have described in previous chapters.
Tom’s own explanation for his actions in the scene when he
sells his horse clearly demonstrates that he was driven to assist
the family first and foremost out of feelings of guilt. He tells
Allworthy,“I could not bear to see these poor Wretches naked and
starving, and at the same time know myself to have been the
Occasion of their suffering-–I could not bear it Sir, on my soul
I could not” (94). Tom’s explanation shows that he does not
assist the family simply because he can or because he feels
naturally inclined to do so, but because he feels he must give in
order to alleviate his conscience for having caused their
downfall. Although Tom is not entirely without compassion for the

Bernard Harrison, Henry Fielding’s Tom Jones: The Novelist as Moral Philosopher (London: Sussex University
Press, 1975); and Sean Shesgreen “The Moral Function of Thwakum, Square, and Allworthy,” Studies in the
Novel, 2 (1970) 159-67.
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less fortunate, he acknowledges that guilt is the primary reason
he sells his horse and gives away the proceeds. Indeed, Tom does
bear some responsibility for Black George’s fate because Black
George was fired for taking part in a poaching incident at Tom’s
encouragement, and then punished for allowing Tom to take
willingly all the blame. The hero’s guilt is, in this sense, both
personal and social.
In this scene, Tom’s actions distinguish him from other
characters in the novel--such as Thwackum,Square and Blifil, who
expect to be rewarded in Allworthy’s will--because he does not
give with the expectation of a monetary return; however, he
expects a moral return–-he believes that his good deed will
cancel or alleviate his debt to Black George and provide
psychological relief from his guilt over the incident. Tom’s
later acts of giving–-to Molly, Partridge, the highway robber,
and the Millers–-also reveal that his understanding of
beneficence derives from a strict sense of duty, debt, and
obligation, and not from innate disembodied notions of honor and
compassion. Tom’s repeated gift-giving is crucial because these
acts underscore the readers’ recognition both that he has
internalized a complex value system based on a sense of moral
obligation and that he recognizes that this obligation works in
two ways. As a foundling who is the recipient of countless acts
of benevolence, it emphasizes that his sense of unending
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obligation to Allworthy and to the paternalistic sociopolitical
authority that he embodies is open-ended–-Tom can never entirely
clear this debt of gratitude. And, Tom’s sense of obligation
demands that he act generously in giving gifts to those below him
on the social scale, both to alleviate his conscience and to bind
the Black Georges of the world (at least in theory) to a
hierarchical economy of privilege and patronage. In this sense,
Tom’s seemingly natural benevolence enacts a prolonged repayment
of debt by illustrating the foundling as naturally indebted to an
upper-class moral and economic authority. The illegitimate and
potentially disruptive figure of the novel’s foundling emerges as
the hero precisely because he recognizes his debt to Allworthy
and to the ideology that aligns property with moral propriety.
Thus, Tom the foundling ironically becomes a legitimizing figure
who willingly and repeatedly repays Allworthy’s gifts of
compassion and mercy by giving to others. He stabilizes the value
system that depends on the yoking of property and propriety by
reenacting through his willingness to give the upper-class moral
authority he assumes at the end of the novel.9
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In this chapter, I want to examine the emphasis on
benevolence in Tom Jones and the ways in which eighteenth-century
notions of generosity intersect with the period’s concerns about
property and ownership. My analysis of Fielding’s novel
contributes to the larger argument I have been making about the
widespread fantasy of the gift as a means of ideological
recuperation in the eighteenth century. Just as Saris’ and
Macartney’s accounts expose the work of the gift as a
misrecognized form of power negotiation, and the gifts Roxana
receives disguise her indebted and dependent position, Fielding’s
fictional representation demonstrates the narrative of the gift
as one that legitimizes traditional notions of authority while
perpetuating the fantasy of a society that, at least ideally,
engages in exchanges of mutual benefit and concern. As opposed to
Roxana and Cecilia, however, as I will demonstrate in the final
chapter, Tom Jones narrates male social and personal obligations
as cast in a rhetoric of honor and gratitude, a vocabulary of the
gift that reasserts the values and ideals of fading systems of
patronage and feudal relations.10
Drawing on Fielding’s philosophy of benevolence and his
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investment in traditional views of property, I argue that the
“subtext” of benevolence in Tom Jones is in actuality the primary
ideological vehicle in the novel. Gift giving in the novel
reinforces through a misrecognition of the social work of the
gift an upper-class moral authority. The gifts in Tom Jones
circulate not as gestures of social alliance, but as ways to
obligate recipients to an upper-class moral authority that in
turn preserves the prerogative of material property. As I argued
in the introduction to this dissertation, eighteenth-century
conceptions of property and benevolence are closely related in
the sense that benevolence ironically becomes a way to mediate
and secure property relations that favor the land-owning classes.
Because the gift always is a form of property, the ongoing
debates about charity in this period and the anxieties of
changing property laws offer an intriguing conflict. I propose
that these two seemingly antithetical concepts–-the strict
ownership of property handed down through a familial line and the
giving away of forms of property to strangers in the name of
charity-–are paradoxical concepts that are mutually reinforcing
and ideally mutually constitutive. In this sense, I suggest that
Fielding’s novel is as much about the ideology of benevolence as
a means to preserve property relations through adherence to
traditional moral and sociopolitical authority as it is about the
hero’s acquisition of knowledge and the inculcation of
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prudence.11

II.
To understand the dynamics of asymmetrical exchange in Tom
Jones, I want to turn to the work of Slavoj Zizek and revisit
Pierre Bourdieu. These two theorists offer accounts of this
asymmetry that can be juxtaposed to Fielding’s representations of
paternalistic exchange as the basis of a moral code of authority.
Zizek discusses the “misrecognition” essential to capitalist
exchange, and Bourdieu analyzes the concept of misrecognition in
his analysis of social practices. For Zizek, misrecognition in
exchange is the overlooking of the “universal, socio-synthetic
dimensions” of an act.12 For Bourdieu, misrecognition is a
collective act overlooking “imposed relations of kinship,
neighborhood, or work.”13 In drawing on both of their concepts of
misrecognition, I identify a double-misrecognition as the actual
practice that enables both capitalist and gift exchange. I argue
that misrecognition inheres in the socioeconomic dimension of all
exchange-–whether capitalist, gift, or barter. The exchange must
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be misrecognized as performative: each act must represent an
idealized social relationship that can be rendered in terms of
mutual advantages and reciprocal obligations. As I have argued
throughout this dissertation, gift exchange is predicated on a
necessary collective misrecognition, one that disguises relations
of obligation as selfless acts of benevolence, and in the
eighteenth-century–-the self-titled “Age of Benevolence"—-the
repression or denial of this recognition provides an ostensible
model for both social and economic generosity. As with the agents
who exchange in the marketplace, the participants in a gift
exchange must necessarily misrecognize the nature of the
transaction in order for a gift exchange to take place: once the
“gift” is recognized as an object with a material or calculable
value that can force a return of an object or obligation of
"equal" value, the gift ceases to exist, and the moral system
predicated on disinterested benevolence is called into question.
Critics have written a great deal about Fielding and his
ideas of benevolence.14

As Sean Shesgreen notes, “...the single

most important moral concept in Henry Fielding’s ethical thought
is the idea of benevolence or good nature.”15 Most trace
Fielding’s notions of benevolence to the latitudinarian
tradition, and see benevolence as underwriting his concept of
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good nature, a concept promoted in both his fictional and nonfictional works. Few critics, however, take into account that
Fielding’s traditional views of property and sociopolitical
authority seem to be antithetical to his understanding of
benevolence. The disinterested and selfless goodness that the
novelist locates as an intrinsic part of human nature that only
needs to be tapped to be put into effect is shown to emerge in a
select few: “Good nature is that benevolent and amiable temper of
mind, which disposes us to feel the misfortunes, and enjoy the
happiness of others; and consequently, pushes us to promote the
latter and prevent the former...”16 The “good man” is a
benevolent man; the benevolent man is a property owner.
Halfway through Tom Jones, the narrator gives the reader a
yardstick by which to measure a man’s good nature. He first draws
on the true story of Henry Fisher, who reportedly shot and killed
his friend and benefactor to whom “he owed his Bread” and
“considerable bounty” (260). The narrator asserts that no one
could believably be this ungrateful. The second example presents
an entirely selfless man, of whom nothing bad could be said. He
is perfect-–an extremely bountiful man who never takes credit for
his gifts. The narrator thus asserts that no one could be this
good (although he claims to know this man), and that this type of
man is so rare that most people would not believe he existed.
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Essentially, the narrator determines how we should evaluate the
poles of human nature by situating men’s characters and actions
within conceptions of benevolence, gratitude, and debt. In order
to assess a man’s value, one must determine his relation to
benevolence. Tom Jones revolves around charitable giving-–it
determines the characters, moves the plot, resolves tensions, and
dramatizes the paradox of beneficence in the period and the
cultural and material means of enforcing both moral and
socioeconomic order. Tom Jones demonstrates that order is not
necessarily maintained by a strict adherence to a moral and
religious philosophy but to a practical and material
understanding of domination and obligation.
Fielding’s emphasis on benevolence in Tom Jones
distinguishes a type of moral authority that is intimately
connected to property ownership. The cycle of reciprocity in the
novel both invokes a primitive economy through the idealized and
paternal representation of Paradise Hall, a representation that
seems to resist the inroads of capitalism, and shores up in the
novel a moral code that preserves Fielding’s sociopolitical
investment in a paternalist ideology. Even as Fielding satirizes
the self-interest that threatens or mocks such ideals of
benevolence through the characters of Thwackum and Square, for
example, Tom’s adventures in the novel ultimately validate the
virtues that Paradise Hall represents. As both a satirist and in
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the last third of the novel a sentimentalist, Fielding was very
much a man of his time.

III.
The surest way to preserve property in the eighteenth
century was to manage and often restrict its transmission, sale,
and distribution. The relationship between benevolence and
property thus tended, ironically, to challenge the concept of
disinterested benevolence itself. The ideology of benevolence was
clearly aligned with property and regulation, so that the fiction
of the gift-–the disinterested concern for the poor-–sutured over
the reality that charity was a way to monitor and control the
property-less lower orders. In this sense, charitable endeavors
can be read as policing actions, allowing those with the means to
give the authority to regulate property and exact a moral
obligation in return. In the words of John Hey, the charitable
institution should regulate property ownership and preserve the
ideal of selfless giving within the terms of those who give:
What we want is some contrivance which shall answer the
following purposes: shall leave property secure, or
even add to its security; shall leave men unconfined by
civil Laws as to providing any thing for the poor
beyond mere necessities; shall keep alive and nourish
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the natural power of benevolence, and yet prevent its
being thrown away unthinkingly or abused
ungratefully.17
Hey’s list of requirements calls immediately into question the
“natural power of benevolence” that he wants to secure and that
becomes the hallmark of an age that prided itself on the rise of
charitable institutions, such as the Foundling Hospital and the
Magdalen Hospital. As this passage suggests, the charitable
institution arises not so much from a disinterested concern for
the poor, but from the social and economic threat to the elite
that economic uncertainty and the population boom of the mideighteenth century posed.18 Hey’s dominant concern is property,
and he clearly indicates that the drive for philanthropic
institutions was perpetuated by the fears of those who were
vulnerable to loss, and who thereby wanted to ensure for
themselves protection from socioeconomic upheaval.
Rather than alleviating the hardships of the poor out of a
genuine concern for their well-being, then, many of the
philanthropic supporters of the period contributed in order to
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monitor the poor through judicious aid to recipients whom they
deemed worthy. As Lisa Zunshine points out, one the successful
campaigns of the Foundling Hospital was to allow subscribers to
observe the children they supported. On many occasions, the
visitors would criticize the hospital and suggest improvements.
Zunshine states, “...such civic-minded interventions would be
heeded with respect, no matter how high-handed and irritating
they might seem to the governors.”19 Therefore, gift giving in the
form of charity is intended to produce in the recipients
precisely the sense of unending obligation that characterizes
Roxana’s behavior. For Hey, however, the implication is that
institutional charity is also intended to foster a specific form
of gratitude–the willingness to work and to be forever thankful
for such hard labor. One of the ironies that Tom Jones poses is
that such unending obligation may produce guilt but it cannot in
and of itself produce individual moral reform. Fielding’s satire,
in this regard, is often directed against the comic
misappropriations of the language of unending obligation that
masks hypocrisy and self-interest.
As a foundling, Tom is hyper-aware of the socioeconomic
implications of his status and the potential burden his
illegitimacy imposes upon the community around him. At the center
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of the novel’s concerns with property and benevolence is Tom
himself, the foundling who threatens traditional inheritance laws
and who exemplifies the kind of social anxiety that led to the
Foundling Hospital, England’s first national charitable
institution. The Foundling Hospital attempted to regulate
bastards and raise them for a life of labor that would contribute
to the economic security of the nation. The legal status of the
foundling or bastard, as Zunshine has shown, was incongruent with
conceptions of traditional and legitimate authority and with the
potential for economic and social mobility.20 As the hero, Tom
shows benevolence and goodness while he errs, and he learns from
his actions to be prudent. However, in the framework of a novel
underwritten by concepts of property and benevolence, Tom’s
illegitimacy complicates traditional narratives of social and
moral authority assigned to those who gave charitably in the
eighteenth century. As a bastard, Tom owns nothing and is
unowned. In a period in which property is synonymous with
identity, Tom is crucially marginalized and seemingly powerless.
On the one hand, he can be read as mimicking a rising mobile
class through his peripatetic adventures and his ultimate
appointment as Allworthy’s heir through his moral superiority to
Blifil. On the other hand, he represents the traditional values
of landed property and authority associated with Allworthy–he
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seems to have an innate aristocratic nature as demonstrated
through his natural tendencies to gratitude, benevolence, and
loyalty. Certainly, we are given an ambiguous hero whose fate can
go either way: he can remain outcast or be incorporated into the
patriarchal economy of Paradise Hall. His generosity is a return
for the economy of privilege that enables Allworthy to raise him
as his own without any charge to the parish. In this sense, the
ambiguity of the foundling’s social position produces a narrative
of obligation in which the foundling repays society for his
acceptance into the community. Tom’s adventures on the road and
in London extend Allworthy’s example, and his trial is not so
much to learn prudence, but to enact the return of the gifts he
has received. This repost becomes evidence of his exemplary moral
behavior towards the upper-class and shows him to be worthy as
both recipient and benefactor.
The early scene in the novel in which Tom sells his horse
thus defines the crucial problem with concepts of ownership
involved in gift exchange. Tom’s sale of his horse points to the
central conflict in the novel: ownership and the rights and
liberties that attend those who own. The problem that accompanies
Tom’s charity and which provokes a “rebuke” from Allworthy is the
implication that the horse was not Tom’s to sell (94). While
defending himself, Tom repeatedly refers to the horse as “your
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present,” identifying the legitimate owner of the horse as
Allworthy (94). Thus, the horse is at once Allworthy’s possession
that he puts into circulation as a present to Tom, but is also
Tom’s possession from which he receives pleasure and
satisfaction. This confusion highlights the hierarchical
relationship between Allworthy and Tom: Allworthy remains the
symbolic owner while Tom is an indebted recipient of Allworthy’s
generosity. Thus Allworthy can accuse Tom legitimately of
ingratitude, of corrupting the gift by turning it into a form of
capital, a marketable commodity described by its monetary instead
of its affectionate value. As Sahlines reminds us, the spirit of
the gift insinuates that “what is one Man’s gift should never be
another man’s capital.”21 What this scene illuminates is the
relationship between gifts and property, and the complexities of
ownership that inhere in the dynamics of benevolence. Allworthy
retains a level of ownership over the gifts he has given Tom, so
that even through Tom’s acquisition of things through others
generosity, he has little authority over them. Allworthy’s
response to Tom’s gesture is interesting for the ways in which it
situates Tom’s generous behavior as both good and bad form.
Allworthy “now stood silent for some Moments, and before he
spoke, the Tears started from his Eyes. He at length dismissed
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Tom with a gentle rebuke, advising him for the future to apply to
him in Cases of Distress, rather than to use extraordinary Means
of relieving himself” (94). Tom’s very unselfishness marks him
paradoxically as both a generous and potentially ungrateful
individual.
Much of the satire in Tom Jones stems from the ironies that
exist within systems of debt and obligation. Tom’s generosity,
his very lack of prudence with money, distinguishes him from
Blifil, whose outwardly demonstrates his obligations to
Allworthy. Shortly after the scene in which Tom sells his horse,
the reader learns that Tom has sold a bible, a nightgown and
other items, also a gifts from Allworthy, to Blifil, for the
purpose of getting money for Black George’s family. Blifil,
recognizing the implied ingratitude and breach of propriety,
purchases the bible in order to highlight Tom’s supposed
transgression–appropriating a gift as property that can be
transferred as one’s own property or transformed into capital.22
As Stewart notes, Tom’s circulation of gifts given to him by
Allworthy “serve to associate Tom with poachers, wastrels, and
thieves in the minds of most who judge him.”23
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impressed by Tom’s selflessness, he still rebukes him, although
gently, for resorting to what he considers an extraordinary and
unnecessary measure: selling a gift. In contrast to Blifil, Tom
has a moral consciousness that sets him up as Allworthy’s
rightful heir. Tom ultimately owes Allworthy and demonstrates
this gratitude by perpetuating a moral economy that circulates
through gifts and debt that inevitably support the authority that
makes this circulation necessary. Although Blifil does not
inherit the estate that he covets, he is not totally disowned–Tom
agrees to help support him with a yearly sum. Wolfram Schmidgen
describes Tom himself as a gift that circulates within the
community; however, in the narrative of the gift it is not people
who mediate gifts but gifts that mediate people.24 Tom does not
own anything; the gifts that he receives own him.
As a bastard, Tom owns no property, but seemingly would have
claim to those items that Allworthy gives him. Yet, within the
logic of the gift, Tom owes Allworthy a return, but he uses the
money he gets from the horse and other gifts not to make a repost
to Allworthy but to extend another gift to a third party. The
issue of inequality disrupts the idealized operation of a system
based on reciprocal obligation. Mauss would have the gift
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circulate between the community to confirm this network of
reciprocal obligation, which Tom attempts to do by converting the
horse into cash. However, Black George then converts the cash
into capital to pay his debts. When the gift leaves the realm of
social mediation, it becomes an owned object that is appropriated
by Tom, Black George, and then the creditors. This transformation
also undermines Allworthy’s claim to the presents and the
relationship they embody. As gifts, they were affective gestures
to reward Tom, and, as such, can be defined only by being his.
Yet Allworthy believes he still has a claim to the presents and
by insisting that Tom direct cases of distress to him, Allworthy
reinforces his position as the wealthy property owner and
Justice-of-the-Peace who evaluates actions and characters and
determines punishments and rewards. In Tom Jones, the gift acts
as a substitute for the market, enabling a limited circulation of
goods and at the same time ensuring cohesion within the parish.
The gift in Tom Jones manipulates the emerging ambiguities of
property in terms of benevolence and mutual exchange that in turn
reaffirm relations of dependence and the rights defended by an
upper-class ideology.

IV.
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Tom Jones provides an exemplary representation of the
misrecognition necessary for gift exchange to do its ideological
work. Squire Allworthy’s unending generosity is misrecognized by
his myriad recipients in order to deny (to themselves as well as
to others) the obligation they have to his authority, both before
and after they receive his gifts. They also misrecognize their
dependence on his mode of administering justice. Those who come
before Allworthy exhibit an internalized sense of moral
deference, so that they offer in exchange for justice their
submission to Allworthy’s ideal of civic virtue, one which
privileges the rich over the poor, and the maintenance of
property relations over an abstract generosity. Thus, the
recipients of Allworthy’s generosity and justice are made to
reinforce the terms of their subjection.
As Zizek claims, the misrecognition of this fundamentally
economic exchange as a reciprocal social and personal sense of
mutual obligation is what makes the exchange possible.

The

characters in Tom Jones demonstrate this dynamic: the recipients
of Allworthy's "gifts," most especially Tom, misrecognize these
inherently asymmetrical relations of obligation because they
misrecognize the nature of their debts to Allworthy and the
socioeconomic order he embodies. Throughout the novel, the
ideology of domination must be misrecognized as the rationale for
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the affective and mutual bonds of social cohesion and even quasipaternal affection. This misrecognition is best demonstrated
through Tom’s repeated deferral to the morality and privilege
encompassed by an ethic of benevolence as a means to repay
Allworthy’s moral compassion–-Tom’s adoption of benevolence as
the defining feature of his identity is in itself a form of
return: it returns to Allworthy the moral character he demands
from a foundling who is to become the heir of his estate and
fortune. Tom’s understanding of generosity and giving situates
him as a representative of a class that expects consistent
returns from those who are dependent, so that by the end of the
novel Tom’s benevolent nature makes him the ideal authority to
regulate the parish and to exhort returns from the community
through the perpetuation of misrecognized gestures of natural and
selfless giving. Tom pays back his obligation to Allworthy by
learning to become his legitimized heir.
The relationships between Allworthy and his dependents
demonstrates the complex relationships between the gift and
property that come into play when seemingly benevolent exchanges
enforce an upper-class socioeconomic ideology. Rather than
allowing the recipients to achieve a sense of autonomy, the gifts
obligate them to Allworthy’s moral and economic authority. For
example, when Jenny is reintegrated into the community as Mrs.
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Waters, Allworthy’s initial plan for her finally comes to
fruition: “As to those of lower accounts, Mrs. Waters returned to
the country, had a pension of 60 l. a year settled upon her by
Mr. Allworthy, and is married to Parson Supple...”(640). Cleared
of the crime of being Tom’s mother, Jenny can return but must
inevitably be subjected to the traditional, moral order which she
originally was only too willing to escape at the expense of her
reputation–she is married with an appropriate income. The
recipients do not gain ownership or property–the circulation of
the gift requires a return and this return manifests itself
throughout as an obligation to Allworthy’s standard of virtue,
one that problematically is defined by ownership. Therefore, the
gift is not the exchange of property that allows an assertion of
ownership but a mechanism through which to police social and
economic mobility. The gift is a fantasy in Tom Jones because the
individuals who receive Allworthy’s gifts remain dependent, even
when individuals such as Thwackum remain resentful and
hypocritically complaisant.
Most critics argue that Allworthy truly is generous for
generosity sake–that he does not use his gifts to demand direct
and overt submission. However, Allworthy is also, in some
respect, a victim of the ideology of the gift. Rather than
mediating the gift exchanges, he himself is mediated by the gifts
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he bestows. His conception of generosity is formulated within a
distinct class and economic position that is not shared by those
around him. Allworthy believes that he is being just and
conferring his favors on worthy recipients, but often–even
characteristically-he is wrong. The most prominent of these
errors of course is his misreading of Tom and his unquestioned
trust in Blifil for most of the novel. He expects certain
responses to his judgment, mercy, and generosity and he reads
both his gifts and the returns he receives (or expects to
receive) as disinterested gestures. He remains unaware of the
plots by others, most notably Blifil, Thwakum, and Square. For
their part, the inhabitants of the parish misrecognize their
indebtedness: it is not to a specific individual, Allworthy, but
to a system of gift exchange, the process that binds them to an
economy of obligation because they do not have the resources to
engage in a market economy, own land and give gifts. Ultimately,
the gifts that define Allworthy’s relationships to his dependents
are not simply objects with value but legitimacy and moral selfidentity. As Mauss points out
the nature of the legal tie that arises through the
passing on of a thing is mythical, symbolic, imaginary,
and for that reason all the more exacting.

Since the

gift is an expression of human solidarity, and involves
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the imagined oneness of a community, the failure to
honor the tie is to reject the bond of alliance and
commonality.25
Because those in the parish are dependent on Allworthy’s
generosity for financial support and for the justice that
regulates their lives, they accept his gifts and thus, in theory,
accept the debt they owe him. The relationship between gifts and
eighteenth-century conceptions of property works in this novel
not only as a system of loss and continual circulation of goods
throughout the community through repost, but, ironically, as a
means of a securing, stabilizing, and increasing private
property. In this respect, Allworthy’s gifts reinforce an
upperclass socioeconomic order that obligates the lower economic
classes to a moral authority and asymmetrical social cohesion. To
recognize one’s debts is virtue; to evade one’s obligations marks
a surrender to ingratitude, self-interest and vice. Those who
merit his rewards are then given monetary gifts–annuities,
living, sums of money–but these are only enough to sustain them
within the class status of which they already belong. Allworthy
does not enable them to be mobile individuals in the new economy,
but restricts them to a tradition, carefully controlled economy
predicated on the Squire–the symbolic paternal figure–judging
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them worthy to receive their gifts.
In contrast to Thwackum and Square, Allworthy may seem an
ideal instance of prudent conduct, though many critics have
pointed out his gullible nature and quick, and therefore often
incorrect, judgments.26 As a Justice of the Peace, he is
authorized to distribute justice, pronounce sentences on
criminals, and display charitable leniency on those whom he deems
fit. Both Black George and Partridge are victims of his
asymmetrical justice. The narrator takes pains to point out when
describing Allworthy that
there was no one in the Kingdom less interested in
opposing that Doctrine concerning the Meaning of the
Word Charity,...So as no man was ever more sensible of
the Wants, or more ready to relieve the Distresses of
others, so none could be more tender of their
Characters, or slower to believe any thing to their
Disadvantage (my emphasis).
In fact, Allworthy is very quick to judge. When Partridge is
accused of infidelity and of being Tom’s father, Allworthy allows
him to plead his innocence. However, when Jenny cannot be found
to corroborate Partridge’s claim, Allworthy passes judgment
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quickly

based on his own moral standards and judgements rather

than any sufficient evidence:
Mr. Allworthy then declared that the Evidence of such a
slut as she appeared to be, would have deserved no
credit; but he said he could not help thinking,...she
must have confirmed what so many Circumstances...did
sufficiently prove. (68)
The ambiguity of Allworthy’s character arises from his gifts
binding him to a sense of social obligation rather than his
regulating the dispensation of gifts. At the beginning of the
novel the readers learn that Allworthy had intended to give Jenny
in marriage “together with a small Living, to a neighbouring
Curate” (36). This ambiguity is evident both early and late in
the novel in his relationships with the women of the parish, and
the ways in which women are judged by Allworthy’s moral rather
than legal standards.
The conflict between property as gift and property as
identity first becomes apparent when Allworthy applies the poor
laws to Jenny. When he administers the poor laws to Jenny he is
merciful and forgiving, and in fact, members of the parish feel
he is too lenient: “...’it was universally apprehended, that the
House of Correction would have been her fate” (41). However, at
the same time he insists that Jenny commit to a specific moral
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code, and she is removed from the parish. The child is kept and
cared for by Allworthy and thus he removes the burden of care for
the foundling from the parish. Allworthy’s form of justice
implies that he too sees his gifts of justice and mercy as
binding him to an obligatory logic of guardianship and moral and
political responsibility. His mercy to Jenny gives him the
authority later in the novel to reassert his authority over her
when she is discovered to be Mrs. Waters. The consideration that
he shows her demands that she demonstrate her submission to his
authority and thus justifies Allworthy’s later giving Jenny away
in marriage. Furthermore, at the novel’s conclusion he appoints
Molly as Partridge’s wife, and thus adopts a paternal authority
over the subjects of the parish by enacting a right “give” them
in marriage. Essentially, the parish is an extension of
Allworthy’s property and his assistance to its inhabitants binds
them to the dynamic of obligation by convincing them that they
are rightfully and honorably subjected to Allworthy’s power. The
fiction of the gift recasts this subjection as gratitude. The
Millers, for example, are thankful for the gifts because
Allworthy’s “generosity” disguises their true socioeconomic
positions.

In justifying her authority to regulate Tom’s

behavior, Mrs. Miller invokes her obligation to Allworthy:
Mr. Allworthy placed me in the House where you now see
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me, gave me a large Sum of Money to furnish it, and
settled an Annuity of 50 l. a Year.... Do not think me
impertinent ...if I beg you not to converse with these
wicked women. (491)
On more than one occasion, Mrs. Miller refers to Allworthy as her
Benefactor and thus regulates her household in London on terms
she believes he will find acceptable. Thus, his recipients see
themselves as an extension of an ideology of benevolence and
property-not as subjects to the rule of an authoritarian governor
but as children protected and rightfully admonished by a caring
paternal figure.
The inconsistencies in Allworthy’s judgments occur because
instead of moderating justice and exchange he himself is
moderated by it. The idealized reciprocity of obligation and
debt–and the problems of actually living up to such ideas–are
evident in the relationship between the squire and his adopted
heir. Allworthy gives Tom his name, he inculcates him into the
value system defined by propriety and asks to be referred to as
father. This relationship binds Tom to Allworthy, and Tom is
repeatedly punished for his transgressions that seem to violate
this relationship. Tom is exiled from Paradise Hall because of
ingratitude, because he fails to reciprocate adequately a return
for the Squire’s generosity. Allworthy insists that Tom’s return
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adhere to a specific moral standard–the same that he asks of
Jenny, Molly, and for which he ultimately condemns Black George.
Deference to Allworthy’s generosity is more important than any
material repost. Even after Tom is exiled from Paradise Hall and
takes to the road, his sense of generosity, obligation, and
virtue reinforce the values associated with Squire Allworthy.
He does not convert any of the gifts to cash but gives what he
gets from Lady Bellaston to others.
In an important sense, much of the novel explores how Tom
comes to attain and deserve the money and property that he is
always willing to give away. Tom clearly has an idea of proper
ownership and a value for property–he refuses to break Sophia’s
bank note so that he and Partridge can travel easier or rest for
the night or even purchase food. When

Partridge tries to

convince Tom to spend the bank bill instead of starving, his
pleas are “rejected with disdain” (459). Later, when Tom gives 50
pounds to Mrs. Miller to give to her indigent cousin, Fielding
himself notes the reader’s curiosity about the source of his
wealth and clarifies that the money had in fact been given to Tom
by Lady Bellaston. We recognize the strong moral conscience that
is presented as innate in Tom when he sacrifices all the money
that he has to his name, even while he wonders how he will get by
without it. Because Fielding identifies this money as a gift, it
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therefore represents something other than Tom’s property to give.
By giving away the 50 pounds, Tom circulates the gifts he has
received in his kept status-however questionable his sexual
behavior may be-to maintain the needy. Tom’s indebtedness to Lady
Bellaston serves the greater good–he is able to give to the
highway robber who turns out to be a desperate father.

Unlike

Roxana, who accumulates gifts but withholds them from
circulation, Tom practices generosity when he has little means to
do so.
Tom’s relationship with Lady Bellaston has been a problem
for critics; indeed, the inequalities of gender show Tom trading
his sexual labor for subsistence, but at no time does Tom or
anyone else–including the narrator–call him a “whore” the way
that Roxana is labeled by herself and society. In fact, Rexroth
sites all of Tom’s relationships with women as “motivated by the
desire to please or help” and describes his response to seduction
by both Mrs. Waters and Lady Bellaston as “the reaction of a
generous man to generosity.”27 While Tom and Roxana both are
obligated by the gifts they receive, their gender determines how
readers perceive them. Roxana clearly is consciously repaying a
debt with her sexual labor–she is an obligated debtor–while Tom
reinforces an upperclass morality even within a system of loss

27

Rexroth, 676.
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and obligation that prepares him for his inheritance of both
Allworthy’s estate and a paternalistic moral authority. This
point will be taken up in more detail during my discussion of
Cecilia in chapter five, but for now it is important to consider
that Roxana’s narrative ends in disaster, Cecilia’s in “resigned
contentment” and Tom’s with “the entire community praising the
day he married his Sophia” (641). In this respect, the narrative
of the gift rewards a male authority that can give away property
as a means to ensure socioeconomic stability, and chides female
attempts to exert authority over property. Tom’s return, his
sexual labor, is articulated as gratitude even in his
relationship with Lady Bellaston, while both Roxana and Cecilia
identify their returns as debts that never can be repaid.
In this respect, Tom recognizes that his relationship with
Bellaston confers on him an obligation. He consents to the
relationship so that he can get financial assistance and find
Sophia. As Spacks states, Tom’s exhibits “a mistaken sense of
honor and a genuine sense of gratitude.”28 Many critics read this
as one of Tom’s faults, but one that actually reaffirms his
status as hero because, according to Fielding, no believable
character in a history can be too perfect. However, his
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Patricia Meyers Spacks, Desire and Truth: Functions of Plot in Eighteenth-century English Novels
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 82.
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willingness to sleep with Lady Bellaston for money also shows
that Tom is aware of the intricacies of obligation and debt, and
the underlying interestedness of benevolence: “He knew the tactic
consideration upon which all her Favours were conferred; and as
his Necessity obliged him to accept them, so his Honour, he
concluded, forced him to pay the Price” (463). The obligation he
has to Lady Bellaston (like the one he feels to Black
George)differs from other obligations in the novel because Tom
often gives to others to whom he seemingly has no obligation,
particularly, the would-be thief and Mrs. Miller’s family
members. Although Lady Bellaston gives money to Tom, enacting
openly an exchange of sexual labor, she dismisses her obligation
to the poor and refuses to marry Tom. Lady Bellaston and Tom
engage in reciprocal obligation but the marriage proposal (though
false)exposes the fiction that Lady Bellaston is a giver
motivated by Allworthy-like benevolence: she may exchange her
money and her body for Tom’s sexual “gratitude” but she will not
marry a man without money or prospects. Lady Bellaston seems like
one of Hey’s beneficiaries of institutionalized charity–the gift
keeps the lower orders in their place.

V.
The final sentence of the novel focuses not on Tom’s
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personal education or on his knowledge of prudence and selfregulation, but on the passing of Allworthy’s wealth to Tom and
the continuance of gift exchange through Tom and Sophia’s
generosity. The novel, therefore, affirms a concept of material
circulation that is in fact static, that supports a traditional
status quo. The gift informs Tom Jones as much as moral knowledge
and prudence; in fact, the vocabulary and logic of the gift
underwrite the novel’s conception of morality and knowledge, so
that these are supplements to achieving and maintaining a
communal form of exchange that ultimately legitimates and reifies
upper-class authority through the ownership and preservation of
property. The final sentence of the novel articulates precisely
Fielding’s purpose of a peripetitic novel that ends precisely
where it began. The narrator states of Tom and Sophia,
And such is their Condescension, their Indulgence, and
their Beneficence to those below them, that there is
not a single neighbor, a Tenant, or a Servant who doth
not most gratefully bless the Day when Mr. Jones was
married to his Sophia. (641)
The satisfactory conclusion is dependent upon the reassertion of
the divide between those who give and those who receive. While
Tom has learned to mediate his vices through the lesson of
prudence, the community is sealed by the comfort that Tom and
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Sophia are the generous authorities of the parish. However, the
final sentence throws these concerns into relief as the real
issue–one of ownership of property and the right to give it
away–is reconciled by Tom’s assuming the crucial role of the
generous squire.
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CHAPTER FIVE
‘Her Gift Was Compelled’:
Gender and the Failure of the ‘Gift’ in Cecilia
I.
Throughout the first half of Frances Burney’s Cecilia; or
Memoirs of an Heiress (1782), the heroine engages in what she
believes are disinterested acts of generosity.

Orphaned, single,

and heiress to a large estate, Cecilia adopts a sense of fiscal
and moral agency as she awaits her twenty-first birthday.
Although legally under the authority of three guardians, she
considers her money hers to spend and regards herself as “an
agent of Charity, and already in idea anticipated the rewards of
a good and faithful delegate...”(1:52).1

Cecilia’s scheme for

happiness through philanthropy arises from her almost immediate
dissatisfaction with her life in London and in the Harrel
household.

Unable to find in the world of fashion the human

intimacy she had cherished when in the care of an “aged and
maternal counselor” (1:6), she commits herself to acts of

1

Frances Burney, Cecilia; or Memoirs of an Heiress, ed. Peter Sabor and Margaret Anne Doody (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1988). Subsequent references are to this edition.
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charity, convinced that they promise social and moral authority.
As Kristina Straub points out, Cecilia views giving as a way to
“enable herself to act and initiate rather than being acted
upon;”2 she truly believes she will succeed in making “worthy use
of the affluence, freedom and power” she possesses (1:55).

At

the same time, Cecilia considers her fortune “a debt contracted
with the poor, and her independence, as a tie upon her liberality
to pay it with interest” (1:55, my emphasis); or, as Catherine
Gallagher states, she believes that “she owes whatever she owns.”3
The novel, however, works to undermine her belief in unalloyed
generosity; she is both impractical and mistaken in her
assumptions about self and socioeconomic obligation.

Confusing

benevolence for “DUTY” and with “a fervent desire to ACT RIGHT,”
(1:55) Cecilia formulates a plan to give, and to give generously-a plan that, from its inception, never enacts the
disinterestedness she covets.

Rather, it entangles her in an

ethical dilemma of financial obligation, threatening both her
fortune and identity.

Cecilia’s intended acts of generosity are

revealed to be instances of coercion as she quickly finds herself
giving her money to the most unlikely of recipients, such as her

2

Kristina Straub, Divided Fictions: Fanny Burney and Feminine Strategy (Lexington: University Press of
Kentucky, 1987), 123.
3

Catherine Gallagher, Nobody’s Story: The Vanishing Acts of Women Writers in the Marketplace, 16701820 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 238.
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guardian Harrel, and the most unworthy of causes.

In actuality,

her acts of gift-giving and charity are compelled acts in
response to a paternal debt–a debt that, by its very nature, can
never be repaid and always is experienced as an imposition.
This chapter examines the intersections among gift economy,
paternal authority, and the patriarchal structures that inform
Cecilia’s understanding of the “gift” and its social
implications.

As a novel written by a woman, Cecilia depicts the

heroine’s relationship to the complexities of gift exchange in
ways that differ subtly from the analogous portraits of Defoe and
Fielding. The problems within the novel provoked by an economy of
gift exchange have both historical and theoretical dimensions,
and, in this chapter, I want to examine how the dilemmas that
confound Cecilia locate Burney's novel within eighteenth-century
debates about women's roles in philanthropic giving and expose
the problems posed by the mutual implications of gifts and
obligation.

The gift–particularly the heroine’s “gift” to the

Harrels, her acts of “charity,” and the love exchange between
Cecilia and Mortimer–sutures over her complicity in a patrilineal
and repressive economic system.

The novel’s representation of

the complexities of gift exchange exposes what Derrida terms the
“impossibility” of the gift and presents interested and
exploitative exchange as disinterested generosity and voluntary
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charity.4

My reading of Cecilia, in this respect, draws on

debates about the nature of gift exchange to contest arguments
that the heroine acts in accordance with eighteenth-century
conceptions of social responsibility.

Critics such as Terry

Castle and Catherine Gallagher read Cecilia’s capitulation to a
patriarchal economy ultimately as informed, socially aware, and
voluntary.5

Similarly, Barbara Zonitch states that “practicing

charity is the key to female self-empowerment in Cecilia,” (78)
and Catherine Keohane argues that Cecilia’s giving in the novel
offers the possibility of female agency through charitable
participation in the public sphere.6

Keohane states that the

novel’s focus on charitable giving signifies Cecilia’s “authority
to distribute money while single” and her “belief that

4

Jacque Derrida, Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money, ed. Peggy Kamuf, (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1992. See also the introduction to this dissertation, “The Impossible Gift in the Age of
Benevolence,” for a thorough discussion of Derrida’s theory of the impossible gift and its intersections with other
gift economy theories.
5

Terry Castle, Masquerade and Civilization: The Carnivalesque in Eighteenth-Century English Culture
and Fiction (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986), 253-289. Castle states that the benevolent projects Cecilia
engages in “have the status of voluntary acts: she takes ‘exquisite satisfaction’ in relieving others from penury. Yet
in light of displaced authorial intentions, Cecilia’s charities might be seen as enforced: they represent the theme of
repayment in its morally sentimentalized form. ...nevertheless, to the extent that Cecilia does begin to divest herself
of wealth, she prefigures her later acts of voluntary self-impoverishment....” Gallagher, 203-256. Gallagher states
that “the heroine very gradually loses her fortune through a series of painful extortions. Nevertheless, each
expropriation displays Cecilia’s moral consciousness, that is, the consciousness that she is already in debt.”
6

Barbara Zonitch, Familar Violence: Gender and Social Upheaval in the Novels of Frances Burney
(Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1997), 78. Catherine Keohane, “‘Too Neat for a Beggar,’ Charity and Debt
in Burney’s Cecilia,” Studies in the Novel, vol. 33 (winter 2001): 379-401.
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she has a right to choose what to do with it.”7

Despite the overt

connections in the novel among violence, coercion, and giving,
Keohane and others align all of Cecilia’s acts of giving with a
“traditional model of hospitality” and responsible charity.8
That is, they hold open the possibility of the disinterested gift
as an alternative–even if only an idealized one–to an
exploitative, masculinist, and capitalist economy.

In countering

this reading, I examine scenes in the novel that expose the
impossibility of the gift and the limitations of female agency
even within networks of charity and social duty. Specifically,
Cecilia’s appearance at the masquerade, her relationship with Mr.
Harrel and her other guardians, and the consequences of her
courtship and marriage with Mortimer demonstrate ways in which
women are compelled to assume a socioeconomic identity that
allows them temporarily to act as though their giving can suspend
or somehow transcend the inequalities of a male-dominated
economic system.
To understand how Cecilia forms her assumptions about her
social and familial obligations to give and the ways in which
these assumptions are defeated, it is helpful to understand the
status of women’s charity in the eighteenth century.

7

Keohane, 383.

8

Ibid, 384.
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this essay discusses the work of the gift within interpersonal
relationships rather than within the institutional context of
public charities, such as the Foundling Hospital and Magdalen
House, historical conceptions of women within the discourse of
philanthropy inform complex, eighteenth-century attitudes towards
women and public activity, attitudes that reflect upon domestic
and affective relationships.9
As historian W. K. Jordan notes, the number of female donors
to charitable organizations in England rose steadily before and
during the eighteenth century.

However, the limited legal status

of women and their restricted involvement in public life makes
any specific number unreliable; Jordan observes that the numerous
gifts from women were "in all cases…credited to the husband."10

A

recurring problem is our inability to discern the extent to which
women were following their husband's or their family's wishes,
acting on their own, or having males in the family donate in

9

The relationship between gifts and philanthropy is complex and beyond the scope of this essay. For
studies regarding gifts and charitable exchange in the eighteenth century, see Donna T. Andrew, Philanthropy and
Police: London Charity in the eighteenth century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989); Margot Finn, The
Character of Credit: Personal Debt in English Culture, 1740-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2003) Beth Fowkes Tobin, Superintending the Poor: Charitable Ladies and Paternal Landlords in British Fiction
1770-1860 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993); Roy Porter, “The Gift Relation: Philanthropy and Provincial
Hospitals in eighteenth-century England,” in The Hospital in History Lindsay Granshaw and Roy Porter, eds.
(London: Routledge, 1989), 149-78; and Lisa Zunshine, “The Gender Dynamics of the Infanticide Campaign in
Eighteenth-Century England and Richardson’s History of Sir Charles Grandison” in Writing British Infanticide:
Child Murder, Gender, and Print, 1722-1859, ed. Jennifer Thorn (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2003).
10

W. K. Jordan, The Charities of London 1480-1660: The Aspirations and the Achievements of the Urban
Society, (London: Ruskin House, 1960), 353.
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their names.

The true status of women's charitable participation

and the gender politics entrenched in eighteenth-century
philanthropy is revealed in the complicated ways in which women
were both committed to and excluded from public charities.

Lisa

Zunshine notes that female participation was both crucial to and
problematic for one of the period's most well-know charities, the
Foundling Hospital.11

Zunshine observes that the support of

upper-class women in the campaign for the hospital was encouraged
and highlighted: “correspondence between the Hospital and its
Govenors attests to the crucial role played by women…in the
functioning of the charity.”12

However, she adds that by the

early 1740s "women ceased to lend their names to the public
support of the hospital all together."13

How and why women

resisted public acknowledgment of their giving remains another
key historical problem.

Ruth McClure suggests that women

withdrew from public support of the Foundling Hospital because
they were "...unaccustomed to the burden of governing a public
charity...."14

Donna Andrews, more pointedly, views the exclusion

11

Lisa Zunshine, Bastards and Foundlings: Illegitimacy and its Representations in Eighteenth-Century
England, (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2005).
12

Zunshine, 153.
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of women as enmeshed in crucial social, moral, and ideological
values:
...the absence or presence of female subscribers can be
taken as an indication of the “reputation” of the
charity, that is, of its supposed tendency to increase
or decrease vice while relieving affliction.

Both the

Foundling and the Lock hospitals listed no female
subscribers, though the former had sent a petition
signed by a host of noblewomen to the king, and the
latter indicated that they received donations from
women who had requested that their names not appear on
any public lists.15

These requests by women to remain anonymous indicate their
awareness that even ostensibly disinterested acts of charitable
giving come with costs, obligations, and consequences.

Although

women contributed to charities such as the Lock Hospital and the
Lying-in Hospital, the masculine and paternal anxieties about
female benevolence that women internalized dictated the ways in
which their giving was represented.
In both social and literary texts, women writers in

15

Andrews, 72.
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particular often take pains to present their giving as an act of
agency that reinforces, rather than usurps, masculine
prerogatives and paternalistic values.

As Beth Fowkes-Tobin

points out, women authors, most notably Hannah More, defined
responsible charity for middle and upper class women by arguing
that the traditional purveyors of benevolence, such as the clergy
and the gentry, had failed in their duty to attend to the poor.
In turn, these writers asserted that because women had "mastered
the microtechnologies of self-regulation, [they] could change the
hearts of the poor, teaching them to accept with humility and
gratitude their place in the paternal order."16

As Tobin's

analysis suggests, female philanthropy was tied to the
reinforcement of masculinist values, so much so that women's
involvement in the public sphere ironically was formulated as
rescuing failing patriarchal authority.

Paradoxically, in its

ineffectiveness, a dominate masculine ideology continued to
define social order by assigning a feminized moral authority to
regulate the moral economy of seemingly disinterested
philanthropy.

Thus, the benevolent agency that late eighteenth-

century women appeared to regulate in actuality worked to
reinforce the very system that limited their public activity:
their charitable aims and education promoted among the poor duty

16
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and deference to an exploitative and morally indifferent
hierarchy.

Burney herself knew well the middle-class conviction

that charity bound the poor to an ongoing debt that required they
accept their place in the social order.

In regards to the

orphans aided by the Foundling Hospital, she states "they were to
be trained up to useful purposes, with a singleness that would
ward off any ambition for what was higher, and teach them to
repay the benefit of their support by cheerful labour."17

As

Cecilia demonstrates, female benevolence certainly had its place
in the eighteenth century, as long as women’s charitable efforts
reinscribed masculine and hierarchical values.

Chief among these

values was women’s self-regulation of their own desires for an
independent economic agency expressed through such gifts.

II.
In addition to the problems associated with female charity,
the gift poses particular problems in Cecilia because the culture
the novel critiques through an emphasis on charity is one
dominated by public credit.18

As Derrida’s description of the

17

Frances Burney, The Diary and Letters of Frances Burney, Madame d’Arblay, ed. Sarah Chauncey
Woolsey (Boston: Robert Brothers, 1880), 135.
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154

gift makes clear, gift exchange is impossible because it always
is implicated in notions of debt and return. In this respect, the
conditions that define the disinterested gift cannot be
articulated without invoking a rhetoric of credit and the
practices that define credit relations:
For there to be a gift, it is necessary that the donee
not give back, amortize, reimburse, acquit himself,
enter into a contract, and that he never have
contracted a debt.

There must be no reciprocity,

return, exchange, countergift, or debt. If the other
gives me back or owes me or has to give

me back what I

give him or her, there will not have been a gift....19

The staging of gift-giving eludes the possible since the moment
the gift presents itself as gift it simultaneously is annulled.
Because it is necessary that the recipient not give back, it also
is imperative that at the same time he or she not acknowledge the
gift as such; recognition of the gift as gift implies a
restitution in that it demands in exchange a “symbolic
equivalent;” it “perceives the gift...the intentional meaning of
the gift...[and] this simple identification of the gift seems to

19

Derrida, 13.
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destroy it.”20

The gesture of the gift in Cecilia–for example,

her “loan” of money to the profligate Harrel–presents itself as a
paradoxical instance in the sense that Derrida suggests: “the
gift is never truly a gift but instead a symbolic transaction
that must take the form of the gift for it to be recognized.”21
The impossibility of the gift that Derrida identifies is what
allows gift-giving to perform an act of ideological recuperation
in the novel, one that is subjected to compulsive repetition in
order to be sustained.

For instance, in order for Cecilia’s

“gift” to repair Harrel’s economic disasters, it must appear as a
gift, but, in actuality, perform the work of a loan.
In both modern and primitive societies, the language of debt
and the implications of extended credit interrupt the idealized
gift process.

As Mauss argues in his discussion of primitive

gift economies, modern notions of credit essentially are
extensions of the gift: both distribute power and authority to
forge social relations, and both function on the premise that a
return is imminent and indeed due.22

Pierre Bourdieu also finds a

homology between the obligatory gift and modern credit; both are

20

Ibid, 13-14.
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Marcel Mauss, The Gift: Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies, trans. W.D. Halls,
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an “attack on the freedom of one who receives it....it creates
obligations.”23

It is significant that while Burney attempts to

critique a society that has become engrossed in an unstable
economy of extended credit, the gift that is presented as an
alternative economy is recast as credit and debt itself.
Consequently, in Cecilia the impossible gift reinscribes the
market economy of credit and debt even as Burney casts the
heroine as a rational and responsible heiress who identifies
wealth as an opportunity to mitigate others’ hardships.

Because

the gift is impossible, Cecilia cannot avoid being implicated in
a system of debt herself, even while she attempts to reconcile
her mounting loss with a benevolent spirit.

Although Cecilia’s

intentions are to assist the poor without bounds, her generosity
places her in precarious financial situations.

The power of the

credit system consumes her charity within an illusion that is the
motor of credit.

Just as Harrel can engage in an illusion of

wealth through credit’s legitimization of a delayed return,
Cecilia is caught up in the illusion that she can continually
give without receiving returns and still maintain her status as
heiress in control of her fortune.

However, her gifts come to

resemble in form and in rhetoric the credit system that pervaded

23
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the late eighteenth-century economy.24

The semblance of the logic

of the gift in the novel and the logic of credit in the
eighteenth century is not coincidental.

Despite Burney’s attempt

to posit an alternative economy of selfless giving to an economy
of consumption and credit, the gift merely denies the overt
recognition of a specific return within a given period of time.
In fact, the gift in Cecilia is a much more insidious exchange
than the often vilified system of credit.25

The eighteenth-

century credit system was predicated on the legal articulation of
the obligations entailed by giving and receiving.

On the other

hand, as is clear in Cecilia’s acts of giving, gift exchange
revolved around unspoken obligations mediated by a fantasy of
equality and mutual concern.

In this sense, the gift is a

disguised process and the motor of the exchange is hidden by
relations of friendship, kinship, and charity.

The dynamics of

credit and the gift are homologous except that credit is based on

24
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legal and compulsory practices while gift exchange is
misrecognized and the power relations it inscribes are disguised.
Ironically, Cecilia is no better off as a charitable giver than
she would be as a creditor.

The gift is impossible precisely

because it takes the form of credit that cannot be recognized as
such.

This is significant because by not recognizing the gift,

the exchanges that should empower Cecilia as both a charitable
citizen and compassionate friend are manipulated to increase her
debt to a patriarchal imperative.
Burney’s novel reinforces the homology between credit and
gift exchange, illustrating also the harm that can befall the
giver and the creditor.

The relationship between gift and credit

problematizes Cecilia’s understanding of generosity.

Despite her

intentions, her acts of giving are always accompanied by a
language of contract, credit, and debt.

While her generosity may

play itself out in her mind as a selfless gesture that does not
anticipate a return, the realities of late eighteenth-century
market economy repeatedly interfere with her good intentions.
For example, when she identifies Mrs. Hill as a worthy recipient
of her charity, she attempts to bestow more than she has
available (she has not yet turned 21 and is living on an
allowance), subsequently placing herself in debt through her
generosity.

Later, her gifts to Harrel accumulate to the point

that she must draw on credit, thus implicating herself in the
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credit system that has destroyed the Harrels: she now owes the
usurer and must borrow to repay that debt.

The inability to

distinguish between credit and gift is a central problem in
Cecilia because it both encourages Cecilia to idealize her
generosity while allowing the recipients to engage her not in
charity, but in a network of debt.
The impossibility of the gift means that there can only be
an account of the gift and of the desire that impels us to
mislabel obligations as gift, even if, as Derrida suggests, “the
gift were never anything but a simulacrum”: there must be an
account “of the possibility of this simulacrum and the desire
that impels towards this simulacrum.”26

Thus, in Cecilia, this

account must present itself, I argue, as a narrative of unending
obligation, as a narrative of familial and paternal obligation,
specifically, an open-ended debt to a patriarchal ideology that
ultimately demands the “restitution” of the female self to
paternal authority.

Therefore, while Cecilia’s gifts ostensibly

empower her as an agent in a feminized economy of charity, the
gift simultaneously subverts this authority because it functions
symbolically to bolster patrilineal succession and a
socioeconomic ideology based on subordination and exploitation.
By consistently aligning acts of gift exchange with scenes of

26

Derrida, 12.
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violence and extortion, the novel effaces feminine moral and
economic agency, thereby exposing benevolence as an inherently
feminine form of obligation to a masculinist symbolic order.

III.
The first recipient in the novel, Cecilia begins her life as
an heiress with a paternal debt: she owes an obligation to the
“Father” for the independence that the system of inheritance
allows her.

Receiving this gift automatically obligates her to

make a return because the gift ethic insists on repayment.

While

she immediately recognizes charitable donation as a means of
recompense, she unknowingly repays her inheritance in other ways
throughout the novel as those around her deplete her fortune
through the demands of social customs that she cannot resist.

In

effect, her giving consistently is compelled by the pressures of
a masculinist prerogative that regulates the economic system; her
charity is recast as a debt to a patriarchal ideology and repaid
only through her complicity in its networks of obligation and
privilege, as well as in a system of credit and payment
schedules.

Because Cecilia’s gifts of charity and “loans” must

be subsumed within a system of exchange that requires a countergift in order to prevent her from attaining the idealized agency
that the gift promises, the gifts are inscribed within a symbolic
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order and translated into an account of daughterly duty to the
father.

In other words, the “gift” is payment on a symbolic debt

to a paternal ideology that never can be repaid and which demands
Cecilia’s total submission.
Cecilia fails to recognize that her inheritance places her
in debt not to the poor but to the patrilineal structures that
define her social and personal identity.
never hers to give.

Therefore, the money is

Within the opening paragraphs of the novel,

we learn that Cecilia, having received 10,000l. from her father
and an estate of 3000l. per annum from her recently deceased
uncle, not only is “indebted to fortune, [but that] to nature she
had yet greater obligations” (1:6).

Cecilia is endowed with

financial independence, at least to the extent that the legacy
from her father carries no overt restrictions on its use—it does,
however, imposes on her the kinds of obligations to class and
gender based notions of benevolence that Zunshine, Andrews, and
Fowkes Tobin discuss.

Concomitantly, she possesses elegance,

liberality, and intelligence, commodities that should ensure her
success in fashionable society and on the marriage market.

On

the brink of maturity, however, Cecilia experiences a familial,
social, and economic crisis.

Her father and her uncle dead, she

is left with no male kin to authorize her entrance into the
world, to exchange her in marriage, or for her to repay through
her obedience to social custom.

Moreover, her uncle’s will
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inextricably links her patrimony to her social identity: a name
clause insists on Cecilia’s future husband “annexing her name” of
Beverly or the inheritance will revert to a distant third cousin
(1:6)–a restriction that ultimately will make the heroine’s
reintegration into domesticity violent and prolonged.

Bereft of

familial ties that would dictate her course in life, she finds
herself wondering not as her novel predecessor Evelina does, “to
whom I most belong,” but to whom her money, and therefore her
social identity, most belongs.
This identity crisis prompts Cecilia’s philanthropic plan.
However, as Catherine Gallagher points out, the novel asserts
continually the indebtedness of single women and demonstrates
that their socioeconomic identities are their only means of
repayment; fortunes do not belong to women but are “property she
holds in trust for her future husband.”27

This indebtedness,

though, does not enact itself in a particular moment, such as in
marriage, but is an ongoing responsibility.

The ‘impossibility’

of Cecilia’s adequately reciprocating a gift traps her in a
narrative that ultimately evades resolution.

Her “scheme of

happiness” ultimately is eroded by her perpetual debt. By the
novel’s conclusion, “the strong spirit of benevolence which had
ever marked her character, was... no longer, as hitherto,

27

Gallagher, 244.
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unbounded” (939).

Cecilia’s blunted spirit of benevolence

represents what has been demonstrated throughout: Cecilia may be
authorized to occupy a feminized space of generosity but she
never is authorized to act or to give freely.
The masquerade episode reveals early in the novel the
cultural conflict inherent in Cecilia’s social position as a
single woman and as an heiress with a name and fortune to give.
Her fortune and autonomy situate her as a culturally conspicuous
parodic male: her plain dress at the masquerade signifies the
complicated dual role that the title of “heiress” entails by
placing her simultaneously outside and within the confines of
traditional systems of exchange.

While she does not appear

literally in masquerade dress, the scene dramatizes the process
of unmasking Cecilia.

Almost immediately after her arrival in

the Harrel household she is thrust into a scene of
conspicuous consumption as they prepare for an “at home”
masquerade.

The reckless spending at the masquerade proves an

exemplary instance of the Harrels’ extravagance and prefigures
the pressures Cecilia will endure to give, donate, contribute,
and lend.

These pressures expose and eventually repair the

cultural indiscretion in her uncle’s will by stripping Cecilia of
her fortune and reintegrating her into domesticity as a wife.
Furthermore, the masquerade foreshadows the love conflict
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that reduces Cecilia by the end of the novel to a “dejected and
melancholy gift...”(623).

That her inheritance is, essentially,

Cecilia, an economic identity that makes her an exchangeable
good, implicates her as an agent of exchange--more specifically,
as an agent in her own exchange since her acts of giving have
direct consequences on her value as an object.

On one hand, by

presenting her social role at the masquerade as heiress without
disguise, Cecilia symbolically presents herself as a “gift,” a
commodity on the marriage market that inscribes her as an object
to be bargained for rather than as an agent who controls how she
will appear and function.

Because the fortune left to her by

both her father and uncle should secure a respectable husband for
Cecilia, her inheritance relegates her to the position of
commodity on the marriage market; she is, like all women, an
object of exchange, and the inheritance she receives assigns her
a specific value on that market.

On the other hand, the

inheritance enables her to give and embark on missions of charity
and potentially to subvert the narrative that would force her to
exchange herself.

Where her money ends up, however, exposes the

complexities that the gesture of the gift seeks to bury.
Cecilia’s economic transactions must necessarily take the form of
gift-giving as a means to deflect her participation as both an
agent and object of exchange in a repressive and competitive
economic system.

Through the performance of gift-giving,
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Cecilia’s role as lender to Harrel and philanthropist to the
Hills–distinctly masculine roles, as Zunshine and Andrews
demonstrate, in eighteenth-century society–appears as an
externally feminine form of obligation.

As a woman, Cecilia must

appear disinterested, even adverse to economic agency.

Her role

is not to exchange commodities one for the other but to be given
passively as the object, and the marriage plot eventually
overwhelms her schemes for disinterested generosity and erases
her charitable agency.

Cecilia’s dual role is ultimately what

subverts her benevolent agency.

Her gifts, both compelled and

seemingly given freely, actually undermine her authority over
herself and her money so that the generous gestures that would
give her independence work steadily throughout the novel to
position her a dependent wife.
Although Cecilia herself is a ‘gift’ to be given, the love
exchange between her and Mortimer becomes burdened with issues of
debt: despite the seeming equality gift exchange presupposes,
their love cannot be given freely and without incurring a loss.
As Gayle Rubin makes clear, in order to participate in gift
exchange, “one must have something to give;” however, women, as
traditional objects of exchange for men, “are in no position to
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give themselves away.”28

Moreover, the name clause in her uncle’s

bequest threatens the integrity of patrilineal succession by
disrupting familial and marital tradition.

Therefore, the most

important act of giving in the novel–Cecilia’s giving up of her
name–requires also that she give over her inheritance and her
fantasy of autonomy.

For Cecilia, the role of heiress not only

signifies her coming into wealth but also the agency she attempts
to assert through charitable donation.

In order to sustain this

agency, her husband must agree to take her last name of Beverly
when she marries.

Thus, the disruption of a traditional gift-

exchange ritual–the man gives his name, the woman’s father or
guardian a dowry–renders the fiction of exchange.

In the case of

Cecilia and Mortimer, the giving of one negates the possibility
of the other.

If Cecilia takes Mortimer’s gift, her gift of

money is revoked by the conditions of her uncle’s will.

If

Mortimer takes Cecilia’s name, then he does nothing but take, as
that familial signifier–his name–is his right to confer on his
wife only in exchange for her fortune.

Moreover, the act of

giving his name is an act of possession: to receive the “gift” of
the Delvile family name, the heroine must surrender to Mortimer
her social and economic agency.

The tradition of the gift

ultimately impedes the union and forces the most economically

28

Gayle Rubin, “The Traffic in Women: Notes on the ‘Political Economy’ of Sex,” in Toward an
Anthropology of Women, ed. Rayna Reiter (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1975), 173.
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transgressive act in the novel, the secret marriage.

This

dilemma reveals the impossibility of ethical gift-exchange even
at a contractual level when the partners clearly know their
obligations and have agreed to the terms.

There is no equal gift

exchange, no one instance when what is given by one is equivalent
to what is given by the other.

While Cecilia’s financial loss

resolves the ambiguity of her status by making her a socially
sanctioned wife, it is not self-denial that enacts the reversion
but the pressures of a patriarchal economy.

IV.
In a strategy that challenges the very nature of generosity,
Burney repeatedly situates her heroine in moments of duress,
therefore insisting her benevolent acts be read as forced
responses to paternal aggression.

Because the gift always is, in

Bourdieu’s terms, a misrecognition, Cecilia can never give from
the disinterested motivations that serve as her moral guide;
rather, the hostility, emotional manipulation, and selfdestruction that Burney links to the economic throughout Cecilia
prevents the heroine from ever giving out of an idealized
benevolence.

Rarely does she experience the anticipated bliss

that accompany her daydreams of charity: “...now she supported an
orphan, now softened the sorrows of a widow.... The prospect at
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once exalted her hopes and enraptured her imagination” (1:55).
Her gestures to the Hills reward her with only a brief sense of
gratification.

Instead, Cecilia consistently attempts to justify

her gifts while simultaneously trying to force herself into
believing in the worthiness of her recipients:
She had now parted with 8050l. to Mr. Harrel, without
any security when or how it was to be paid; and that
ardor of benevolence which taught her to value her
riches merely as they enabled her to do good and
generous acts, was here of no avail to console or
reward her, for her gift was compelled, and its
receiver was all but detested (271).

Each time Cecilia attempts to mediate familial and economic
conflict by giving over money, she invariably becomes the victim,
not the savior: “The soothing recompense of succouring
benevolence, followed not this gift, nor made amends for its
loss”(383).

Her belief that she gives to help others merely

masks the underlying corruption of the system which depends on
self-interest and productive exploitation.

The rhetoric of the

gift from Cecilia to Harrel succeeds in cloaking Harrel’s
manipulation of her compassion and over-zealous generosity when
he threatens suicide: “‘You have stopt me,’ said he, in a voice
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scarce audible, ‘at the very moment I had gathered courage for
the blow: but if indeed you will assist me, I will shut this up,-if not, I will steep it in my blood!’” (266).

Driven to

desperation by Harrel’s threat, Cecilia agrees hastily to do
“all–any–everything” he asks (266).

While she ultimately

reconciles her complicity in her own exploitation by describing
the exhorted money as a “donation”(270) and “gift” (271), the
transaction is nothing more than a paternal demand on her
economic identity as a means to redeem Harrel from ruin.
effect, the gift reproduces itself as debt.

In

Rather than enabling

Harrel finally to subvert the burdens of the credit system,
Cecilia’s generosity places her in debt and at the mercy of
others: “Cecilia turned from [Harrel] in horror; and with a
faltering voice and heavy heart, entreated Mr. Arnott to settle
for her with the Jew” (271).

By having to borrow money against

her own future inheritance, Cecilia’s gift incorporates her
within a system of debt rather than a network of charity–a debt
that Cecilia will discover revolves around continual loss and
ultimate subjection.
Both Harrel and Albany exploit the coercive nature of gift
exchange by insisting that Cecilia give while they themselves
refuse to engage in the structure of reciprocal obligation that
gift exchange entails.

Albany, with “vehemence and authority,”

demands Cecilia “seek the virtuous, relieve the poor”(68), but he
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fails to acknowledge that his idealized notion of charity
requires she get nothing in return, an omission that eventually
contributes to her financial ruin. He coerces Cecilia through
verbal assault and guilt so that even generosity becomes
exploitative--another gift that is compelled:
Thou hast lost a faithful old friend, a loss which with
every setting sun thou may’st mourn, for the rising sun
will never repair it! But was that a reason for
shunning the duties of humanity? Was the sight of death
a motive for neglecting the claims of benevolence?
Ought it not rather to have hastened your fulfilling
them? (746-747).

Cecilia clearly can never give enough, but Albany demonstrates
that her giving has moral consequences; he judges her moral value
on her willingness to give: “Frivolous, unmeaning, ever ready
excuses! ..what business is so important as the relief of a
fellow- creature?... again thou failest me?” (747).

Albany’s

rant shows that his investment in Cecilia’s charity is a paternal
and coercive investment and that her duty to benevolence is a
duty to him as well.

His insistence that she consistently attend

to objects of charity, even if this means she ignore the loss of
a close, maternal companion, emphasizes the lack of options
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Cecilia has as a wealthy and single heiress: if she does not pay
heed to her duty of giving away her money, then she fails both as
a moral agent and as an indebted ward.

Albany and Harrel,

therefore, succeed in exhorting money from Cecilia on the basis
of a paternal authority that can continually measure and pass
judgement on Cecilia’s moral worth.
The internalization of the ideology of the gift likewise
provokes Mrs. Delvile to pressure both Cecilia and Mortimer out
of trying to transgress the aristocratic rules of patrilineal
succession.

Appalled at Mortimer’s intention of marrying Cecilia

and taking her name, Mrs. Delvile accuses Mortimer of trying to
subvert this most valued of exchanges by threatening the status
of the Delvile name: “How will the blood of your wronged
ancestors rise into your guilty cheeks, and how will your heart
throb with secret shame and reproach, when wished joy upon your
marriage by the name of Mr. Beverly!” (677).

The construction of

marriage as a form of gift exchange ensures that the inequities
of gender exploitation appear voluntary and equally beneficial;
however, the gift does not presuppose equality, it simply
disguises inequality. Because this inequality works in favor of
aristocratic paternalism, Mrs. Delvile’s behavior demonstrates
the extent to which women must internalize the manipulative
realities of the gift.

On the one hand, the traditional marriage

exchange promises to preserve for the Delviles an aristocratic
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lineage.
Cecilia

On the other hand, Mortimer’s potential marriage to
threatens the collective fantasy that disguises the true

contradictions of a society that uses women as symbolic gestures
of benevolence.

As a result, Mrs. Delvile too must resort to

threats, and Mortimer blatantly accuses her of manipulating
Cecilia’s duty to propriety: “You will exhort from her a promise
to see me no more” (680).

While Harrel can use threats to

control Cecilia and self-inflicted violence to evade his
creditors, Mrs. Delvile relies on the gift to prevent overt
violence to herself.

Her involuntary self-affliction shows that

relinquishing the fantasy of the gift creates the potential for
uncontrollable and unwarranted violence towards women.

Without

the symbolic gesture of the gift–the collective fantasy of equal
exchange–the violent realities to which females are subjected
become real.

Ironically, Mrs. Delvile’s hemorrhage finally

secures for her, temporarily, Mortimer’s obedience.

Her attack

becomes a violent extortion that mirrors Harrel’s earlier
manipulation.

This time, Cecilia gives over her name and

identity to save Mrs. Delvile through the perpetuation of
aristocratic lineage, just as she relinquished earlier her
economic independence to save Harrel.

V.
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If in non-western societies gift exchange, ideally, was a
way to construct and affirm a variety of interpersonal and social
relationships, then in capitalist society the gift acts as means
to deny and conceal economic injustices that lie at the heart of
the social and economic system.

Cecilia offers a circuitous

route to blame by invoking the rhetoric of a gift economy to
deflect responsibility and disguise bad behavior.

The men

surrounding Cecilia, both her guardians and her suitors,
consistently are rendered impotent or infantile in their attempts
to perform properly in the economic sphere and to assure paternal
authority: Harrel is a spendthrift, Briggs is a miser, Albany,
despite his invoking of Christian theology, is an abusive
exploiter, and Delvile is a fading aristocrat who depends on his
son’s marriage to avoid slipping into upper-class penury.
Cecilia’s suitors eye the heroine for what she can offer in the
most basic form of gift-exchange–marriage.

Sir Robert Floyer

agrees to marry Cecilia in a deal that promises to bring him a
fortune in exchange for releasing Harrel from a gambling debt, a
debt he is unable to recover by any other means; her childhood
friend Monckton has “long looked upon her as his future property”
(9) and believes he can court Cecilia through the pressures of
debt: “he was glad in making her owe him an obligation”(438).
Similarly, the Delviles too depend on the tradition of giving the
husband’s name in marriage as a means of repairing their finances

174

and sustaining symbolically an aristocratic image that they
cannot otherwise support economically.
Just as Cecilia is read within the novel by fashionable
society as a female philanthropist who resists classification,
Cecilia’s guardians struggle with the burdens of masculine
propriety. Most specifically, Harrel attempts to hide the fact
that he does not have money by continually spending and publicly
displaying his diminishing and then borrowed wealth.

His

exploitation of the obligations of gift exchange that Cecilia has
internalized enables him to keep his creditors temporarily at bay
and to postpone suffering publicly the consequences of his
financial mismanagement.

His hollow promises to pay back

Cecilia’s “gifts” serve to invoke the gesture of the gift, to
imply a circular pattern of gift and repost, and consequently
disguise from his fashionable friends his inability to function
responsibly in an economic system that demands masculine
superiority.

The money he owes to the Hills, while an obviously

tragic transgression in Cecilia’s eyes, goes practically
unnoticed by Harrel’s family as the debt repeatedly is relegated
outside to the competitive economic sphere of legal obligations
and usurious interest payments.

Only Cecilia’s persistent

championing of the Hills’ cause and Arnott’s generous “loan”
eventually rights the wrong.

Cecilia’s repeated loans

demonstrate her investment in the fiction of the gift as a way to
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rescue a morally corrupt system.

At the same time that the

creditors close in on Harrel’s estate in an attempt to redeem
their loans, he uses Cecilia to redeem his character when faced
with bankruptcy and humiliation.

Harrel, who does anything but

give, finds temporary salvation in the practice of gift-exchange
as a means by which to deflect blame for his financial
irresponsibility.

The impossibility of the gift authorizes

Harrel’s repeated deferral of a return as well as his habitual
denial of the need to reciprocate.

Unlike the gifts given to

Mrs. Harrel–who is able to extort money from Cecilia on the basis
of a nostalgic childhood friendship–the gift between Cecilia and
Harrel is not between friends but between a daughter and a
father, between one who owes a debt continually and one who never
is expected to repay.

Cecilia’s money is not hers to give but

for her guardians to regulate and exploit.

Hence, Cecilia’s

“gift” does not arise out of an autonomous act that signifies her
agency in economic exchange but rather as the payment of an openended debt concealed as both a loan and a gift.
Likewise, Albany, who verbally abuses Cecilia into parting
with her money through gifts of assistance, is driven not by a
genuine sense of sympathy for the poor or a natural inclination
to benevolence, but by guilt.

After breaking a marriage vow to a

fifteen-year old girl of a lower class, Albany revels in his
newly attained paternal inheritance only to find later that by
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abandoning the girl he has forced her into a clandestine affair,
prostitution, and her untimely death.

As a means of alleviating

his overwhelming guilt, Albany converts himself into a
philanthropist.

But the purpose of his gift-giving is two-fold.

Not only does he attempt to rid himself of guilt, he also secures
himself in a masculine economic tradition as a giver, or as one
who has an abundance to give.

For Albany, gift-giving reinstates

the fallen into positions of power–determining who will receive
his gifts of charity and who will not–thus covering up his moral
and spiritual defects with an idealized masculine economic
authority.
Burney repeatedly aligns financial transgressions with
gender transgressions and deviations within gendered spaces.

The

heroine’s coerced gifts draw Cecilia into the contemporary
dialogue concerning female value and domesticity that pervaded
the eighteenth-century conduct books.

By having the spendthrift

Harrel implicate Mrs. Harrel in the indulgence which led to their
ruin, Burney offers an account not only of the dissipated male
but of the irresponsible domestic woman.

Harrel is shown

attempting to mitigate his own poor judgment by blaming his wife
for ill-managing the domestic economy.

As Nancy Armstrong

explains, late eighteenth-century conduct books repeatedly
located the domestic woman’s ability to manage the household
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economy as the primary factor in determining her value.29

While

the husband’s role was to bring in capital, the woman’s role was
to regulate it, thus adding value to his labors of accumulation.
Although Mrs. Harrel follows her husband’s profligate lead, her
spending is a transgression of cultural expectations.

Her

husband’s participation in the economic sphere is a distinctly
male activity while her disregard for financial moderation stands
out as a violation within the private sphere, a violation her
husband can justifiably condemn:
A good wife perhaps might have saved me,--mine, I thank
her! tried not. Disengaged from me and my affairs, her
own pleasure and amusements have occupied her solely.
Dreadful will be the catastrophe she will see to-night;
let her bring it home, and live better (431).

In his own mind and within the code of eighteenth-century
domesticity, Harrel rightly targets Mrs. Harrel as having ruined
him by neglecting her wifely duty.

It is not surprising,

therefore, that Harrel looks to Cecilia for recourse as the
creditors close in.

He immediately recognizes Cecilia as both an

economic and domestic asset.

29

Early in the novel, she stands out

Nancy Armstrong, Desire and Domestic Fiction: A Political History of the Novel (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1989).
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as a voice of reason directly in opposition to Mrs. Harrel.

All

too quickly, however, Cecilia’s role as a financially independent
woman becomes a way to manage not just Harrel’s economic crises
but his crisis of identity.

His inability to give in any

exchange, whether it be the repayment of a debt or the
reciprocation of a gift, ultimately emasculates him.

As merely a

receiver, Harrel is powerless in the system and only the
heroine’s money enables him to perform his social role of the
wealthy male who controls and manipulates money–a role that must
publicly disguise the loan as a gift, even as it forces Cecilia
into debt.

VI.
Benevolence in Cecilia becomes a form of social obligation,
a demand on one’s personal and socioeconomic identity.

The work

of Cecilia is to take back what belonged to the father and insist
on a return with interest, the added value the daughter has
acquired as an heiress.

Thus, the first half of the novel

extorts her money and the second half her independence.

Cecilia

is an heiress only because there is a failure in the male line:
there are no male heirs to inherit her father’s and uncle’s
estates so it goes to Cecilia only by default and only
temporarily–her inheritance, in effect, is a loan. While the

179

reinstatement of Cecilia into a domestic space seemingly
nullifies her father’s and uncle’s gifts, these gifts ironically
secure patriarchal order.

The novel unmasks the paternal gift as

a loan that eventually must be paid back to her husband’s family.
While the route is circuitous, what rightly belongs to the Father
returns to the Father: Cecilia’s inheritance pays for Harrel’s
loses, repairs the capitalist oversight that renders the Hills at
Harrel’s mercy, and transfers the Beverly name and fortune to a
distant male relative when Cecilia marries. Ultimately, Cecilia’s
fortune and identity are returned symbolically to the Father when
she is reintegrated into society as a dependent object.

Despite

the absence of a real father and the too obvious presence of
inept paternal substitutes, the Law of the Father systematically
reasserts itself until the heroine is properly reinstated into a
domestic role.
Before her reintegration into private life, however, Cecilia
suffers precisely for her presumption of economic independence.
Eventually, her own sanity is added to the list of returns she
makes throughout the novel.

The secret marriage culminates in

her complete loss of agency and her recourse to a socially
sanctioned authority figure fo help.

After running mad through

the streets of London in search of Mortimer, certain he is near
death at the hands of Belfield in a duel, she loses her purse and
is taken in by the owners of a pawnshop.

Her crazed, amnesic,
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and penniless state is a precise metaphor for the dependent
condition of married women and the asymmetrical nature of the
gift.

While the fiction of the gift implies equality, Cecilia’s

marriage shows clearly that gift exchange in fact takes from
women their social identity and potential independence without a
sufficient return: “No one will save me now! I am married, and no
one will listen to me! ill were the auspices under which I gave
my hand. Oh it was a work of darkness, unacceptable and
offensive” (903).

Cecilia’s loss of sanity, as Gray-Cutting

notes, coincides with a promotion of her own self-interest: her
commitment to Mortimer in a marriage disproved of by her
guardians and his parents.

The “ruling order of reason” is

obscured when Cecilia strays from the “female standard of
benevolence and self-sacrifice” that is demanded as the only
appropriate female passion (40).

Even after she is rescued by

Albany and returned to the paternalist fold, she continues to pay
interest on her debt; she must disguise her passion in the
“transparency of sincerity and care,” (40) living a domestic life
that is “imperfect” and only with “cheerful resignation” (941).
If the partners in a gift exchange, as I have argued in my
chapters on foreign trade, Roxana, and Tom Jones, forge complex
familial, economic, and political relationships, then intergender giving should result in the securing of male/female
relations, most especially if it is a woman who gives.

The
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inherent refusal of the economic system to acknowledge feminine
agency in transactions calls into question the very relations the
gift supposedly affirms.

Thus, despite the tendency on the part

of early modern economic theory to feminize gift exchange, the
gift ultimately maintains a patrilineal and repressive economic
system.30

Clearly, Cecilia’s gifts do little to seal a bond

between herself and her male guardians or to change the lives of
the lower and middle-class objects of her charity.

In fact, the

gifts further alienate Cecilia while solidifying the symbolic
paternal authority of the males surrounding her.

As a result,

her acts of gift-giving appear not as moments of disinterested
generosity but as instances of the coercion that redeems an
ideology of crass economic self-interest under the rubric of
symbolic familial obligation and gendered authority.

The

ultimate gift, the debt that Cecilia must pay, forces her to
surrender her fortune, sanity, and social identity.

The demands

of the male recipients are finally insatiable: the female self is
the gift, who in marriage and domesticity, must keep on giving.

30

For analyses of the gift and feminine economy see Helen Cixous, “Sorties: Out and Out: Attacks/Ways
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